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ABSTRACT
“CHOOSE YOUR WORDS”: REFINING WHAT COUNTS AS
MATHEMATICAL DISCOURSE IN STUDENTS’
NEGOTIATION OF MEANING FOR RATE OF
CHANGE OF VOLUME

Christine Johnson
Department of Mathematics Education
Master of Arts

The purpose of this study is to describe how university honors calculus students
negotiate meaning and language for conceptually important ideas through mathematical
discourse. Mathematical discourse has been recognized as an important topic by
mathematics education researchers of various theoretical perspectives. This study is
written from a perspective that merges symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969) with
personal agency (Walter & Gerson, 2007) to assert that human choice reflects, but is not
determined by, meanings that are primarily developed through social interaction. The
process of negotiation of meaning is identified, described, and analyzed in the discourse

of four students and their professor as they draw conclusions about the volume of water
in a reservoir based on graphs of inflow and outflow. Video data, participant work, and
transcript were analyzed using grounded theory and other qualitative techniques to
develop three narrative accounts. The first narrative highlights the participants’ use of
personal pronouns and personal experience to negotiate meaning for the conventional
mathematical terms “inflection” and “concavity.” The second narrative describes how the
participants’ choices in discourse reflect an effort to represent both their mathematical
and experiential understandings correctly as they negotiate language to describe critical
“zero points.” The third narrative describes the participants’ process of mapping
analogical language and meaning from the context of motion to the context of water in a
reservoir. Analysis of these three narratives from the perspective of conventional and
ordinary mathematical language suggests that the contextualized study of mathematics
may provide students access to mathematical discourse if the relevant mappings between
mathematical language and language from other appropriate contexts are made explicit.
Analysis from the perspective of social speech (Piaget 1997/1896) suggests that specific
uses of personal pronouns, personal experience, and revoicing (O’Connor & Michaels,
1996) may serve to invite students to become participants in mathematical discourse. An
agency-based definition of mathematical discourse is suggested for application in
research and practice.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
A class of university honors calculus students was asked to draw conclusions
about the quantity of water in the Quabbin Reservoir in Massachusetts, given qualitative
graphs of the inflow and outflow of water in the reservoir over the period of one year
(Figure 1, Hughes-Hallett et al., 1994, p.325).

Figure 1. Graphs of inflow and outflow for the Quabbin Reservoir.
In the transcript below, one of the students, Daniel, explains the shape of his
created graph of volume of water in the reservoir (Figure 2).
58 (0:13:50.1)

Daniel:

So, it has a negative slope. And then it starts going
positive up to that point [July]. And so it levels off at
zero. Cause the v-, the v- [1 sec] I don’t know what
you call that. The velocity of the flow of the water or
something? The velocity of this is zero. [2 sec] Which
is correct on our velocity chart. And then it starts
going negative again. And it starts, kind of, sloping
out. And it has, its greatest slope is right here
[October], so that’s its inflection point

Figure 2. Daniel’s created graph of volume.
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As I investigated the mathematical discourse of these students and their instructor
relevant to the Quabbin Reservoir Task, I had many questions about their choice of
language. For example:
•

How does a term like “velocity” end up in a conversation about water in a
reservoir?

•

What is the “it” of which Daniel speaks, how does he know when “it” is zero, and
why is knowing that “it” is zero significant to Daniel?

•

Is Daniel’s switch between the third person “it” and the first person “I” reflective
of notions of personal agency and social speech in mathematical discourse?

•

What is the role of conventional terms such as “inflection point” in student-tostudent discourse?

In this study, I view Daniel’s statements above as a launching point for my investigation
of these and other questions as I seek to answer the research question: “How do these
university honors calculus students negotiate language and meaning for conceptually
important ideas?”
The transcript above reflects a starting point for three narratives of the negotiation
of meaning presented in this thesis. However, it would be difficult to characterize any
piece of data as the official starting point or ending point of the process of negotiation of
meaning. After Blumer (1969), I view meanings as social products, held by individuals
who are constantly revising and refining meanings for things based on how other people
act toward such things. As such, individual and collaborative processes of negotiation of
meaning for things are ongoing and intertwined. For example, Daniel had previously
heard the term “inflection point” in classroom discourse before using it in the transcript
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above. His current decision to use the term “inflection point,” and the way that he uses it,
reflects his participation in, and interpretation of, that previous discourse. By introducing
the term “inflection point” into the current discourse, Daniel reinitiates the social
negotiation of meaning in which the participants question, explain, compare, agree, and
disagree, reaching temporary closure as to how the conventional term “inflection point”
will be used in their mathematical discourse. The first explanatory narrative in this thesis
describes how Daniel’s initial use of “inflection point,” and the subsequent negotiation of
meaning, is reflected in the language of another participant, Justin, as he provides an indepth explanation of his perspective on the group’s goals and methods for the Quabbin
Reservoir Task. In the second narrative, I describe how the participants negotiate
language for what Daniel eventually calls “zero points”–points which are known to many
as the conceptually important “critical points” in differential calculus. The third narrative
investigates the participants’ negotiation of language and meaning for the analogical
problem solving process that enables them to not only view, but speak of, the rate of
change of volume as “the velocity of the water.”
Meanings and interpretations alone, however, cannot be said to determine human
choices in discourse. Rather, humans exercise personal agency, acting upon their
meanings and interpretations in ways that reflect the three explanatory and sometimes
contradictory factors of (1) experience and imagination, (2) social roles and
responsibilities, and (3) an individual’s concern for their own mathematical
understandings (Walter & Gerson, 2007). The roles of these explanatory factors, as
revealed through grounded theory and other qualitative research methods, are described
in this study. I also characterize emergent views of conventional and ordinary
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mathematical language and Piaget’s (1997/1896) notion of social and egocentric speech.
This study contributes to literature on inquiry-based mathematics instruction by
highlighting language factors involved in analogical problem solving. It contributes to
research and theories of mathematical discourse by providing an in-depth analysis of the
social process of negotiation of meaning and by suggesting an agency-based definition of
mathematical discourse.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Viewing mathematical discourse as a conduit to greater understanding of
mathematical meaning making and learning, I combine the perspective of symbolic
interactionism (Blumer, 1969), with the notion of personal agency (Walter & Gerson,
2007) to frame my analysis of the mathematical discourse of four undergraduate students
and their professor. After a brief explanation of the major premises of symbolic
interactionism and personal agency, I introduce two continua that I use to describe and
classify decisions made by these participants in mathematical discourse. These continua
are characterized by the extremes of ordinary and conventional language (Walter &
Johnson, 2007), and egocentric speech and social speech (Piaget, 1997/1896). Finally,
although my view of agency suggests that decisions made by the participants are never
completely determined by external factors, the perspective of symbolic interactionism
suggests that specific explanatory factors do play a role in the participants’ exercise of
agency. I define three categories of explanatory factors for the purpose of this study.
Why Discourse?
Advocates of the participationist (Sfard, 2001) perspective expound upon the
connection between thought and language with the “thinking as communication”
metaphor. Rather than view mathematical knowledge as an entity to be acquired and kept
independent of the context in which it is learned, participationists view learning as
synonymous with becoming a participant in a given activity. To learn mathematics,
therefore, is to become a participant in mathematical discourse (Sfard, 2001).
Aquisitionists, on the other hand, view meaning, thought, and learning as separable
products of mathematical activity. Nevertheless, most contemporary acquisition theories,
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including forms of constructivism, suggest that learning takes place as a result of social
interaction (Cobb, 1994; Jones & Brader-Araje, 2002). Therefore, acquisitionists may
regard discourse as a way of getting at mathematical meaning, thought, and learning,
while the participationist viewpoint suggests that discourse may be the very embodiment
of such things.
Whether these differing perspectives on learning are viewed as contradictory or
complementary, both point to mathematical discourse as an important setting for studying
mathematics learning (Sfard, 2001). Mathematics education researchers are coming to
recognize what linguists have suggested for some time. As Goodwin (2000) put it:
A primordial site for the analysis of human language, cognition, and action
consists of a situation in which multiple participants are attempting to carry out
courses of action in concert with each other through talk, while attending to both
the larger activities that their current actions are embedded within, and relevant
phenomena in their surround. (p. 1492)
Not only may discourse be viewed as an ideal setting for researchers to conduct
their studies of mathematical language, cognition, and action, but recommendations for
teaching practices have recently begun to suggest that mathematics may be best learned
through greater student participation in collaborative problem solving and discourse
(NCTM, 2000). Such recommendations, and the corresponding descriptions of ideal
mathematical discourse, are helpful, but are also likely insufficient for the majority of
mathematics teachers who are expected to implement such recommendations in their own
practice. If discourse is to play such a central role in the mathematics classroom, teachers
would be wise to have at least a working definition of what they think mathematical
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discourse should look like. As with many movements for educational change, the
majority of mathematics teachers do not experience such practices first-hand as students,
and therefore require rich descriptions that analyze rather than simplify. The National
Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM, 2007) has suggested that, “to effectively
orchestrate mathematical discourse, teachers must do more listening, and students must
do more reasoning” (p. 46). Likewise, I believe that researchers from all perspectives
would benefit from an in-depth discussion of what conclusions can be drawn about
individual and collective mathematical thought, simply by listening to students speak
about mathematics. The intent of this study is to describe what kind of discourse
mathematics students are not only capable of, but choose to, create and participate in as
they engage in the mathematical activities of explanation and justification. I also suggest
how this discourse may be reflective of, and contribute to, an underlying process of
students learning to think mathematically as the participants comment on their discursive
choices within the activity of justifying and refining their created solution for a
mathematical problem.
It should be noted that my intent in describing mathematical discourse is not to
provide teachers with an organized checklist or line-by-line script for an ideal form of
mathematical discourse. I believe that asking learners of mathematics to participate in a
scripted discourse for the purpose of building mathematical understanding may be a selfdefeating enterprise. As they become participants in mathematical discourse, learners
must have the opportunity and responsibility to act in ways that they believe will benefit
and reflect their own mathematical understandings. As Goodwin (2000) suggests, such
discourse should not (and I would suggest cannot) occur in a mathematical vacuum that is
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void of social context. Because it involves the exercise of human agency and varied
human experiences and meanings, such discourse may initially seem disorganized and
unproductive to the teacher or mathematician who has spent a large amount of time
learning how to present mathematical arguments in logical and organized manners. What
I intend to do is highlight the logic and progression of mathematical ideas that arise as a
result of the participants’ interactions and personal choices in mathematical discourse by
focusing on the aspect of discourse that I characterize as “the negotiation of meaning.”
Mathematical Discourse
Before progressing further into the theoretical perspectives of symbolic
interactionism and personal agency, I offer my working definition of mathematical
discourse, which will be refined and refocused through data analysis and the discussion
of results in later chapters. Concise definitions of mathematical discourse are rare in the
literature, and even the lengthier definitions often fail to explain under what conditions
discourse should be considered mathematical (Moschkovich, 2003). The NCTM (2007)
has stated that “the discourse of the learning community refers to the ways of
representing, thinking, talking, and agreeing and disagreeing that teachers and students
use as they engage in mathematical thinking and learning” (p.16). One with a robust
vision of “mathematical thinking and learning” might be satisfied with this definition of
discourse, but those who are still developing theory and practice might infer from such
broad strokes that mathematical discourse refers to “anything happening in a mathematics
classroom.” Those with opposing visions of mathematical thinking and learning would
likewise result in opposing visions of mathematical discourse. I believe that a more
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focused definition of mathematical discourse should be developed by mathematics
educators, one that both communicates theory and directs practice.
Sfard (2001) describes two factors that one must confront in becoming a
participant in mathematical discourse. The first factor is the set of mediating tools, such
as language, representations, and ways of symbolizing, that are common to forms of
discourse that are considered mathematical. Indeed, one of the most salient features for
recognizing “mathematical” discourse may be the presence of specific mathematics
symbols and terminology. Although the presence of mathematical terminology and
representations in discourse may be correlated with mathematical activity and thought, I
do not consider it a necessary or sufficient condition for defining mathematical discourse.
In fact, the mere presence of conventional mathematics terminology is inconclusive
evidence until further information is gathered regarding the function of such terminology
in discourse. The use of mathematical terminology for mathematical enterprises such as
proof, explanation, or generalization may constitute mathematical discourse. However,
the use of unconventional terminology for mathematical enterprises may also constitute
mathematical discourse. To determine whether discourse is mathematical, one must look
beyond the form of language to also consider function, or how language is used
(Halliday, 1978).
Sfard’s (2001) second factor for becoming a participant in mathematical discourse
is a set of meta-discursive rules that describe forms of communication that can be
considered mathematical. When participationists speak of becoming a participant in
mathematical discourse they refer not necessarily to memorizing a set of terms or
definitions, but rather becoming a participant in a cultural practice. Gee’s (1996), notion
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of “Discourses” (with a capital D) includes more than sentence structure and vocabulary
(issues of form), extending to “ways of behaving, interacting, [and] valuing. . .” (p. viii)
that may be considered mathematical within a culture. Following Gee’s notion of
Discourses, a description of mathematical Discourse would necessarily include a
description of mathematical behaviors, mathematical ways of interacting, and
mathematical values.
Unfortunately, “mathematical” ways of behaving, interacting, and valuing are not
well defined. For example, Richards (1991) identified four major domains of
mathematical discourse, that of (1) research mathematicians and scientists, (2)
mathematically literate adults in their daily lives, (3) mathematical print journals, and (4)
mathematics classrooms. These four domains of discourse embrace different ways of
behaving, valuing, and interacting due to their individual goals. However, Richards was
nevertheless able to identify these four domains of discourse as mathematical. Therefore,
one might assume the existence of an underlying definition of mathematical activity or a
common set of mathematical values. For example, Moschkovich (2003) suggested that
the values of mathematical discourse might include precision, explicitness, certainty,
abstraction, and generalization.
For the purpose of this study, I define discourse as connected acts of speaking,
gesturing, or symbolizing. By connected acts, I mean that individual acts are related to
past acts or in anticipation of future acts. For discourse to be considered mathematical,
(1) the content or topic must be mathematical objects, operations, or properties, and (2)
the discourse must involve mathematical processes such as reasoning, explaining,
conjecturing, and justifying. I impose two criteria for determining mathematical discourse
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because I recognize that one may speak of mathematical objects without engaging in
mathematical processes (for example, consider the Initiation-Reply-Evaluation pattern
described in the next chapter). On the other hand, a teacher may engage their students in
reasoning (a process common to mathematical discourse) about a topic that is not
mathematical (such as asking students to consider and explain why it is important to raise
one’s hand before speaking), and thus the resulting discourse would not be considered
mathematical. When I speak of mathematical discourse, both criteria must be met. For
example, teachers and students explaining and considering why the multiplication table
has the structure that it does would be considered mathematical discourse.
Meaning and Symbolic Interactionism
As this study focuses on how the participants negotiate meaning through
discourse, the meaning of meaning is also quite relevant. Terms used in discourse may be
considered to have specific meaning for, or to be interpreted in differing ways by, the
various participants in discourse. Although many constructs of meaning are virtually
impossible to observe, it is possible to observe vocabulary usage, or how a learner
chooses to use terminology in discourse (Dörfler, 2000). Therefore, from the viewpoint
of an observer of discourse, it may be also much more productive to consider meaning a
matter of function rather than form. The theory of symbolic interactionism (Blumer,
1969), which is described in further detail below, suggests that individual participants
evaluate the way in which they believe terminology is or should be used in discourse and
compare and contrast their own expectations with how terminology is used in the present
discourse. Thus, participation in mathematical discourse involves participation in a
negotiation of how terminology is and should be used. From my viewpoint as a
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researcher and observer, this negotiation of terminology usage in discourse is an
approximation of the negotiation of mathematical meaning.
The three major premises of symbolic interactionism are: (1) “Human beings act
toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them;” (2) “the
meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has
with one’s fellows;” and (3) “these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an
interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the thing he encounters”
(Blumer, 1969, p. 2). Blumer differentiates the methodological position of symbolic
interactionism from that of his contemporary psychologists and sociologists in two major
areas. Those two areas are, first, perspectives on meaning and second, perspectives on
human action.
First, the theory of symbolic interactionism is at odds with theories that suggest
that meaning is either purely intrinsic or purely psychical. The meaning of an entity does
not “belong” to the entity itself, nor is meaning purely dependent upon an individual’s
perception of that thing. Rather, meaning develops in the context of social interaction.
“The meaning of a thing for a person grows out of the ways in which other persons act
toward the person with regard to the thing. Their actions operate to define the thing for
the person” (Blumer, 1969, p. 4-5). Therefore, meanings are viewed as flexible social
products that reflect an individual’s interpretation of social interaction.
I might add that, while Blumer focused on the meaning of things as growing out
of how other persons act toward a thing, it is also possible for persons to interact with
things in a way that develops meaning. A simple example may be the meaning of a chair.
While one might observe other people sitting on a chair and commenting upon the
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comfort of that chair, this does not prohibit an individual who has observed such actions
from sitting on the same chair and, based upon their own bodily sensation, declare that
chair to be uncomfortable and choose to sit on the floor. Therefore, a person’s meaning
for a thing may also grow out of that person’s interaction with such things, as well as how
other individuals act toward those things.
Blumer (1969) further differentiates symbolic interactionism from other theories
of his day with respect to the principal explainer of human action. He recognizes that,
although his contemporaries may not disagree with his assertion that human action is
based in meaning, they often dismiss meaning as a minor or irrelevant factor when
explaining human behavior. The psychologists, states Blumer, prefer to focus on external
factors such stimuli, attitudes, and conscious or unconscious motives, while the
sociologists focus on social positions, roles, norms, and values. Without denying the
existence of such factors, the perspective of symbolic interactionism maintains meaning
as the principal explainer of human behavior.
It is important to note that I also speak of meaning as an explainer of human
action, rather than a determiner of human action. Meaning as a social product does not
contribute directly back to human action and society without first passing though the
channels of interpretation and the exercise of personal agency. According to Blumer
(1969), the interpretive process by which meaning contributes to action involves two
parts. First, in a process of self-communication, the person must indicate the object
toward which they are acting. Second, the person “selects, checks, suspends, regroups,
and transforms meanings in the light of the situation in which he is placed and the
direction of his action” (p. 5).
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For example, a participant in mathematical discourse may notice that another
participant uses the term “limit” in a very different way than that which they have
encountered in their own experience. Reflecting upon their own experience with the term
“limit,” and their interpretation of this new use of “limit,” the participant may modify
their own meaning to accommodate (Piaget & Inhelder, 2000/1969) this new meaning, or
usage for the term. On the other hand, the participant may assume that they have
encountered a case of homophony (two or more unrelated meanings for the same word),
and assimilate (Piaget, & Inhelder, 2000/1969) the new use as a new or special case. The
participant may also pose questions about others’ uses of the same terminology, avoid
using a term which seems to have ambiguous meaning, suggest alternative terminology,
or any other of a number of actions, each of which will likely contribute to further
modification of meaning for the term “limit.”
Personal Agency
This ultimate choice of how to act, although based in previous action and
interpretation of action, is determined by the exercise of personal agency. Although not
specifically mentioned by Blumer (1969), I believe that personal agency not only
explains, but ultimately determines, human action. Or, in other words, although a
person’s formative process of interpreting meanings may guide their action in a specific
direction, a person ultimately maintains the right to determine his or her action. Bandura
(1989) suggests that human agency is “emergent interactive,” meaning that action,
personal factors, and the environment influence one another in a process of “triadic
reciprocal causation” (p.1175). Ahearn (2001) gives a provisional definition for agency
as “the socioculturally mediated capacity to act” (p. 112). After Walter and Gerson
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(2007), I define personal agency in mathematical activity as the “requirement,
responsibility and freedom to choose based on prior experiences and imagination, with
concern not only for one’s own understandings of mathematics, but with mindful
awareness of the impact one’s actions and choices may have on others” (p. 209; see also
Levinas, 1979; Martin, Sugarman & Thompson, 2003).
Embedded in this definition of personal agency (Walter & Gerson, 2007) are
references to explanatory factors for human action, namely, (1) one’s prior experiences
and imagination, (2) one’s current meaning for the mathematics, and (3) the consideration
of the impact of one’s decisions upon others. As these three explanatory factors may
compel a human to act in various and contradictory ways, none can be considered the
determiner of human action. The capacity and responsibility of each participant to
ultimately choose their action is the single factor that can be considered the determiner of
human action. In other words, choices in mathematical discourse are determined by
individuals, although they may be explained by the meanings that those individuals have
developed for their experiences, the mathematics, and their fellow participants.
Some choices have greater impact on the resulting mathematical discourse than
others. One important choice is the form of participation. Although all are referred to as
“participants” in this study, some participants choose to participate in discourse in
different ways than others. For example, at differing times, some participants choose to
listen, some choose to question, some choose to explain, some choose to check for
understanding, some choose to tell jokes, some choose to laugh at those jokes, and some
choose to create representations. It is important to note that the choice to not participate is
also a choice that contributes to the resulting mathematical discourse. However, this
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study focuses more specifically upon the choices that may be considered active
participation in mathematical discourse, or the use of language and representations in
ways that contribute to the negotiation of meaning among the participants.
Two Continua for Characterizing Participant Choices in Discourse
In this study, the participants’ choices of language and non-verbal representations
in mathematical discourse are described in terms of two continua. The first continuum is
characterized by the extremes of conventional and ordinary language (Brown, 2001;
Pirie, 1998; Walter & Johnson, 2007). Conventional language of mathematics includes
technical terms along with their definitions and usages that are unique to the study of
mathematics. These terms contribute greatly to the study of mathematics as a social
practice (Pirie, 1998). Those who have appropriated the conventional language of
mathematics may use it to identify abstract mathematical concepts quickly and precisely.
Conventional mathematics terminology is often found in mathematics textbooks and
documents that delineate core mathematical standards for mathematics educators.
Mathematical dictionaries and glossaries also give mathematical definitions for
conventional mathematics terminology.
Although much effort has gone into the creation of conventional mathematics
definitions and terminology, few words can be categorized as belonging strictly to the
realm of mathematics (Halliday, 1978). (For example, consider the terms “limit” and
“set.”) While it is true that language does not have to be conventional in order to function
as mathematical, the value that certain communities of mathematical discourse attribute
to conventional language makes such terminology a relevant issue of study. Certain kinds
of non-verbal representations, as well, can be considered conventional within the realm of

17
mathematical discourse, while others might be considered ordinary representations
fulfilling mathematical roles in discourse. I do not see either of these extremes as more
valuable than the other; rather, I view them as filling different roles. Where conventional
language may allow entrance into specific communities of discourse and has been
designed for purposes of precision and efficiency, ordinary language may be more
appropriate for the process of “linguistic invention towards producing structures and
meaning” (Brown, 2001, p. 76; see also Johnson, 2005; Walter & Johnson, 2007).
The second continuum for characterizing mathematical language and
representation contrasts Piaget’s (1997/1896) notions of egocentric and social speech.
Egocentric speech is characterized as speech in which the speaker “does not attempt to
place himself at the point of view of his hearer” (p. 9). Children have been observed to
exhibit egocentric speech through repetition, monologue, and collective monologues.
Social speech, on the other hand, is directed toward a hearer. The speaker attempts to
determine whether he has been understood, or attempts to interact with others in some
manner. The speaker also adapts information in order to influence designated individuals
to do or believe certain things. Piaget viewed criticism, requests, questions and answers
as examples of social speech in children. Developmentally, Piaget believed egocentric
speech to be a precursor to social speech. Vygotsky (1986/1934) also characterized
egocentric speech and social speech, but suggested that egocentric speech was the
developmental result of participating in social speech.
Bartsch and Wellman (1995) studied the development of children’s conceptions
of the mind, noting that children under the age of three years not only described their own
action in terms of their own desires and beliefs, but were also able to explain the action of
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other individuals in terms of those individuals’ supposed desires and beliefs. Therefore,
even young children have exhibited the capability of reasoning and speaking about
others’ points of view. Wertheimer (1945) described how a twelve year old boy examined
a game of badminton from his losing opponent’s point of view, and redefined the purpose
of the game so that both players could enjoy the outcome. Wertheimer also noted how a
tendency to only describe relationships from one’s own point of view was reflected in a
working woman’s egocentric description of power relationships in the office where she
worked.
Wertheimer (1945) described how forms of egocentric speech may be reflective
of egocentric ways of viewing the world. “Productive thinking,” he suggested, may
involve “reasonable reorganization, [or] reorientation, which enables the subject to view
the given situation in a new and more penetrating perspective” (p. 124). As my interest in
egocentric and social speech is based in my efforts to better define the negotiation of
meaning in discourse, egocentric discourse, or the participants’ failure to consider or
adopt the point of view of the hearer, may not be productive toward negotiating
collaborative meaning within a group of students. On the other hand, forms of egocentric
speech may help individual students to refine their own opinions and meanings for the
mathematics by putting those meanings into words, and consequently contribute to the
social negotiation of meaning. Therefore, while I do not consider either form of speech
more productive or valuable than another, I believe that social and egocentric forms of
speech may serve different purposes in mathematical discourse.
I view these two continua (conventional vs. ordinary and egocentric vs. social) as
possible instruments for describing choices of language and representation made by
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participants in mathematical discourse. One might say that a participant in mathematical
discourse exercises personal agency in choosing to use conventional language or ordinary
language in either social speech or egocentric speech. However, this is not an exhaustive
list of the available options. It is important to note that I have chosen my two continua as
preliminary tools for characterizing choices made in discourse. While these choices are
ultimately determined by the participants’ exercise of personal agency, these choices can
often be explained in terms of the interplay between constantly changing meanings for
the mathematics, the language, and the various participants involved in the discourse.
Naturally, the definition of discourse as “connected acts” implies that previous choices in
discourse contribute to each participant’s personal negotiation of meaning, and therefore
can also be viewed as explanatory of subsequent choices in discourse.
Explanatory Factors for Choices in Mathematical Discourse
As mentioned before, three explanatory factors suggested by Walter and Gerson
(2007) for the exercise of personal agency in mathematical discourse are (1) experience
and imagination, (2) social roles and responsibilities, and (3) an individual’s concern for
their own mathematical understandings. I view these explanatory factors as representative
of three categories of meaning, and refer to Goodwin (2000) and Bandura (1986) to
further develop these categories. Goodwin states that although participants in discourse
may be participating in an activity with particular goals, they also exhibit an awareness of
the “larger activities that their current actions are embedded within” and the “relevant
phenomenon in their surround” (p. 1492). For our participants, the “larger activities” in
mathematical discourse may be the participants’ meaning for the social roles and
responsibilities that have been, and currently are, being negotiated through social
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interaction. Goodwin’s mention of “relevant phenomena” supports the category of
experience and imagination, as the participants build upon their personal experience in a
physical world to reason about mathematical concepts. The relevance of social and
experiential factors to all forms of discourse suggests that even mathematical discourse
does not, and should not, resemble the precise, definite, and context-free communication
of ideas that Descartes originally praised mathematics for when he described it as
“mathesis universalis” (Cottingham, 1993, p. 7).
Bandura (1986) identifies four “determinants” for language development and use
that are also related to the three categories of explanatory factors suggested by Walter and
Gerson (2007). Bandura’s four factors are (1) cognitive skills of the linguistic type
(grammatical rules, the ability to abstract rules from exemplars. etc.), (2) non-linguistic
knowledge (knowledge of the topic of the conversation, the ability to judge word
meaning based on context, etc.), (3) the complexity of linguistic input (which may be too
high or too low for optimum development), and (4) interpersonal factors (such as an
individual’s wishes to engage in social interaction or influence the social environment
and that individual’s interpretation of the results of his or her attempts to use language to
do so). These factors may come to play in various combinations to explain the nature of
the choices made in mathematical discourse. For example, although a mathematician may
have been exposed to primarily conventional language in his mathematical career
(complexity of linguistic input), he would be considered wise and pragmatic if he
adjusted his language for a general interest lecture on number theory (interpersonal
factors). An audience member at this lecture may be particularly familiar with a context
in which a number theory problem is posed (non-linguistic knowledge), and therefore
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engage in productive mathematical discourse with the mathematician which provides that
mathematician with valuable insight for a challenging problem.
To align Bandura’s (1986) four factors with three explaining factors gleaned from
Walter and Gerson (2007), I view Bandura’s description of “non-linguistic knowledge”
as a possible contributor to both the first factor of experience and imagination, and the
third factor of an individual’s understanding of the mathematics. For example, the use of
reasoning tools such as analogy, metaphor, and examples to explain mathematical
concepts in discourse may be explained by these two factors’ incorporation of “nonlinguistic knowledge.” Bandura’s “interpersonal factors” fit well into the second
explanatory factor, which situates mathematical discourse in a social sphere. This factor
may explain the participants’ choices of egocentric or social speech, and, in the case of
social speech, may explain just how much ordinary language or conventional language a
speaker may choose to use to best negotiate meaning with the hearer. Bandura’s
“complexity of linguistic input” also contributes to the first explanatory factor of
experience, as language choices often reflect previous uses of language.
While Bandura’s (1986) mention of “cognitive skills” does not map directly to
one of the agentive explanatory factors, the importance of such a factor to mathematical
discourse cannot be denied, as one’s possible choices in mathematical discourse may be
shaped by a participant’s own language abilities, or even possibly by a participant’s
knowledge of the structure of the language within which the discourse is taking place. In
this study, I do not attempt to characterize the participants’ linguistic knowledge or skills
in any general sense. However, I do view improvisation (Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner, &
Cain, 1998) for linguistic purposes as an example of a cognitive skill of the linguistic
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type that is related to the “imagination” component of the first explanatory factor.
Improvisation may also be considered a meta-component of the explanatory factor
framework, as it reflects an individual’s choice based on differing, and often
contradictory meanings for several explanatory factors. In this study, instances of
analogical problem solving and linguistic invention serve as examples of how
participants combine their experience with mathematical meaning to develop new ways
to speak about mathematics. Although improvisation is one of many possible cognitive
skills that Bandura may have intended, it is particularly relevant to this study because
Holland et al. described the appropriation of the results of improvisations as tools of
agency and change.
The realization of the influence of the preexisting language structures on current
mathematical discourse leads into a concluding discussion of the relationship between
humans and language. Hermeneutics (Brown, 2001) suggests that the way humans
perceive their world is influenced by the way in which they describe their world, and vice
versa. Historically, mankind’s perception of the world, and perhaps the world itself, has
evolved as a result of this hermeneutic cycle. Holland et al. (1998) described a similar
cycle, stating that, “social scientists, today as in the past, are studying what their field of
study has helped to create” (p. 24). In the next chapter, I describe how research on
discourse in mathematics education reflects this hermeneutic cycle. Here, however, I
consider the implications for the development of mathematical language and thought.
Brown (2001) describes two divergent viewpoints that exist within hermeneutics.
The first is that humans can operate on language to mold their own perceptions over time,
and may eventually come to interpret the world in a “correct” or desirable manner. The
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second viewpoint suggests that the reality of mankind is such a product of language that
the hermeneutic cycle is beyond human control. This latter viewpoint may suggest that
the language that has been previously chosen to describe mathematics has sent us on a
trajectory of mathematical understanding that will continue to evolve despite any efforts
we may make to redirect our progress. While I do not attempt to suggest the existence of
a “perfect mathematics,” I do maintain that the principle of personal agency remains the
sole determiner of human action, including human language, speech, and thought. Inden
(1990) defined human agency as “the realized capacity of people to act upon their world
and not only to know about or give personal or intersubjective significance to it,”
suggesting that human agents not only have the capacity to reiterate the world through
agency, but also the capacity to remake the world (p. 23; in Holland et al., 1998, p. 40).
The previous choices of the human race have shaped our current experience in a system
of language and expression that cannot, and should not, be ignored in mathematical
discourse. By the same token, it is us, the participants in current mathematical discourse,
who will create and direct mathematical language and thought in our present and future.
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CHAPTER 3: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
In this chapter, I first review the progression of literature that describes and
defines mathematical discourse and examine how such literature reflects shifting
theoretical and practical perspectives on mathematics, mathematical activity, and
mathematics education. In a second section, I review literature related to the content area
of calculus, specifically the role of personal experience in graph interpretation and the
development of meaning for the concept of derivative. The emphasis on the role of
personal experience in the development of mathematical meaning leads into a final
discussion of how linguistic devices such as metonymy, metaphor, simile, and analogy
can be viewed as cognitive vehicles for mathematical reasoning.
Mathematical Discourse
Discourse is becoming an increasing popular topic of conversation in mathematics
education. In the year 2000, the Principles and Standards for School Mathematics
document published by the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM),
suggested that two purposes for student participation in mathematical discourse are to (1)
communicate to learn mathematics and (2) learn to communicate mathematically. Later,
in 2007, NCTM’s Mathematics Teaching Today document appealed to classroom
discourse as the primary means by which students learn to define mathematical activity.
It is interesting to note a shift in perspectives between these two documents published by
the same organization. While the earlier document reflected a view of discourse from the
individual cognition perspective of learning mathematics, the more recent document
focuses on the social perspective of defining mathematical activity. These shifting
perspectives of the NCTM documents are reflective of shifting perspectives on discourse
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and mathematics in the research community of mathematics educators as well as in the
larger community of mathematicians, educators, policy makers, parents, and the general
public. These shifting perspectives are guided by, and guide, empirical research on
mathematical discourse in a zig zag of description and definition in efforts to not only
define mathematical discourse as it currently exists, but as many believe it should exist,
in the schools.
Defining Mathematical Discourse
Mathematical discourse has been said to differ from other forms of discourse in
terms of vocabulary and word use. Researchers have characterized verbal communication
in mathematics classrooms as using either mathematical or “ordinary” language (Pirie,
1998), while recognizing that mathematical discourse does not require the use of a
specific mathematical vocabulary (Moschkovich, 2003). Ferrari (2004) has followed the
tradition of Halliday (1978) in a functional linguistics evaluation of differences between
mathematical and colloquial registers, which characterize “linguistic varieties according
to use” (Ferrari, 2004, p. 387). While mathematical discourse can include a wide variety
of language, mathematical registers are more closely related to the literate registers of
written texts, and consequently the interpretation of mathematical language as colloquial
language, or vice versa, may be the source of misunderstanding among participants in
mathematical discourse (Ferrari, 2004; Zevenbergen, 2000). The use of mathematical and
ordinary language simultaneously may result in further ambiguity due to differences in
syntax and explicitness (Ferrari, 2004).
Zandieh and Knapp (2006) noted that mathematical language structures are often
more rigid than natural language structures. For examples, cases of polysemy, where a
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word has multiple related meanings, occur quite frequently in ordinary language. A
standard example is the word “foot,” which can refer to the lower part of the human leg,
or the lower part of a mountain or hill, as in “the foot of the hill,” or “the foothills.” In
mathematics, however, it is less common for a mathematically defined term such as
“derivative” to have a multitude of related definitions. Students may not be aware that
every situation dealing with a mathematical “derivative” should be isomorphic in specific
ways (Zandieh & Knapp, 2006). While mathematical definitions may attempt to avoid the
ambiguity of polysemy, Zaskis (1999) points out that polysemy continues to exist,
comparing the uses of “divisor” and “quotient” in whole number division to “divisor” and
“quotient” in number theory. While a similar root may exist for mathematical forms of
polysemy, these similarities are not always made explicit in instruction. One might
compare, for example, how the term “tangent” may be defined differently in an
introductory geometry course (a line tangent to a circle), a trigonometry course (the ratio
of two sides of a right triangle), and a calculus course (a line that has the instantaneous
slope of a curve at a point).
Mathematical discourse has also been defined in terms of content. Ben-Yehuda,
Lavy, Linchevski, and Sfard (2005) define mathematical discourse as discourse having to
do with mathematical objects such as shapes or quantities. Such definitions are not
entirely useful for identifying mathematical discourse because the definition of
mathematical objects can vary greatly in different fields of mathematics. Furthermore,
discourse about similar mathematical content can differ drastically in form. Thompson,
Philipp, Thompson, and Boyd (1994) identified two orientations for mathematical
discourse that they referred to as calculational and conceptual. Calculational discourse
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was associated with “an emphasis on performing procedures” and “a tendency to do
calculations whenever an occasion to calculate presents itself” (p. 87). Conceptual
discourse was driven by a teacher’s “image of a system of ideas and ways of thinking that
[the teacher] intends the students to develop” (p. 86). Although neither orientation was
characterized by Thompson et al. as more or less mathematical, the benefits of a
conceptual orientation were highlighted in the discussion.
Other definitions of discourse go far beyond the dimensions of terminology and
topic to define discourse as a social practice (Gee, 1996; Moschkovich, 2003). Such
definitions imply that, in order to define mathematical discourse, mathematics educators
need to determine what mathematical discourse currently looks like in terms of the
dimensions of behavior, interaction, values, and beliefs. Lampert and Cobb (2003)
characterized this decision as being related to the decision of whether to view
communication as a means for developing mathematical understanding or
communication as the ends of mathematical instruction, noting that the former view is
suggested by the acquisitionist view of learning while the latter agrees with the
participationist metaphor (Sfard, 2001). A related issue is the sorting out of whether the
success or failure of students is evidenced by their ability to communicate, caused by
their ability to communicate, or even correlated with the ability to communicate, and
whether the inability to communicate understanding might be misinterpreted as
misunderstanding. These beliefs about what mathematical discourse does and should
look like are strongly linked to different learning theories and philosophies of education.
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Teacher Roles in Classroom Discourse
Nearly thirty years ago, researchers discovered a prevalent discourse pattern of
teacher initiation, student reply, and teacher evaluation (I-R-E) in education (Mehan,
1979; see also Lobato, Clarke, & Ellis, 2005). This discourse pattern placed the teacher in
the role of an authority who asked questions to which the answer was already known. The
purpose of such questions was an evaluative purpose. The I-R-E pattern revealed the
prevalence of behaviorism as a theory for learning, which suggests that immediate
positive reinforcement for correct replies helps to develop internal bonds between
specific academic questions and their correct answers (Resnick & Ford, 1981).
O’Connor and Michaels (1996) suggested an alternative role for the teacher in
discourse in which the teacher revoices the words and ideas of the students, thereby
situating those students in specific roles in discourses that may be “a vehicle for complex
thinking and problem solving in groups” (p.95). Forman and Ansell (2001) suggested that
teachers use revoicing in the mathematics classroom to “repeat, expand, recast, or
translate student explanations for the speaker and the rest of the class” in order to
“articulate presupposed information, emphasize particular aspects of the explanation, or
disambiguate terminology (Forman et al., 1998; O’Connor & Michaels, 1993, 1996)” (p.
119).
The contrast between the teacher role in the I-R-E model and the teacher role in a
discourse practice such as revoicing highlights two different views of mathematical
learning and activity. The first view, known as the “sage on the stage” metaphor, is one in
which the teacher is the authoritative source of knowledge and information. In a second
metaphor, the teacher’s role is to guide students in developing their own voices in
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mathematical discourse, collaboratively building ideas based on their own inquiry and
experience; a role known as the “guide on the side” metaphor (Davis & Maher, 1997).
Forman and Ansell (2001) found that, within one classroom, conflicting perspectives on
mathematics could be observed in the talk of one elementary school teacher. When
leading discussions of student strategies for solving multiplication problems, this teacher
would respond to non-traditional student-developed strategies with delight, and would
expound upon such strategies through revoicing. On the other hand, when students
suggested the use of a traditional multiplication algorithm, the teacher would refrain from
revoicing or even explaining the algorithm. The steps of traditional algorithms were
merely allowed to be demonstrated, the teacher discounted such strategies as “confusing .
. . to a lot of people,” and explained that when she was a student, such standard
algorithms were all that she was allowed to use. Although the teacher commented that
traditional algorithms should be taught when students had a greater understanding of
place value, it is interesting that her response to what she might call a lack of agency in
her own experience was to discourage her own students’ choice to use standard
algorithms.
Student Roles in Classroom Discourse
The shift in a teacher’s role from sage on a stage to guide on the side has had
serious implications for the nature of teacher talk in the mathematics classroom. Even
greater, however, are the implications for the mathematics student’s role in discourse. In
respect to the I-R-E pattern, Mehan (1979) stated, “As a result of the teacher’s search for
the one correct answer to her question, it is difficult to determine whether [a] child’s
answer stemmed from a mastery of the conceptual demands of the academic task, or

30
stemmed from a mastery of the conversation demands of the questioning style” (p. 293).
In an effort to shake students from focusing simply on teacher reactions, teachers have
been encouraged to question all student replies, asking students to explain both correct
and incorrect answers. Despite these efforts to encourage students to focus on the
mathematics rather than the questioning style, some students continue to expect the I-R-E
pattern in mathematical discourse. Bills (2000) studied politeness in student-teacher
interactions and suggested that, although teachers may ask sincere questions or questions
designed to help the student to examine their thinking and deepen their understanding,
some students react to such questions as politely masked signals of their incorrect
thinking. Implicit conventions of discourse such as “the teacher only interrupts when I’ve
done something wrong” may be considered meta-discursive rules (Sfard, 2001), or
unspoken social rules that govern mathematical discourse in many classrooms.
Conversational maxims, such as the assumption that given information is
sufficient or relevant, may also be considered examples of discursive meta-rules that
reflect each participant’s role in the social context. As verbal mathematical discourse
cannot be separated from the social context, the goal of mathematical discourse cannot be
viewed as simply a negotiation of meaning or usage. Learners’ relationships to each other
and their ideas about mathematics and learning will also affect the way in which language
is used. For example, a student may expect his instructor to have a deep understanding of
mathematical concepts that the student is describing, and therefore accept vague
definitions of mathematical concepts given by the instructor as sufficient (Ferrari, 2004).
In the presence of such a wide variety of unspoken meta-rules with social and
mathematical purposes, it is no wonder that students may misunderstand their instructors’
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intentions in engaging them in mathematical discourse. At an even greater disadvantage
may be the students who encounter drastically different discourse patterns, with different
unspoken rules, at home (Zevenbergen, 2000). Ben-Yehuda et al. (2005) analyzed
differences in the arithmetical discourse of two girls with learning difficulties and
suggested that students’ capacities for mathematical reasoning may be unrealized or
undeveloped due to these students’ failure to appropriate endorsed forms of mathematical
discourse.
A New Definition of Discourse and Learning
In 1990, Lampert used the writings of Lakatos (1976) and Polya (1954) to
reintroduce the value of the moral qualities of courage and modesty in mathematical
discourse. Lampert and her elementary school students provided an existence proof for
new teacher-student interactions that involved students in the mathematical activities of
knowing, thinking, revising, and explaining in a classroom where the legitimacy of
mathematical ideas was determined by reasoning and mathematical argument. Along
with this new view of classroom discourse came a realization that teaching students how
to participate in mathematical discourse involved teaching them new social behaviors.
Cobb, Wood, and Yackel (1993) recognized that two kinds of talk could be observed in a
second grade mathematics classroom, talking about mathematics, in which students
verbalized and evaluated their own interpretations of, reasoning about, and solution
processes for mathematical problems, and talking about talking about mathematics,
which consisted in explicit instruction and commentary on the former type of talk. The
socially negotiated meta-rules of talking about mathematics were explicated in talking
about talking about mathematics. These studies (Cobb, Wood, & Yackel, 1993; Lampert,
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1990) suggested that student roles in mathematical discourse do not have to be implicitly
taught or learned; rather, they can and should be explicitly suggested, modeled, and
negotiated by teachers and students alike.
Although Lampert (1990) appeared to embrace what would eventually be called
the participationist view of learning by Sfard (2001), Lampert also recognized that
evidence that elementary school students were capable of participation in such
mathematical discourse may not be sufficient for those interested in measuring
knowledge acquired by her students. Nevertheless, a new type of discourse and new
possibilities were up for consideration. Having broken free from the traditional
constraints of I-R-E patterns, this new discourse has been much more rich and interesting
for researchers to study. Even the smallest details, such as students’ claims that a
trapezoid is “half of a parallelogram” (Moschkovich, 2003, p. 329) are no longer framed
as misconceptions to be remedied, but powerful commentaries on students’ ability to
notice properties, generalize, and participate in a process of linguistic invention as they
operate on language to create meaning (Brown, 2001).
Pronouns, Power, and Politeness
The use of pronouns in mathematical discourse has provided powerful
commentaries on beliefs about mathematics and power relationships in mathematics
classrooms. Like definitions of mathematical discourse, characterizations of these beliefs
and relationships have also evolved as research and practice have mutually contributed to
one another. For example, the figurative use of “we” by a teacher has been identified as
associating with a powerful group, or feigning solidarity (Pimm, 1987; Rowland, 1999).
Ju and Kwon (2007) have suggested an alternative interpretation for a teacher’s use of
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“we” in modern classrooms as referring in a literal sense to the students and teachers in
the classroom, therefore generating a sense of “authorship and ownership” among the
community of learners for the ideas that they had collaboratively developed. While
teachers may refer to students as “you” in the literal sense, Rowland (1999) observed that
students rarely refer to teachers in a reciprocal manner.
The figurative use of “you” as a replacement for the general “one” has been
associated with generalization (Rowland, 1999). More currently, this figurative use of
“you” by a student has been interpreted as a commentary on mathematics as an accessible
practice, while the third person “it” and “that” obscure the role of agency in mathematics
(Morgan, 2006). Wagner (2007) also associated the use of “I” with the concept of
agency. Inspired by Fairclough’s (1992) notion of critical language awareness, Wagner
(2007) led discussions in an 11th grade mathematics classroom regarding the use of
language in mathematics textbooks and explanations. The 11th grade participants
recognized a general use of “you” and “we” as “an attempt to bridge a diversity of
perspectives” (p. 42), which may be a more positively framed interpretation of the
findings of Pimm and Rowland on the use of “we,” or a reflection of how mathematical
discourse has changed in comparison to those earlier findings.
Continuing in the tradition of critical discourse analysis, researchers have taken a
closer look at discourse practices that may deny students’ access to discourse. Motivated
by student comments on mathematical discourse, Wagner and Herbal-Eisenmann (2008)
focus on relationships between discourse particles such as the word “just” and the nature
of subsequent dialogue in mathematics classrooms. Studies of classroom discourse have
focused on sociolinguistic factors such as markers of politeness as well as process and
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continuity. For example, the phrase, “you know,” at the end of an explanation may
indicate positive politeness between students to establish common ground, while an
utterance preceded by, “I think,” may have the opposite effect, therefore distinguishing
one’s thoughts from those that have already been expressed. In undergraduate student-led
discussions, “I think,” has been identified as a marker of continuity, which allows a
participant to make a comment that may not relate directly to the previous comment, yet
contributes or responds to an overarching topic of discussion (Craig & Sanusi, 2003).
Additional Social Factors and Implications
In 1987, Kagan hypothesized that there may be a link between the ability to
“produce divergent responses to open-ended problems and the ability to perceive others
in divergent ways” (p. 183). In order to further investigate “the social implications of
higher level thinking skills,” she suggested that researchers reach out from their home
field of study to collaborate with those in other fields. Researchers in mathematics
education have built extensively on the work of the psychologists Piaget and Vygotsky in
the development of learning theories. As discussed earlier, Piaget (1997/1896) and
Vygotsky (1986/1934) also studied different forms of speech. Mathematics educators
have applied the notions of private and social speech in analysis of the mathematical
discourse of young children (Alexander, White, & Daugherty, 1997).
Even when their intent is to study other topics such as individual cognition,
mathematics educators are having a difficult time ignoring the social aspects of
mathematical discourse (Cobb, Wood, & Yackel, 1993). Jirotkova and Littler (2003)
found that two students participating in a communication task involving verbal
descriptions of geometric solids differed in their social tendencies to build models of each
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other’s thinking. One student would ask the other questions intended to determine how
that student was using the terms “square” and “rectangle,” and upon determining that her
co-participant’s meaning for such terms was different than her own, adapted her own
language accordingly in order to collaborate effectively. This same student, however,
rephrased the language and questions of the researcher with more precise language, in a
possible demonstration of Goffman’s (1981) notion of footing. The other student made
no such attempts to modify his language. Although both students had comparable scores
in their mathematics class, this exercise in verbal communication revealed drastic
differences in both language and social competence.
Another linguistic notion that has gained importance in the analysis of
mathematical discourse is Bakhtin’s (1981) notion of dialogic discourses. After Bakhtin,
Lewis and Ketter (2004) define a dialogic conversation as “one in which there is an
awareness of other utterances and social meanings” (p.118). Lewis and Ketter apply their
definition to a group of practicing teachers in a study group for the teaching of multicultural literature in a rural middle school. Their view of learning as “appropriation and
reconstruction of one’s social world” implies that the echo of one participant’s social
view in the language of another participant may be a powerful indicator of generative
activity (p. 140). In concluding this section, I note that the presence of dialogism in
mathematical discourse may be a key element for defining productive mathematical
discourse in the future.
The Role of Personal Experience in Mathematics Learning
The use of personal experience in graph interpretation and reasoning about rates
of change is the first topic of the literature reviewed here. Reform efforts in mathematics
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education have attempted to replicate the authentic activity of graph interpretation in the
mathematics classroom, emphasizing the “need to move beyond plotting and reading
points to interpreting the global meaning of a graph and the functional relationship that it
describes” (Dugdale, 1993, p. 101). Graphical representations have also played a major
role in calculus instruction, specifically for purposes of demonstrating the relationship
between functions and their derivatives (Zandieh, 2000).
A second, related topic of this section is the study of mathematics, particularly
calculus, in the context of kinematics. The relationship between displacement and
velocity has become a prototypical context for the investigation of the concept of
derivative (Marrongelle, 2004; Zandieh, 2000). The context of the task in this study is not
one of velocity and displacement, but the rate of flow of water and quantity of water in a
reservoir. Nevertheless, I review literature related to student thinking about the velocitydisplacement relationship for three reasons. First, I consider the implications of drawing
on personal experience to develop meaning for mathematical concepts to be relevant to
my theoretical perspective of personal agency and meaning, specifically the agentive
explanatory factor of experience and imagination. Second, previous to their work on the
rate of flow and volume task, the participants in thus study spent 10 class sessions
(approximately 16.5 hours) working on two tasks that are set in the context of
displacement and velocity. Literature relevant to these two tasks, “The Desert Motion
Task” (diSessa, Hammer, Sherin, & Kolpakowski, 1991), and “The Cat Task” (Speiser &
Walter, 1994, 1996; Speiser, Walter, & Maher, 2003) is discussed below. Third, the
participants in this study used the language of “velocity” and “displacement” as they
participated in analogical reasoning about their given task. I conclude this section with an
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abbreviated review of the wealth of literature on metaphor, metonymy, and analogy
pertinent to mathematics education in general and to this study in particular.
Graph Interpretation
Studies of graph interpretation have suggested that personal experience with the
situation represented by graphs may either help or hinder students’ interpretations
(Johnson, 2005; Leinhardt, Zaslavsky, & Stein, 1990; Roth, 2002). Students in the middle
grades were found to exhibit “iconic interpretation,” or the interpretation of a graph as a
picture of an event (Leinhardt et al., 1990). For example, students creating
representations of a cyclist riding up and down a hill have suggested that the graph of
speed versus time may be incorrect, because decreasing speed followed by increasing
speed has the appearance of the shape of a valley between two hills, implying that the
cyclist rode down a hill, and then up another hill (diSessa et al., 1991). Dugdale (1993)
reviewed ways in which technology can create graphs of student action, resulting in
students having immediate prior personal experience with the interpretation of the graph
(see also Nemirovsky, 1994). These graph-creating technologies can also allow students
to “test out” their interpretations of a given graph by acting out (and creating a graph of)
the story that they told for the given graph. Roth (2002) reported that working
professionals outperformed teaching professionals when asked to “read” a graph
describing an event in their field. Roth suggested that the working professionals’
performance was better because they were more familiar with the phenomena that the
graphs described.
Ochs, Gonzales, and Jacoby (1996) described how members of a physics research
group would incorporate the conventions of the graphical representations of physical
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phenomena into their gestures as they reasoned about such phenomena. For example, a
physicist would accompany the phrase “come down [in temperature]” with a hand
moving from right to left (p. 356). In the physical world, “down” is often associated with
a falling vertical motion. But within the semiotic frame (Goodwin, 2000) of graphical
representations, the direction of “down” may be determined by a vertical or horizontal
axis. The physicists in the study were using a graph that represented temperature on the
horizontal axis, and incorporated this convention into their discourse. The physicists also
exhibited a discourse pattern of personal pronominal subjects combined with predicates
of motion or change of state, as in the utterance, “When I come down I'm in the domain
state” (p. 331). Ochs et al. suggested that such language functioned as a linguistic device
that allowed the physicists to “symbolically participate in events” (p. 348) as they thought
through problems together.
Walter and Johnson (2007) investigated the language of practicing elementary
school teachers as they interpreted a graph of the rate of water entering a reservoir with
respect to time. These participants spontaneously resituated the problem in the context of
water entering and exiting a bathtub, and participated in a process of linguistic invention
to create a story that would explain the given graph. The created story about a bathtub,
along with abstract conventional language, served as a semantic warrant for the teachers’
claims about the volume, or level of water in the bathtub. Walter and Johnson defined
linguistic invention as the linguistic process of relating mathematical concepts to personal
experience. They defined semantic warrants as “personally meaningful, intuitive
instantiations of mathematical concepts or examples to ground and reason from in
building formal inferences” (p. 709; see also Weber & Alcock, 2004).
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Velocity and Displacement in the Mathematics Classroom
There is not a lot of research available regarding students’ interpretations of
graphs of water flow in mathematical contexts (Dugdale, 1993; Gerson & Walter, 2008;
Walter & Johnson, 2007). However, many authors (diSessa et al., 1991; Marrongelle,
2004; Nemirovsky, 1994; Sherin, 2000; Speiser & Walter, 1994, 1996; Speiser et al.,
2003; Zandieh, 2000; Zandieh & Knapp, 2006) have researched students’ interpretations
and representations of motion, specifically relationships between distance, time, and
velocity. Zandieh (2000) suggested that the widespread use of velocity as an instructional
context for derivative may be due to the highly developed natural language used to
express the ideas of displacement, velocity, and even acceleration. As experience with
motion is common, students as young as 6th grade have demonstrated the potential of
addressing sophisticated ideas about the relationships between time, displacement, and
velocity (diSessa et al., 1991). Set in the context of inventing representations for verbal
descriptions of motion, these students concluded that each of the three aspects generally
used to describe motion, (speed, distance, and time) can be derived from information
about the other two aspects. Therefore, a representation independently showing speed,
distance, and time, was considered redundant by these young students. DiSessa et al. also
observed that students preferred graphs of speed versus time to distance versus time,
suggesting a natural inclination to treat speed as a primary quantity, rather than a rate of
change of the primary quantity of distance. This preference of speed to distance was also
reported by Nemirovsky (1994) in his paper about an 11th grade student who, with the aid
of computer-based motion detector, created and interpreted graphs representing the
motion of a toy car.
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In their work on “The Cat Task,” Speiser and Walter (1994, 1996) and Speiser et
al. (2003) suggested that the implications of basing calculus instruction in authentic data
may be substantial. University faculty and high school students were given a sequence of
time-lapse photographs of a cat in motion (Muybridge, 1985/1885) and were asked to
draw conclusions about the motion of a cat at given points in time corresponding to given
photographs in the sequence. The role of students’ personal experiences with motion,
both embodied and observed, in comprehending the relationships between position,
velocity, and acceleration, was examined as a vehicle for sophisticated mathematical
activity. Motivated by the comments of the various participants, these authors challenged
one of the major traditions of calculus instruction, that of assuming continuity of
functions.
The assumption of continuity of functions in traditional instructional approaches
for the concept of derivative is not a minor one. The 6th grade students in diSessa et al.
(1991) criticized discrete representations as not showing “what’s between the lines” (p.
137). Nemirovsky (1994) identified additional tensions between experienced reality and
the conventions of mathematical representations. The notion of negative velocity on a
graph is problematic because, unlike other contexts involving rate of change (inflow and
outflow, for example), there is no “naturally” positive direction for displacement.
Furthermore, representing negative velocity on a velocity versus time graph results in the
complication of interpreting decreasing velocity in the upper half-plane as decreasing
speed, but decreasing velocity in the lower half-plane as increasing speed. The idea of
negative velocity, combined with the assumption of continuity, suggests the existence of
a point of zero velocity when one-dimensional motion changes direction. However, the
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6th graders in diSessa et al. suggested that “instantaneous stopping” was a contradiction
of terms (p. 146).
Metonymy, Metaphor, and Analogy
Zandieh (2000) describes four contexts in which the concept of derivative is
commonly represented. These contexts are (1) graphically as a slope, (2) verbally as a
rate of change, (3) physically as velocity, and (4) symbolically as the limit of the
difference quotient. Recognizing Zandieh’s list as not exhaustive, but a possible
framework for evaluating student understanding, Zandieh and Knapp (2006) observed the
roles of metonymy and metaphor in student reasoning about the derivative. For example,
a student’s statement that “the derivative is the velocity” or “the derivative is the slope”
would be considered paradigmatic metonymy, because one context of Zandieh’s
framework is taken to stand for the entire concept of derivative. Presmeg (1992, 1997)
recognized the widespread use of paradigmatic metonymy in mathematical statements
such as “let a be any number,” where a single member of a set is used to represent a
whole set.
Following established literary theory, Zandieh and Knapp (2006) view metaphor
as differing from metonymy in that metaphor compares entities from two different
conceptual domains, while metonymy compares two entities from the same conceptual
domain. Therefore, a student speaking of a derivative as velocity would be using
metonymy, because velocity is an example of a derivative. On the other hand, a student
using their knowledge of derivative as velocity to reason about the instantaneous rate of
change of temperature would be applying metaphorical reasoning because they are
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comparing two different contexts where one context cannot be considered a sub-context
of the other.
Presmeg (1997, 1992) defined metaphor, metonymies, and similes as different
forms of analogy. Metaphor and simile differ in their explicitness; a metaphor states that
“A is B,” while a simile states that “A is like B.” In both cases, A is not the same entity as
B, but the comparison is implicit in the case of metaphor, and explicit in the case of
simile. Presmeg also characterized metonymy as pertaining to symbolism and metaphor
as pertaining to meaning. Metonymies are primarily concerned with the representation of
a class by way of one or a small collection of key members of that class. Metaphors on
the other hand, allow one to reason about one class (the target) by referring to knowledge
of a different class (the source). As demonstrated by Zandieh and Knapp (2006), a
metaphor can also operate within a class, where one member of a class (velocity as a
derivative) can be used to reason about another member of that class (the rate of change
of temperature as a derivative).
Although Presmeg (1997) viewed metaphor as one type of analogy, Sfard (1997)
suggested that metaphors be viewed as distinct from analogies in a specific way. While
analogy may be used to reason about relationships between two extant domains or
contexts, Sfard suggested that the term “metaphor” should be reserved for the specific act
of creating a new domain by projecting the characteristics of previously constructed
domain onto observed phenomena. For example, Sfard explains the emergence of
negative numbers as the metaphorical projection of the existing positive numbers onto the
set of symbols that included “impossible subtractions . . . such as 3-8 or 0-2” (p. 345).
Sfard suggest that analogies are for reasoning, and metaphors are for conceptualizing. In
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the context of derivatives, I suggest that Sfard would consider a student’s projection of
the qualities of velocity onto the known, but slightly less familiar, context of the rate of
change of temperature a case of analogical reasoning, while a student’s projection of the
qualities of velocity to conceptualize the (new to the student) idea of rate of change of
temperature would be a case of metaphorical construction. Therefore, the distinction
between a student’s use of metaphor and a student’s use of analogy would be entirely
dependent upon that student’s prior exposure to, or reification of, the target domain.
For the purposes of this study, I use the term analogy to refer to the identification
of similar qualities, properties, or internal relationships of two different domains, and
analogical reasoning to refer to all observed cases of the linguistic projection of the
characteristics of one domain onto another domain. When relevant, I suggest that the
specific forms of metaphor, metonymy, and simile may be present in the data, and
reference the respective definitions in which I may base my claims. As I continue to view
metaphor, metonymy, and simile as different forms of analogy, I conclude this section
with a short review of literature on analogical problem solving.
Alexander, Willson, White, and Fuqua (1987), developed a Test of Analogical
Reasoning in Children around four performance components for completing classical
analogy problems of the form A:B::C:?. These components are encoding, inferring,
mapping, and applying. Encoding refers to identification of the given terms A, B, and C.
Inferring is the process of identifying relationships between A and B in the source
domain. Mapping is the step of identifying a connection or similarity between A in the
source domain and C in the target domain. Finally, applying refers to the appropriate
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application of the relationship A:B to identify an entity D, represented by the question
mark, within the target domain so that C and D exhibit a relationship C:D.
Gholson, Smither, Buhrman, Duncan, and Price (1997), in a review of literature
on analogical problem solving, or the process of solving a new problem by mapping it to
a previously solved problem, concluded that four steps are generally recognized in the
problem solving process. First, a solution to the original (base) problem in the source
domain must be obtained. Second, correspondences must be noticed and identified
between the base problem in the source domain and the new problem in the target
domain. Third, the pertinent features of the base problem and solution must be
recognized and retrieved. Fourth, these features must be mapped to the target domain,
and the solution carried out. The four steps seem to include the components identified by
Alexander et al. (1987) in a broader frame that allows for the solutions of more complex
problems.
Gholson et al. (1997), however, remarked that an additional step is often required
in the practical application of problem solving. Due to the fact that the pertinent features
of different problems are not always isomorphic, analogical problem solving
pragmatically involves a step of modification. A learner may attempt to modify and
resolve the base problem in the source domain, make modifications during the process of
mapping from the source domain to the target domain, or modify the solution process
within the target domain after the process of mapping. The failure of analogical problem
solving may be explained in terms of failure to complete one or more of the four original
steps, or a failure to notice the need for or make appropriate modifications.
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English (1997) proposed, as a direction for future research, the investigation of
students’ natural inclinations to use analogical linguistic forms as vehicles for
mathematical reasoning. This study responds to English’s proposition as it describes data
in which students use analogical problem solving methods and analogical language
without prior instruction. This study also focuses on a relatively new context, that of rate
of flow and volume of water, for the development of the concept of derivative, and how
students spontaneously connect this new context to the more widely studied context of
velocity and displacement, as well as other relevant phenomena in their personal
experience.
Along with describing the role of personal experience as an explanatory factor for
choices made in mathematical discourse, I also describe how the additional explanatory
factors of one’s meaning for social roles and responsibilities, and one’s concern for their
own understanding of the mathematics are also reflected in the process of negotiating
mathematical meaning and language. In doing so, I suggest new ways of characterizing
mathematical language and social speech. Finally, this study contributes to the ongoing
process of defining mathematical discourse by suggesting how evidence of the exercise
of personal agency (Walter & Gerson, 2007) might serve as a criterion for defining
mathematical discourse.
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CHAPTER 4: METHOD
In this section, I describe the setting, participants, task, and data collection
procedures for this study. I then explain how I combined grounded theory techniques
with other qualitative methods as I used my data to develop two sets of codes for
characterizing the process of negotiation of meaning in terms of my continua of
conventional and mathematical language and egocentric and social speech. The
development of these codes then led to the development of more complex codes based on
emergent phenomena in the data.
Setting
This study takes place in a university honors introductory calculus classroom at a
large private university in the Rocky Mountain Region of the United States. About 20
students met with two professors three mornings a week for two hours throughout the
Fall Semester of 2006. Students sat at hexagonal tables in groups of four or five.
Learning was task-based and investigative, and the students spent the majority of their
time in class participating in small group and whole class working discussions about
challenging mathematics problems and related mathematical concepts. A working
discussion is characterized by progress toward shaping a solution for a designated task
interlaced with discussion of goals, definitions, and implications of specific plans of
action toward a solution process.
Participants
The research participants are four university students enrolled in the calculus
course that sat and worked together as a group, and one of two co-instructors for the
course. At the time of the course, Daniel was a sophomore majoring in actuarial science
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who took a statistics course and Advanced Placement calculus courses in high school.
Jamie was a senior majoring in Geology who had previously taken a first-semester
calculus course from another instructor at the same university. Julie was in her first
semester at the university and was planning to major in mathematics education. Justin
was a junior who had not declared a course of study but expressed interest in engineering,
mathematics, and mathematics education. Dr. Walter was an assistant professor at the
university who taught secondary mathematics for 13 years in public schools before
completing her doctoral work and joining the university faculty.
After a month of working together, the participants appeared to work comfortably
with one another, as well as in the presence of a video camera. In their discussions, the
students posed and answered questions about the current task, and often developed and
recounted verbal explanations with the help of graphs and other inscriptions. The
participants were careful not to interrupt one another and would pause in their
explanations to check for understanding and agreement by other members in the group.
The mood was never very heavy, and the students would joke with one another and laugh
at intervals throughout their discussions.
The Quabbin Reservoir Task
On October 18, 2006, the participants had a working discussion of the Quabbin
Reservoir Task (Figure 3), which the instructors adapted from Hughes-Hallett et al.
(1994). In the task, the participants are given graphs of inflow and outflow of water in a
reservoir over the period of one year, and asked describe and create graphs of the volume
of water in the reservoir for that year.
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It should be noted that, prior to the instructors’ decision to adapt the Quabbin
Reservoir Task for use in the calculus class described here, the Quabbin Reservoir graph
originally appeared at another university as part of a calculus assessment item in which
students were asked to justify whether there was more water in the reservoir in January
1993 or January 1994. Hughes-Hallett et al. incorporated the task into a Calculus
textbook as an exercise, asking slightly different questions. In this study, the instructors
of the calculus course adapted the Quabbin Reservoir Task based on the previous work
and emergent ideas of the students in the course.
The Quabbin Reservoir in the western part of Massachusetts provides
most of Boston’s water. The graph below represents the flow of water in and out
of the Quabbin Reservoir throughout 1993.

a. Sketch a possible graph for the quantity of water in the reservoir, as a function
of time.
b. Explain the changes in the quantity of water in the reservoir in terms of the
relationships between outflow and inflow during each quarter of the year. How
are these changes evident in your graph in part (a)?

Figure 3. Quabbin Reservoir Task.
The Quabbin Reservoir Task was given to the students in the calculus course on a
sheet of paper as shown in Appendix A. The students had no previous experience with
the Quabbin Reservoir Task, and were given no additional instruction beyond the
instructions printed on the task sheet. The instructors’ purpose in using the task in this
course was not as an assessment or exercise, but for developing students’ conceptual
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understandings of the derivative in a new context. The instructors also anticipated that the
Quabbin Reservoir Task would elicit discussion of important calculus concepts such as
anti-derivatives, extrema, concavity, points of inflection, and an interpretation of the area
between curves. As mentioned earlier, the participants had previously spent 10 class
periods working on tasks set in contexts of motion, and had interpreted velocity as the
rate of change of displacement with respect to time. What became problematic for these
students, then, was determining how to interpret the relationship between the given
graphs of inflow and outflow and the desired graph of quantity, and connecting this
relationship to their previous interpretations of the derivative as an instantaneous rate of
change.
Data Collection
A team of graduate and undergraduate student researchers videotaped each
classroom session. The student at the camera focused primarily on the discourse of the
focus group mentioned previously, except in instances of group presentations and whole
class discussions. During such presentations and discussions, the camera operator would
focus on capturing the words and inscriptions of students at the white board and any
questions directed toward those students. If members of the focus group engaged in
mathematical conversations with each other during whole-class discussions or student
presentations, the camera operator was faced with the decision of determining whether
the conversation of the focus group or the activity of the larger class discussion was more
relevant to the research interests of the research team. Thus, although the camera was
placed in the classroom to capture as much detail as possible, the creation of video data
by nature resulted in an edited version of the actual events that occurred in the classroom.
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During the collection of the data presented in the next chapter, the participants’
discussion was not interrupted by any whole class activity. However, there were stretches
of time when the participants would hold two separate conversations simultaneously. In
these instances, although the microphone could capture the overlapping talk of the two
conversations, for the sake of continuity the camera operator focused on the interactions,
gestures and inscriptions of just one conversation for the duration of the overlapping
conversations.
As part of their regular coursework, the participants were required to submit a
written summary of their solution and solution process, along with brief narratives of
their developmental understandings of key mathematical ideas that emerged for them
individually, in group work, or in class discussion of the task. These student write-ups
served along with the video as sources of data.
Along with my presence as a student researcher in the classroom, survey
responses and a follow-up interview also informed my analysis in peripheral ways. The
participants completed an initial survey about their beliefs on mathematics, mathematics
learning, and responsibilities of teachers and students at the beginning of this course. I
present some of the responses from this initial survey at the beginning of Chapter 5 to aid
the reader in developing a sense for Justin’s meaning for mathematics and social roles
and responsibilities in a mathematics classroom.
Most of the participants were quite vocal in the mathematical discourse, providing
ample opportunities for analysis of their language use in the negotiation of meaning.
Julie, however, was not as vocal (see Appendix B for information about the amount of
participation in discourse) and analysis of her language left me with many questions. For
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this reason, I conducted a follow-up interview with Julie during the final stages of
analysis. During this interview, I showed Julie a ten-minute segment of video and asked
if she could elaborate on what her intent was in making a particular statement in that
video. As this interview occurred nearly two years after the original data was collected,
Julie admitted that she was not entirely certain of her intent. However, her statements in
this interview seemed to support, and did not contradict, emergent explanations based on
the video data.
Transcript Creation and Conventions
I transcribed approximately one hour of video from the first full day of the
participants’ work on the Quabbin Reservoir Task. As the participants often created and
referred to their inscriptions as part of their discussion, I used photocopies of these
inscriptions to help clarify and annotate utterances in the transcript. Research team
members verified the transcript.
In creating and annotating the transcript, the following conventions were used.
Interrupted speech is notated by a hyphen (-) at the point of the interruption. The next line
of transcript indicates the interrupting portion. If the interrupted speech is continued, the
next line with the same speaker begins with a hyphen (-) to indicate this continuation.
Gestures are shown in normal font in square brackets. My personal interpretations as to
the referents of pronouns used in discourse are also in square brackets, but in italicized
text. Pauses in speech are also notated in square brackets by the number of seconds of the
pause, for example: [2 sec].
For navigation purposes, I labeled references in the transcript to specific intervals
on the graph according to letter labels developed by Daniel late in the transcript. As
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shown in Figure 4, Daniel labeled January 1993 as point A; B was the first “zero point,”
at the first intersection of the inflow and outflow; C was at April; D was approximately at
the maximum of the inflow; E was at either July or the second zero point; F was at
October; and G was at January 1994.

Figure 4. Daniel’s letter labels for the horizontal axis.
I originally separated the transcript into turns, or segments of uninterrupted
speech by a speaker. Exceptionally long turns (greater than 30 seconds) were broken into
smaller segments at natural pauses in speech or changes in topic. For example, Turn 58
(below) is an uninterrupted segment of Daniel’s speech that describes related ideas.
58 Daniel: So, it has a negative slope. And then it starts going positive up to that
point [point E, July, on the rate graph]. And so it levels off at zero [point
E, July, on the volume graph]. Cause the v-, the v- [1 sec] I don’t know
what you call that. The velocity of the flow of the water or something?
The velocity of this is zero. [2 sec] Which is correct on our velocity
chart. And then it starts going negative again. And it starts, kind of,
sloping out. And it has, its greatest slope is right here [point F, October,
on the original graph], so that’s its inflection point [point F, October, on
the volume graph].
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However, as eventual coding and data analysis focused more closely on individual
words and phrases, the length of this turn obscured the detail of the coding. Therefore, I
broke this turn into two parts, 58a and 58b. The choice of where to split the turn was
based on the natural change in Daniel’s attention to different intervals on the graph when
he finishes describing the point where the “velocity of the flow of the water is zero,” and
then begins describing the next interval on the graph, where “[the velocity] starts going
negative again.” The majority of long turns occurred in similar situations in which the
participants were describing the shapes of various graphs or narrating the changes in the
graph with respect to time. Verbal cues such as Daniel’s “and then” helped me to
determine when narrative speech was moving forward to describe the next interval of the
graph and I used these verbal cues to break turns into smaller portions when necessary.
58a Daniel: So, it has a negative slope. And then it starts going positive up to that
point [point E, July, on the rate graph]. And so it levels off at zero [point
E, July, on the volume graph]. Cause the v-, the v- [1 sec] I don’t know
what you call that. The velocity of the flow of the water or something?
The velocity of this is zero. [2 sec] Which is correct on our velocity
chart.
58b Daniel: And then it starts going negative again. And it starts, kind of, sloping out.
And it has, its greatest slope is right here [point F, October, on the
original graph], so that’s its inflection point [point F, October, on the
volume graph].
I used Transana software (Fassnacht & Woods, 2008) to link each of these shorter
turns in transcript to corresponding video clips. When all of the turns were 30 seconds or
less, I named these new segments of transcript “clips,” both to be consistent with the
convention of Transana, and also as a way of reminding myself of the importance of
using transcript to aid my analysis of my primary source of video data, rather than
demoting the video to the secondary position of merely supporting my analysis of the
written transcript.
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Data Analysis
I combined grounded theory methodology (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) with my
original interests in social and egocentric speech and conventional and ordinary
mathematical language to conduct a constant comparative analysis of the data. Grounded
theory methodology implies the use of codes to interpret data. Open codes were initially
used to identify and delineate categories of language use and events in mathematical
discourse. As subcategories developed within open codes, I identified relationships
between different subcategories, which led to the development of new codes and coding
cycles. As I continuously reviewed my data during these coding cycles, I identified
patterns and processes in the negotiation of mathematical meaning. I also focused in on
codes that I felt were most difficult to explain, viewing apparent contradictions in coding
and data as opportunities for me to take a different or closer look at the data. In the
following section, I describe two initial sets of open codes that were based on my
theoretical perspective.
Pronoun Codes
As I was interested in the role of egocentric and social speech in mathematical
discourse, I initially attempted to code the various clips as involving either egocentric or
social speech. However, I soon found this coding process quite arbitrary and subjective as
it was difficult to determine whether a speaker was attempting to “place himself at the
point of view of the hearer” (Piaget, 1997/1896, p. 9). To further confound matters, the
participants in my study were so attentive to one another that even if a comment was
made with no designated “hearer,” the other participants treated the comment as if it were
social speech and, “hearing” each other, would attempt to interpret or respond to the
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comment. For example, Daniel’s coining of the phrase “concavitivi-ness-es” appeared to
be a verbal accompaniment of a personal attempt to label his graph, or an instance of
“thinking out loud.” However, Jamie, upon hearing Daniel’s supposedly egocentric
speech commented “Good word!” which was responded to by Daniel with, “I like to
make up words.” I reasoned that if I was aware of the participants’ attentiveness to one
another, they were probably also aware of the fact that virtually nothing they ever said
would go unnoticed by the other participants. Justin’s singing, “Inflection, flection,
what’s your-” seemed related to Piaget’s repetitive “echolalia” (p. 12) category of
egocentric speech, but when Jamie and Daniel chimed in “-flection,” they revealed that,
even if Justin had intended to sing for his own benefit, he definitely had an audience. On
the other hand, Julie would often make quiet statements that could have been interpreted
as her personal summary of the current discussion, or a request for verification of her
summary of the current discussion. Piaget had identified social and egocentric speech in
terms of the intent of the speaker, and at this point in my analysis I did not feel as though
I was familiar enough with my data to draw conclusions about the intents of my
participants. For this reason, I abandoned the notion of objectively coding social speech
and egocentric speech. In Chapters 6 and 7, I describe how other emergent codes revealed
ways in which these participants chose language that reflected the point of view of the
hearer, suggesting that these participants used social speech in specific ways in the
process of negotiation of meaning.
One thing that I felt could be coded a little more objectively in this initial process
of getting to know my data was the actual words used in clips of discourse. I anticipated
that first, second, and third person pronoun use might be indicative of types of speech
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related to certain varieties of social and egocentric speech. For example, the literal use of
you, as in “you worked backwards [to solve the problem]” might serve as strong evidence
of the speaker taking on the point of view of the hearer. Therefore, my first set of codes
described the use of pronouns in each clip. (A list of pronoun codes and the number of
clips in which they occurred can be found in Appendix C).
Impersonal pronouns with a known or unknown referent were coded according to
their form. Personal pronouns, specifically “I” and “you” were coded according to their
referent. If “I” was used to refer to the speaker, this was coded as “I-personal.” If “I” was
used to express the imagined speech of a mathematical object, this was coded as “Ipersonifying.” There were similarly two types of “they;” “they-inanimate” referred to
mathematical objects as in “where they [the lines on the graph] meet,” and “they”
referred to known or unknown human beings as in “they gave us this graph.” Four codes
for “you” emerged from the data. “You-the hearer” was the most common form of you,
as in “Will you explain it to me?” When “you-the hearer” was directed at multiple
hearers, as in “you guys,” these instances were also coded as “you-plural.” Another form
of “you” was present in the data, which did not seem to refer to any particular participant
in the discussion, but rather appeared to function as the word “one” functions in “this is
what one does.” Although the participants never used “one” in this manner in the data,
there were many instances of “you” in the same function, as in “this is what you do.”
Clips including this general use of “you” were coded as “you-one.” Finally, there was a
form of “you-personified” that paralleled “I-personified,” in that it functioned as if one
were speaking to a mathematical object. These personal pronoun codes were also applied
to their possessive adjective forms (my, your, our, their, her, his). These forms were
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reflected in the codes by the additional assignment of the “possessive” code to clips of
discourse in which they occurred.
Vocabulary Codes
As I was also interested in the role of conventional and ordinary language in the
negotiation of mathematical meaning, I coded significant vocabulary words that were
used to describe the mathematical concepts and process in the discourse. In nearly 900
clips of video data, 183 vocabulary codes emerged. A list of these codes and their
frequencies can be seen in Appendix D. These codes were developed based on specific
words in their various grammatical forms and functions. For example, one code, “flow,”
was assigned to both noun and verb functions as well as the various verb forms such as
“flowing.” Individual codes were developed for words that were unique to the data, such
as “positivity.” Although there already were codes for “positive,” and “negative,” I
considered Daniel’s unique use of “positivity,” and “negativity,” to be important in the
development of mathematical language and meaning through discourse.
In the next chapter I describe how I built upon these two initial sets of codes to
create new sets of codes that reflected the emerging phenomena in the data, and then used
all of my codes to construct narratives of the negotiation of meaning.
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CHAPTER 5: DATA AND ANALYSIS
I used grounded theory techniques to build upon my pronoun codes and
vocabulary codes to develop additional sets of codes. In this chapter, I describe the
development of concept codes, which may be considered axial codes in that they help to
identify relationships between the various vocabulary codes. I also describe the
emergence of a set of language awareness codes that reflected the participants’ subtle
verbal cues and more explicit acknowledgements of their participation in processes of
negotiation. I finish this chapter by briefly describing how the presence of language
awareness codes in an eight minute long segment of the video data that I named “The
Gospel According to Justin,” directed a comparative analysis of concept codes and
vocabulary codes which resulted in the construction of three narratives of the negotiation
of meaning. These narratives are primarily told through the language of Justin, and
converge in his language choices in “The Gospel According to Justin.” Because the
narratives suggest how Justin’s (1) experiences and imagination, (2) meaning for social
roles and responsibilities, and (3) mathematical understandings may explain his choices
in discourse, this section begins with a review of peripheral data about Justin that
informed analysis. After presenting this peripheral data, I also orient the reader with a
timeline and short descriptions of major segments of discourse.
Justin’s Initial Participant Survey
On the first day of the calculus course, all of the participants were asked to
complete a background information survey. This survey asked the participants what they
like most about mathematics. Justin’s response was, “Unlike some other fields of study,
the solutions to problems in math are definite and exact. There may be an infinite
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number of solutions but that is itself a definite answer. In most cases, personal bias does
not play a factor in math.” When asked to list three qualities of an excellent mathematics
learner, Justin listed, “patience,” “keeping it simple,” and “humility.” He said that, of
these three qualities, patience was the quality he considered his strength, and “keeping it
simple” was the area in which he was the weakest. He wrote, “I definitely have a problem
keeping things simple. I always want to make things more difficult than they need to be,
which almost always complicates the problem and makes discovering the solution all that
much more difficult.” In the data presented here, Justin makes choices that simplify and
organize the language and ideas encountered in mathematical discourse.
When asked on the initial survey what he felt were the responsibilities of a student
in the course, Justin replied, “Learn, pay attention, teach, and not disturb the learning
atmosphere of others.” Justin expressed hesitancy about group work, listing it as the thing
he found least appealing about mathematics. He wrote, “Unfortunately, I’m not a big fan
of working in groups. But, since this class appears to work extensively in groups I’m just
gonna have to deal with it and learn to like it. I have a hard time trusting the work that
other people do or trusting that they will do the work asked of them. It’s a bad habit, but
I need to work on it so this should be a good class for me.” Over the course of the
semester, Justin emerged as a co-operative leader in his group. He would organize group
activity, asking the group where they currently were and where they were going.
Initial Work on the Quabbin Reservoir Task
Although I have focused my analysis on student discourse from October 18, 2006,
some details from the previous class period, October 16, 2006, are particularly relevant to
my results. With approximately 20 minutes remaining in the 2 hour class period on
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October 16, the participants were given the Quabbin Reservoir Task, with the only verbal
instruction being to “spend the remainder of class time working on this and then your
homework is not necessarily to finish this, but maybe think through and work on it.”
Making Sense
During these initial 20 minutes of collaboration on the task, the participants’
language suggests that their choices were guided by the general principle of “making
sense.” Daniel initially sketched a graph of volume (Figure 5), Julie sketched a graph that
averaged the values of the inflow and outflow graphs (Figure 6), and Justin used his pen
as a measuring tool to sketch a graph of the difference between the values of the inflow
and outflow graphs (Figure 7).

Figure 5. Daniel’s graph of volume sketched underneath the original graph.

61

Figure 6. Julie’s graph (reproduction).
In the transcript that follows, Justin explains to Andrew, a student who was absent
for the next class period and therefore not a participant in the major portion of data
analyzed here, that it “makes the most sense,” to subtract the outflow from the inflow,
rather than the other way around.
Justin:

It would just depend on how you look at it. If you want to take, let’s see.
You would take the inflow minus the outflow. You have to decide if you
want it to be the inflow minus the outflow or the outflow minus the inflow.
Andrew: Mm hmm.
Justin:
So probably go with inflow minus outflow because that makes the most
sense.
Andrew: Okay.
The majority of the discussion among the participants was toward the goal of
determining how the graphs that they had constructed were related to one another. Justin
conjectured that Julie’s graph was a vertical translation of Daniel’s graph, and that the
only difference was the initial amount of volume in the reservoir. Claiming that his graph
represented the change of water in the reservoir, Justin attempted interpret his graph in
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terms of relative amounts of water in the reservoir, but abandoned his interpretation
because it didn’t “make sense.”

Figure 7. Justin’s graph.
Justin:

So that’s the change in the water and so it doesn’t really matter how much
water’s in there, that’s just how much it changes. So if your starting point,
this is how much water there is [horizontal axis of Justin’s rate graph], after
your first month it’s going to be well, this point’s lower than what your
regular is [initial value of Justin’s rate graph]. And then up here it’s [first xintercept of Justin’s rate graph], wait no, that doesn’t make sense. Yeah,
anyways.

Shortly before the end of the class, Daniel connected Justin’s graph to his own
graph by comparing the signs of the values on Justin’s rate graph to the signs of the
slopes of Daniel’s volume graph. Daniel also explained that the maximum value on his
volume graph corresponded with the second x-intercept on Justin’s rate graph. Because
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Daniel’s comparisons “made sense,” Justin suggested that he “accidentally” took the
derivative of Daniel’s graph.
Justin:

Well that would make sense. So I accidentally took the derivative of that.

As the participants left the classroom Justin confidently stated that they had
“accidentally discovered the whole plan of this whole paper [the Quabbin Reservoir
Task].” Although the current solution may have “made sense” to Justin, there was still
much recounting, explaining, justifying, and negotiation of meaning and language that
would take place before the four group members were comfortable with their solution.
These processes, which primarily involved decisions about language, justification, and
explanation, all occurred during the second day of work on the Quabbin Reservoir Task,
which is the data that I focus on in this study.
Analogical Language
During this initial period of work on the task, Justin, Daniel, Jamie, and Andrew
frequently referred to “velocity graphs” and “displacement graphs.” This choice of
language may be best explained by the students’ shared experience working on tasks in
which they had developed the concept of derivative by analyzing situations that involved
velocity and displacement. Justin appeared to be particularly comfortable with this
metaphorical language. When the group began to work on the task, Andrew asked about
the interpretation of the graph given in the task.
Andrew: So is this, what is this graph then? Is this a displacement?
Justin:
It’s rate, rate of flow. So it would beAndrew: Displacement?
Justin:
No, it would be like velocity.
It is interesting that Justin noted that the graph would be “like” velocity, using the
linguistic device of simile, while Andrew spoke more metaphorically, asking if the graph
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was “a displacement [graph].” There were initially comments that “velocity” may not be
the appropriate term. Daniel, at one point said, “I hesitate to say that. It’s not really
velocity of the water but . . .” With time, however, comments of this nature began to
diminish and the participants used the terms “velocity” when speaking of rates of change
and “displacement” when speaking of graphs of quantities without reservation. The
following exchange between Jamie and Daniel demonstrates how the members of the
group drew on their shared mathematical experiences to create a paradigmatic metonymy
(Zandieh & Knapp, 2006) of the velocity-displacement relationship to communicate
about the concept of derivative.
Jamie:
Daniel:
Jamie:
Daniel:
Jamie:

But remember how displacement and velocity graphs, velocity graph was
the derivative of our displacement graph.
Yeah.
So they can’t be, one can’t be, hers can’t be velocity and yours be
displacement.
Why not?
‘Cause they’re the same graph. Yes? No?

In the second day of work on the Quabbin Reservoir Task, the participants
negotiate language and meaning as they come to a consensus on what their various
graphs represent, how they want to talk about the graphs, how the graphs are related to
one another, and how the graphs represent progress toward a solution to the task.
Overview of Mathematical Discourse
Before looking at the second day in detail, I present a chronological storyline of
the first hour of the second day of discourse about the Quabbin Reservoir Task. This
storyline breaks the 48 minutes of video data into 14 segments which I named, when
possible, after key phrases from the student discourse. The names, duration, and clips
included in each segment are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1
Timeline of Discourse Segments
Segment
Name
1
Getting Started
2
Working Backwards
3
Daniel and Julie
4
Daniel and Jamie
5
The Inflection Idea and the Concave Thing
6
Zero Points
7
What Are We Trying to Find?
8
Language for Quantity
9
The Gospel According to Justin
10
Monkey Wrench
11
Anti-derivative vs. Integral
12
Labeling
13
Breaking it into Quarters
14
Comparing Volumes

Clips
21-41
42-50
49-64
62-140
141-187
188-233
234-283
284-329
330-452
451-555
556-621
622-665
666-884
885-906

Duration
00:48.5
00:31.0
01:33.2
04:43.1
02:51.3
04:02.4
01:53.1
03:50.5
08:40.6
05:22.0
03:00.6
01:53.8
08:53.2
01:38.9

I now provide a brief narrative of the discourse in each segment.
Segment 1: Getting Started
The class period begins with a short survey about limits. After the surveys were
collected and the students commented about how they responded to some of the items on
the survey, Justin encourages his group to continue their work on the Quabbin Reservoir
Task by clapping his hands together in front of him and saying, “Let’s go. So, how, what
did we learn?” Jamie, Daniel, and Justin all admit that they did not work on the task since
their last class. Justin moves the conversation along by summarizing the work that the
group had done collectively on the task during the previous class period.
This discussion is briefly interrupted as one of the instructors approaches the table
and informs the group that they will be asked to present on what they feel are “key
points” of the Quabbin Reservoir Task in approximately 30 minutes.
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Segment 2: Working Backwards
In this short segment, Justin briefly describes his interpretation of what happened
in the previous class period. He says that he spent his time consolidating the inflow and
outflow graphs to see what “the derivative will look like,” and that Daniel, Julie, and
Jamie “worked backwards” to find what the water level would look like. Daniel asks if
everyone understood this previous work.
Segment 3: Daniel and Julie
As a response to Daniel’s checking for understanding, Julie begins to ask Daniel
questions about his approach to the task. Assuming that Julie has created a similar graph
of net rate, Daniel begins to explain how he interpreted the values of the net rate graph as
slopes of the volume graph. He uses the term “velocity,” speaking of a point where the
“velocity is zero,” and also identifies the point with the greatest slope as an “inflection
point.” During this time, Dr. Walter, one of the two professors teaching the course, comes
to the table and begins to observe the discussion.
Segment 4: Daniel and Jamie
After Daniel has explained the process of creating a net rate graph and a volume
graph to Julie, Jamie asks Daniel to help her understand “the labeling.” In order to
explain which graph is which, Daniel recounts the solution process of consolidating the
inflow and outflow graphs to create a net rate graph. Daniel then re-explains how he used
the net rate graph, which he calls “the happy flow chart of our velocity” to construct a
volume graph. Daniel claims that the point with the greatest outflow will be a point of
inflection. Jamie asks Daniel why she can’t see the point of inflection on his volume
graph. Daniel emphasizes the shape of the point of inflection as “where it just goes down
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and then starts to level off.” Daniel says that the inflection point is also “where the
velocity is the highest.” Later, Daniel also recognizes that an inflection point can be
where the velocity is the lowest, demonstrating a more complete view of inflection points
of a function as extrema of the derivative of the function.
Segment 5: The Inflection Idea and the Concave Thing
Julie states that she doesn’t think that she understands the inflection idea. Using
his previous idea of inflection point as “where the velocity is the highest,” Daniel invites
Julie to think of riding down a playground slide and imagining where her speed would be
the highest. Daniel also invites Julie to draw a curve, attempting to “feel” where the curve
starts “to curve off.” Julie asks if there is a connection between inflection points and
concavity. Daniel admits that he does not remember “the concave thing,” but Justin
reaches across the table and identifies the concave down and concave up intervals on the
curve that Daniel has been drawing.
Segment 6: Zero Points
Julie asks Daniel for some help in refining her volume graph. Daniel identifies
what he calls “zero points” (conventionally referred to as critical points, or the zeros of
the derivative function) as important in shaping the volume graph. Dr. Walter, one of the
two instructors for the calculus course, asks Daniel to clarify what he means by “zero
points.” Justin, Daniel, and eventually Jamie all voice their interpretations of “zero
points.”
Segment 7: What Are We Trying to Find?
Julie states, “I think I’m still confused with the idea that it’s velocity,” sparking a
discussion of alternative vocabulary for the task. This discussion quickly leads into a
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discussion of what the goals of the task are. Justin re-reads the instructions for part (a),
“sketch a possible graph for the quantity of water in the reservoir, as a function of time,”
and offers his interpretation of what they have been asked to do.
Segment 8: Language for Quantity
The discussion returns to the topic of vocabulary as Dr. Walter asks the students
to consider appropriate terminology for a graph of quantity of water. After considering
the fact that the given inflow and outflow graphs are in terms of “millions of gallons per
day,” Justin concludes that the quantity graph should be in terms of volume. Recalling
that there is special language for derivatives in the contexts that have been previously
encountered in the calculus course, Daniel wonders whether there is a special name for
the “derivative of volume.”
Segment 9: The Gospel According to Justin
As Daniel begins pursuing a name for “the derivative of volume” in his textbook,
Justin begins an in-depth conversation with Julie about the goals and processes of the
Quabbin Reservoir Task. Justin calls his explanation, “The Gospel According to Justin.”
First, Justin explains the process of adding the inflow and outflow graphs together. Next
he explains how the shape of the net rate graph dictates the shape of the volume graph.
He describes this process of constructing a function from its derivative as “working
backwards.” Finally, Justin summarizes his work on the Quabbin Reservoir Task and
Julie identifies the critical zero points on the rate graph as extrema on the volume graph.
Segment 10: Monkey Wrench
“The Gospel According to Justin” ends as Daniel introduces a “monkey wrench”
that he has found in the calculus book. In his quest to find an official name for the
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“derivative of volume,” Daniel has noticed that if you take the derivative of the formula
for the volume of certain geometric solids, you end up with the formula for the surface
area of the solid. Although this connection is only true for derivatives with respect to the
radii of these solids, the participants attempt to interpret surface area as a rate of change
of volume. They finally give up, partially because they can’t agree on a definition for
surface area, and partially because they feel as though they would have to know the shape
of their reservoir in order to implement Daniel’s idea in a useful way.
Segment 11: Anti-derivative vs. Integral
Dr. Walter questions Daniel’s use of the term “anti-derivative,” and asks if “antiderivative” is connected to what Justin has described as “working backwards.” Justin
comments that he understood anti-derivatives as “integrals.” Basing his description in his
previous calculus experience, Daniel suggests that “integral” refers to a symbolic process
of “how you find the anti-derivative.”
Segment 12: Labeling
In this segment, the participants decide that the derivative graph should be labeled
“rate of change in volume” and that the quantity graph should be called a “volume
graph.”
Segment 13: Breaking it into Quarters
The participants move on to part (b) of the Quabbin Reservoir Task, which asks
them to “Explain the changes in the quantity of water in the reservoir in terms of the
relationships between outflow and inflow during each quarter of the year,” relating these
changes to the volume graph that they have created. The students determine that each
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member of the group should focus on explaining one of the four quarters of the year,
since there are four quarters, and four group members.
Segment 14: Comparing Volumes
Dr. Walter asks the participants to compare the amount of water in the reservoir
on January first to the amount of water in the reservoir on April first. Justin begins to
interpret the area between the inflow and outflow curves on the given graph as volume.
Development of Concept Codes
After coding my data for pronouns, and vocabulary, I hypothesized that the
participants were using more than one word to communicate similar concepts. I wanted to
see if I could consolidate my vocabulary codes into concept categories. While reviewing
the chronological occurrences of codes in discourse, I observed that the term “velocity”
was used quite frequently (in 29 clips, on average 1.8 clips per minute) for the first 15
minutes of the discussion, but after that point (clip 277) the term “velocity” was used
quite sparsely (in only 8 clips for the remaining 33 minutes of discussion, or .25 clips per
minute). The term “volume,” on the other hand, was not used for the first 15 minutes of
the discussion, but was used frequently for the remaining 33 minutes (it first appeared in
clip 286 and continued to appear in an average 1.9 clips per minute for a total of 57 clips
in the last 33 minutes). Although numerically, “volume” seemed to have filled a role that
“velocity” may have vacated, this conclusion didn’t seem to agree with my initial reviews
of the data because it didn’t seem like the two words were analogous in their use. The
participants generally used velocity to talk about a rate of change of a quantity, but
volume represented a quantity that wasn’t necessarily changing. It didn’t seem possible
that the concept of “volume,” could have taken on the conceptual role in discourse
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formerly filled by “velocity.” I wondered if I could make a collection of words that did
fulfill certain conceptual roles. To pursue my questions about the role of “velocity,” and
“volume,” I first tried to determine if there was a collection of words that were used to
portray the same idea as volume, or more generally, quantity. The words that I initially
looked at were: amount, displacement, gallons, how much, quantity, volume, water, and
water level. I wanted to know if these words were being used in a similar way, so I used
the search function of Transana to find clips where these words were used in conjunction
with one another. I now examine some of these clips in detail to describe the
development of concept codes.
Clip 891
I found that the terms “amount,” “gallons,” “volume,”, and “water level,” were all
used together in clip 891. This clip occurs in Segment 14, when Justin is comparing the
amount of volume in the reservoir on January first to the amount of volume in the
reservoir on April first.
891

Justin:

I would say, hmm, they’re probably about equal, like it would be at the
same, wherever you start, your water level at January first, or your, the
amount of volume [motioning as in holding a quantity with arms wide],
excuse me, the uh, millions of gallons, will be approximately the same,
as in April.

“Amount” was used in conjunction with “volume,” in the phrase “amount of
volume.” This amount of volume was static, as it was the amount of volume at one point
in time, on January first. Justin also uses the terms “water level,” and “millions of
gallons,” in a sequence with “amount of volume.” Justin often would clarify his language
by using one word and then providing a series of replacements, or what appeared to be
synonyms, for the original word. At this point in the analysis, I was unsure whether he

72
intended these to be synonyms for the sake of explanation and richer interpretation, or if
he considered them to vary in precision or meaning in significant ways.
Clip 339
The search found both “amount” and “water” used in clip 339, when Justin is
explaining to Julie how he consolidated the inflow and the outflow graphs.
339

Justin:

So like, so you take the, you start, start with the income, uh, inflow I’m
sorry, the inflow and you subtract the outflow from that part right,
that’s gonna give you the amount of water that’s either “coming in” or
“leaving,” [making quotation marks in the air with his fingers] if it’s
negative it’s leaving if it’s positive it’s, it’s coming in.

Here Justin uses “amount” in the phrase “amount of water.” Although “amount of water,”
may seem similar to “amount of volume,” this clip was coded differently from clip 891.
In clip 891, Justin used “amount of volume” to refer to the volume of water in the
reservoir at a given time. In clip 339, however, Justin is not referring to the amount of
water that is in the reservoir, but “the amount of water that’s either ‘coming in,’ or
‘leaving’” to describe a rate of change or how the volume of the reservoir changes. The
use of “amount,” in clip 339 was coded as rate of change in volume, while “amount” in
clip 891 was coded as volume.
Again, in clip 339 we see Justin correct his language, replacing “income,” with
“inflow,” in a manner that seems somewhat different from clip 891. He is apologetic, as
if “income,” is inappropriate or confusing for the situation. I considered this another
example of Justin’s language awareness, making a note that I should definitely return to
investigate Justin’s language substitutions. These substitutions and other verbal cues were
later summarized in a set of language awareness codes (see page 78).
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Clip 260
As Justin attempts to explain the goals of part (a) of the Quabbin Reservoir Task,
he juxtaposes the terms “how much” and “water” in clip 260.
260 Justin: So they’ve given us a rate of flow graph. Which means it’s telling us how
much water is entering [pulling right hand to the right in front of body]
this reservoir and how much it’s filling up [lifting raising right hand
while holding left hand steady below it], but also how much is leaving
[pushing right hand away from self to the right] the reservoir at that exact
same time, and so how much it’s going down [lowering right hand to
meet left hand held steady].
Again, although he refers to a volume of water, Justin describes the particular
volume of water that represents the change in the overall volume at a given time. Clip
260 was therefore coded as rate of change in volume. As I reviewed instances of “how
much” and “amount,” I found that these terms were generally used in conjunction with
“water is leaving/entering the reservoir” to describe a rate of change of volume rather
than a specific measurement of volume in the reservoir.
Clip 281
In clip 281, Julie has just stated that rate of flow, or velocity, is not “what they are
trying to find.” Justin again rephrases his interpretation of the task.
281 Justin:

No, we’re trying to find, we’re trying to take this graph [points to the
original graph], they’re telling us how much the water level is changing
[moving hands together and apart vertically with palms facing] and make
uh, our “best guess” [making quotation marks in the air with his fingers]
at what the water level looks like [holding two hands with palms facing
as before], a graph of how, [drops the left hand and just moves the left
hand slowly up and down with palm facing downward] the water level
change over time. Does that make sense?

Justin’s reply suggests that there is a difference between a graph that “tells us how
much the water level is changing” (his description of the information that was given in
the problem) and “a graph of . . . the water level change over time” (his description of
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what they are trying to find). Both descriptions employ the terms “water level,” and
“change.” These two descriptions may seem like they are descriptions of the same thing,
and one might question why the other participants respond in the affirmative to Justin’s
final questions of “Does that make sense?” But closer inspection shows that the first
description employs the term “how much,” while the second employs “over time.” I
concluded that these two small terms signal a significant difference in meaning for Justin.
While both may be used to communicate a change in volume, Justin uses “how much” to
describe an instantaneous rate of change of volume, and “over time” to describe gradual
change in water level over a period of time. Just as in clip 260, “how much” was coded as
rate of change in volume. “Water level change over time,” became the flagship member
of the newly formed code: change in volume over time.
Clip 666
In clip 666, Justin reads the directions for part (b) of the Quabbin Reservoir task,
including his own interpretation of the directions.
666 Justin:

[reading] “Explain the changes in the quantity of water,” or in other
words, our graph that we just sketched, our millions of gallons graph, our
“volume” graph [making quotation marks in the air with his fingers], “in
the reservoir in terms of the relationships between outflow and inflow
during each quarter of the year. How are these changes evident in your
graph in part (a)?”

Clip 666 includes four of my hypothesized volume vocabulary words: “gallons,”
“quantity,” “volume,” and “water.” In this clip, Justin is reading the instructions to the
task. The wording of the task is “the changes in the quantity of water,” but Justin
rephrases the task statement, cueing his interpretation or substitute language with “in
other words.” He offers three sets of “other words,” which are “our graph that we just
sketched,” “our millions of gallons graph,” and “our volume graph.” “Gallons” was
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identified as a substitute, in Justin’s case, for “volume,” and vice versa. Both were
originally coded as volume, as was “quantity of water.” However, the combination of the
concept of volume and the modifiers “changes in,” or “graph,” resulted in my recoding
these phrases, and this clip, as change in volume over time.
Clips 253 and 254
Clips 253 and 254 below are an example of Justin’s use of the term
“displacement.” He says that the graph of “quantity of water” would be “like a
displacement graph.” Because Justin does not refer to a given displacement at a given
time, but in the sense of displacement changing (“going up and down”) with respect to
the horizontal time axis of the graph, the use of “displacement” as an analog for volume
in clip 254 was coded as change in volume over time rather than simply volume.
253 Justin:
254 Justin:

Alright, well, [part] (a) says “sketch a possible graph of the quantity of
water in the reservoir as a function of time.”
So that [the graph asked for in part a] would be the dis-, that would be
like a displacement graph, right? Quantity of water, whether it’s going
up and down [raising and lowering hand with the palm facing
downward].

Clips 253 and 254 also further demonstrate Justin’s use of the term “quantity.”
When reading aloud the instructions of the task, Justin uses the term “quantity.” His only
other uses of the term follow immediately after reading the term from the task, and in
every one of these instances, he offers substitutes or synonyms for quantity. In clip 254,
he uses “displacement graph” to express his interpretation of “graph of the quantity of
water.” Justin’s quantity-evasion habit can also be observed in his Justin’s offering of
“other words” in clip 666 (shown previously).
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The codes: volume, rate of change in volume, and change in volume over time,
(shown in Table 2) developed as a result of this comparative search process for terms that
I anticipated might be related to the concept of “volume.”
Table 2
Three Emerging Concept Codes
Code

Description

Examples

Volume

The amount of volume in
the reservoir. Often at a
given point in time.

“the amount of water in the
reservoir,” “the quantity of
water,” “millions of
gallons,” “volume level,”
“the volume of the water”

Rate of change in volume

An instantaneous rate of
change.

“amount of water that is
coming in,” “how much
the water level is
changing”

Change in volume over
time

Describes a change in
volume over a period of
time, but does not attempt
to quantify a rate.

“volume graph,” “changes
in quantity of water,”
“displacement (graph)”

I was surprised to find that “amount,” and “how much” were used by the
participants to refer to a rate of change in volume in interpreting the information given in
the inflow and outflow graphs, rather than the amount of water in the reservoir at a given
time. I had previously anticipated that the frequently used terms of “rate of flow,”
“derivative,” and “velocity,” would be more likely candidates to fill the “rate of change”
role. My next step was to investigate the role of those terms. I searched the transcript for
clips that included two or more of the following terms: change, flow, gallons per day,
inflow, outflow, rate, rate of change, rate of flow, and velocity. As before, I analyzed the
clips containing two or more of these terms to compare and contrast their use. I found
that some of these terms were used to describe two separate rates of change while others
described a net rate of change. When terms were used to describe rate of change as a net
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rate of change they were coded, as before, as rate of change in volume. I also found that,
similar to the code change in volume over time, the participants also described a changing
rate of change without attempting to quantify the rate at which the rate was changing.
These instances were coded as change in rate of change over time. At times the
participants also spoke of an instantaneous rate of change of rate of change in terms of
“acceleration.”
The lengthier of the transcript segments described earlier (Segments 3, 4, 9, and
14) all involved interval-by-interval descriptions of one or more of three specific graphs.
First, there was the original graph of inflow and outflow that was given in the task. The
participants used the graph given in the task to create two new graphs. One was a created
graph of the net rate of change for the reservoir. The other created graph was a volume
graph. I coded the participants’ references to each of these graphs as either original
graph, rate of change graph, or volume graph, respectively. Specific points on these
graphs also became the subject of much discussion. I coded references to these points as
rate of change = 0, rate of rate of change = 0, and extrema. For navigational purposes (to
help me know when the participants were pointing out or referring to specific parts of the
graph), I also coded references to specific points and parts on the graphs as well as signs
which were adjectives that appeared in contrasting pairs that seemed to play important
roles in the negotiation of meaning.
Refining the Concept Codes
A table with descriptions and examples of the concept codes can be found in
Appendix E. After creating this table, I then collaborated with other members of the
research team to verify my concept codes. We were not only able to refine these codes,
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but also were able to define relationships between many of the concept codes and
vocabulary codes. The three concept codes of separate rates of change, rate of change in
volume, and volume, and the corresponding references to the original graph, rate of
change graph, and volume graph came to represent three frames of references for
categorizing vocabulary that the participants used to interpret the different intervals of the
Quabbin Reservoir Graph. For example, the concept of net rate of change=0 from the
frame of rate of change was concurrently interpreted as either no change in volume in the
frame of volume or inflow=outflow in the frame of separate rates of change. These
corresponding interpretations, along with related codes (in italicized text) and student
language (in quotation marks) are shown in Table 3. These frames of reference eventually
became a powerful explanatory factor for another set of emergent codes, the Language
Awareness Codes.
Table 3
Organization of Concept Codes and Vocabulary to Reflect Frames of Reference
Frames of Reference
Separate rates of change
Original graph

Rate of change
Rate of change graph

Volume
Volume graph

Inflow = outflow
“Where they (inflow and
outflow) meet”

Net rate of change = 0
“Zero points”

No change in volume/Extrema
“Top and bottom points on
volume,” “leveling off”

“The inflow is greater than
the outflow”

“Positive velocity”

Change in volume over time
“Increasing in volume”

“The inflow is less than the
outflow”

“Negative velocity”

Change in volume over time
“Decreasing in volume”

Language Awareness Codes
As mentioned earlier, I also coded clips in which there appeared to be strong
evidence of the participants’ own awareness of the choices of language and
representation that they were making in discourse. I originally used one code, “language
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awareness,” but this code gradually developed into six other codes. One of these codes is
Justin’s use of “airquotes” (described as “making quotation marks in the air with his
fingers” in clips 281, 339, and 666 shown above). I couldn’t explain why Justin was
making these “airquotes” at the time, or even see a pattern in their use. However, I
considered them an important element of describing the negotiation of meaning in my
data because they seemed to represent an underlying commentary by Justin in respect to
his choice of, and others’ preferences for, specific words and phrases. Justin and the other
participants’ hesitations in speech, requests for definitions and clarifications, and verbal
cues such as “in other words” and “so that would be” led to the eventual development of
the Language Awareness Codes shown in Table 4.
Example of Building Narratives through Codes
It was initially difficult to explain the presence of these language awareness
codes, and I knew that explaining the choices made in discourse would involve a
complex synthesis of differing variables present in the context of the discourse. For the
purpose of analysis, I narrowed my focus to the occurrences of language awareness codes
in the language of Justin in Segment 9: The Gospel According to Justin. Each occurrence
of a language awareness code pointed me to the surrounding discourse via the relevant
concept codes and vocabulary codes. This analysis then allowed me to draw conclusions
about Justin’s choices in discourse as essentially choices between social, mathematical,
and experiential factors.
Segment 9: The Gospel According to Justin, begins as Justin and Daniel ask Julie
“how she is doing” and Julie admits that she is not sure “where [they’re] going.” In the
following portion of transcript, various pronoun codes can be identified. Justin and
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Table 4
Descriptions and Examples of Language Awareness Codes
Language
Description
Examples (Justin is the speaker for
Awareness Code
each example.)
Justin’s practice of making
386: And so you know your slope
“airquotes”
quotation marks in the air
of your [making quotation marks
with his fingers.
in air with fingers] “volume
graph,” the slope is going to be
negative, right?
value judgment

Using language to comment
on language as good, bad,
appropriate, or inappropriate

413: . . . it’s a really bad way to
say it but that’s the only thing I
can think of.

hesitation

Hesitation in speech that
includes pauses or repetition
but no change in vocabulary.

351: So, this is, this is what I
came up with [Justin’s net rate
graph in his notebook].

substitutes and
synonyms

Providing elaboration,
definitions, examples or
alternative language to
communicate meaning for
precise vocabulary. Usually
involves parallel structure or
verbal cues.

264: This is inflow, so this is how
much water is coming in . . .

Providing a precise name for
a concept. Generally follows
the form X would be Y. May
be considered the “inverse”
of substitutes and synonyms
because labeling generally
involves a progression from
more descriptive to more
precise language, while
substitutes and synonyms
generally describes or
interprets precise language.

327: . . . how fast you’re
changing your volume would be
the rate of flow, right?

A middle category between
hesitation and substitutes and
synonyms, word search
involves language that
communicates dissatisfaction
with the original language,
and offers different language,
as though the speaker is
correcting himself.

355: And so the water, volume of
the water is gonna stay the same

labeling

word search

666: “Explain the changes in the
quantity of water,” or in other
words, our graph that we just
sketched . . .

649: -and so it’d [the antiderivative] be your distance
graph [touching his volume
graph]. So this [anti-derivative]
would be considered our volume
graph [Justin’s volume graph].

254: So that [the graph asked for
in part a] would be the dis-, that
would be like a displacement
graph, right?
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Daniel exhibit a literal use of “you” (330, 331) in referring to Julie’s personal progress on
the task. Julie uses “I” and “we” (332) in the literal sense as she admits that she does not
understand where the collective group is metaphorically “going.” Justin shifts between
“we” and “I” (333) to indicate that he is giving his personal perspective on the direction
of group activity. Justin also uses “you” in the general sense as he explains a process for
combining the inflow graph and the outflow graph (338, 339).
From this point in the text on, portions of transcript are presented in five columns.
The columns show, from left to right, (1) the clip number, (2) the video time code, (3) the
speaker, (4) spoken text (with my interpretive annotations in [italic text]) and (5) the
speaker’s concurrent physical gestures and pointing to graphs and inscriptions. The fifth
column of transcript is eliminated in portions of transcript in which physical gestures and
pointing were not noted.
330 (0:31:22.4)
331 (0:31:23.5)
332 (0:31:25.5)

Daniel:
Justin:
Julie:

333 (0:31:32.9)

Justin:

334 (0:31:40.7)
335 (0:31:41.4)

Jamie:
Justin:

Julie where you at?
How you doing Julie?
Um, I don’t I don’t know. I, I
still don’t understand where
we’re going.
What we’re gonna do, let’s see,
is, this is the way I see it,
alright? This is the gospel
according to Justin.
[laughs]
Kay, so we’re given this, this
graph right here right?

It gives us an outflow graph

[Justin indicates
the original graph
on Julie’s page. It
is right side up for
Julie, but upside
down from his
point of view]
[tracing outflow
graph roughly
from left to right
with pencil tip]
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and an inflow graph.

336 (0:31:48.0)
337 (0:31:48.5)

Julie:
Justin:

338 (0:31:54.2)

Justin:

339 (0:32:03.3)

Justin:

340 (0:32:23.7)

Justin:

Right.
Now, to me, you can’t really do
much when you want to know
how, what the volume of the
water is, with those two graphs
separate.
So, what I’m thinking to do is to
add them [inflow and outflow]
together, so you take the
difference between the two
points, right?
So like, so you take the, you
start, start with the income, uh,
inflow I’m sorry, the inflow and
you subtract the outflow from
that part right, that’s gonna give
you the amount of water that’s
either “coming in” or “leaving,”
if it’s negative it’s leaving if it’s
positive it’s, it’s coming in.
Does that make sense?

[tracing inflow
graph from right
to left with pencil
tip]

[tracing the
vertical axis on the
original graph
between the
inflow and the
horizontal axis]
[airquotes]

Of particular interest in this first portion of “the gospel” is Justin’s use of what I
have labeled “airquotes.” I think of these “airquotes” as a way of qualifying one’s choice
of words. An example in written text would be my use of quotation marks around the
phrase “the gospel” in this paragraph. In the strictest sense of the term “gospel,” I would
not consider Justin’s explanation of his work on the Quabbin Reservoir Task a “gospel.” I
have observed that the term “gospel,” generally applies to religious texts, specifically, the
first four books of the New Testament. Justin’s explanation is not one of the first four
books in the New Testament. However, Justin’s explanation does share some qualities of
the four Gospels in the New Testament. For example, Justin’s explanation is a first
person narrative of an event. Also, Justin’s narrative, like the first four books of the Old
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Testament, is not meant to be a synopsis or summary. Rather, it is a detailed account. In
other words, it is long. I quote Justin when I call his explanation “the gospel,” but my use
of quotation marks has a purpose beyond avoiding plagiarism. I also use quotation marks
to imply that I do not necessarily agree that “the gospel” is the most correct term for what
I am describing, but that I believe it is a term that efficiently communicates an idea that
might otherwise require an ambiguous label such as “Justin’s Explanation,” or a lengthy
label such as “Justin’s explanation of his work on the Quabbin Reservoir Task.” Simply
referring to this portion of transcript as “the gospel,” is more efficient (although later on I
began referring to this segment simply as Segment 9).
The reader may have noticed that I also placed quotation marks around the term
“airquotes.” Similar to “the gospel,” I use these quotation marks to qualify my choice of
vocabulary. I originally coded Justin’s uses of “airquotes” as “making quotation marks in
the air with his fingers.” I found this label to also be lengthy, and not necessarily an
accurate description of what I was trying to describe. While working with other members
of the research team, we began to refer to Justin’s gesture as “airquotes.” Therefore, I use
quotation marks to qualify language that has been effective in my past attempts to
communicate an idea, yet is language that doesn’t necessarily seem academically
appropriate.
I have just given two examples of how my use of quotations marks in this written
text is a way of implicitly admitting that I do not believe that I am necessarily using the
most precise language, but am pragmatically using language that has proven to be
effective in my past efforts to communicate. The data suggest that Justin’s use of
airquotes in “the gospel” is also a sign of his conscious choices of effective language that
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he perhaps recognizes as not completely appropriate. Returning to the transcript, Justin
demonstrates his use of airquotes in clip 339:
339 (0:32:03.3)

Justin:

So like, so you take the, you
start, start with the income, uh,
inflow I’m sorry, the inflow and
you subtract the outflow from
that part right, that’s gonna give
you the amount of water that’s
either “coming in” or “leaving,”
if it’s negative it’s leaving if it’s
positive it’s, it’s coming in.

[tracing the
vertical axis on the
original graph
between the
inflow and the
horizontal axis]
[airquotes]

It was not initially apparent why Justin would need to qualify his use of “coming
in,” or “leaving.” These are common terms that appear appropriate for the situation.
These terms had also been used previously in the mathematical discourse with little
resistance or question. Confused as to why Justin had now began to qualify his use of
“coming in” and “leaving,” I viewed this moment of confusion as an opportunity for me
to learn something new about my participants’ reasons for their choices (Leatham, 2006).
Guided by an assumption that there was a reason for Justin’s use of airquotes I embarked
on a process of data-guided analysis to develop an explanation for Justin’s choice.
Having used my language awareness code of “airquotes” to identify “coming in”
and “leaving” as vocabulary of interest, I next used my vocabulary codes to investigate
portions of transcript where Justin and the other participants had used similar vocabulary.
I then compared the concept codes associated with the portions of transcript and found
that the participants had used similar vocabulary to communicate slightly different
concepts. Different language awareness codes and events helped me to understand subtle
shifts in language that corresponded to these differences in use. These subtle shifts in
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language became the basis of narratives of the negotiation of meaning for a term that
Daniel had originally referred to as “zero points.”
I followed a similar process of investigating Justin’s use of language awareness
codes in Segment 9: The Gospel Accoring to Justin by tracing the interaction of the
relevant vocabulary and concept codes to unravel the negotiation of meaning in
mathematical discourse. The result is three connected narratives of the negotiation of
meaning and language for (1) points of inflection and concavity, (2) “zero points”
(critical points), and (3) the analogical problem solving process that related the language
of “velocity” and “displacement” to “rate of flow” and “volume.” These three narratives
are presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND FINDINGS
My analysis of “The Gospel According to Justin,” revealed, in Justin’s language,
echoes of previous segments of discourse. In tracing these echoes back to their sources, I
uncovered in my data the negotiation of meaning for three conceptually important ideas
that may be characterized in the conventional language as (1) hypercritical points, (2)
critical points, and (3) the analogical mappings between contextualized examples of a
derivative. In the language of our participants, the negotiation of meaning involved the
terms (1) “inflection” and “concavity,” (2) “zero points,” and (3) “velocity” and
“volume.” The negotiation of meaning for these three conceptually important ideas was
interwoven, all finding root in Daniel’s language in Segment 3, and all being echoed in
Justin’s language in Segment 9. Between Segments 3 and 9, Jamie, Julie, and the
instructor, Dr. Walter, drive the negotiation of meaning with questions and comments
about language. In this section, I provide three narratives for the negotiation of meaning
for these three conceptually important ideas, describing my findings in terms of the three
agentive explanatory factors of personal experience, mathematical understanding, and
social roles; as well as social and egocentric speech; and conventional and ordinary
language.
Inflection Points: Personal Experience and Personal Pronouns
Two different definitions for the conventional term inflection points are
negotiated, one of inflection point as extrema of the rate of change and another of
inflection point as the point between concave down and concave up intervals. Daniel
introduces the idea of inflection points as extrema (Segment 3), and, as a response to
questions from Jamie (Segment 4) and Julie (Segment 5), uses pronouns and the ordinary
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language of personal experience to demonstrate how extrema in the original graphs of
inflow and outflow and his created rate of change graph are reflected in the shape of the
volume graph. Julie asks how the inflection points are related to “the concave,” another
term that she has heard in previous discourse, and Justin builds on Daniel’s definition,
using Daniel’s words and inscriptions, to connect meaning for “inflection point” to
meaning for “concave.” We gain insight into Justin’s visual meaning for “concave” from
a question he asks the instructor, and then observe Justin use the terms “concave” and
“inflection” in “the gospel” (Segment 9)
Daniel Identifies an “Inflection Point” (Segment 3)
When Daniel introduces the term “inflection point,” he speaks of inflection points
as extrema, saying that an inflection point is where the slope is the greatest. Daniel
identifies an inflection point on the original graph, and then on the volume graph. While
Justin’s choice was to first construct a net rate of change graph from the original graph,
and then construct a volume graph, Daniel’s gestures reflect how he originally
constructed his volume graph directly from the original graphs of rates of inflow and
outflow. Later, upon noticing how the other participants created net rate graphs as an
intermediate graph between the original graph and the volume graph, Daniel also
constructed a net rate (or “velocity”) graph of his own (Figure 8).
58b (0:13:50.1)

Daniel:

And it has, its greatest slope
is right here,
so that’s its inflection point

[point F, October, on
the original graph]
[point F, October, on
the volume graph].
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Original Graph

Volume Graph

Rate Graph

Figure 8. Daniel’s graphs.
A “Normal” Inflection Point (Segment 4)
When Daniel describes the shape of the volume graph to Jamie, his description of
an inflection point changes. He formerly described an inflection point as the point of
“greatest slope,” but now he identifies an inflection point as “when it has the most
outflow,” terminology that reflects the idea of separate rates of change. Looking to the
volume graph as a representation of water level, Daniel also describes an inflection point
as where the volume graph “comes down and starts to level off.”
106 (0:17:05.3)

Daniel:

It goes negative
and then that point up there

107

Jamie:

is when it has the most
outflow, I believe.
Um hmm.

[tracing the rate graph
from E to F]
[point F on the original
graph]
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108 (0:17:14.9)

Daniel:

That’s your inflection parts.
That’s when it goes like
whoop.

Hmm. Like that part right
there. So that’s, like, then it
comes down
and starts to level off, kind
of, like the water level.

[Daniel draws a line
with negative slope
which first becomes
more negative and
then more positive]
[the volume graph
from E to F]
[the volume graph
from F to G]

Although Daniel has just described what a point of inflection looks like on a
volume graph, Jamie asks Daniel why she can’t see the point of inflection on his volume
graph.
109 (0:17:29.1)

Jamie:

Okay so why isn’t this
inflection point
really reflected anywhere on
this part of the graph?

[point F on the
original graph]
[circling the area
around point F on the
volume graph]

A point of highest velocity, or highest rate, is a salient feature as the maximum on
a rate graph. To the untrained eye, however, a point of inflection is not a particularly
salient feature on the graph of a function. Daniel recognizes that inflection points are
“hard to draw,” and emphasizes the shape of an inflection point by drawing a prototypical
inflection point (Figure 9). Although Daniel has been speaking primarily in the third
person “it” to refer to the graph, he now personifies the graph, using the first person “I.”
Daniel, as if speaking for the graph, says, “I’m going down down down” and then “I’m
leveling off.” Daniel’s falling intonation dramatically recreates the sensation of falling
down.
110 (0:17:34.6)

Daniel:

It, this is hard to draw, like, a
normal inflection would be
like, “I’m going down,
down, down.”[falling
intonation]

[drawing a line with
a negative slope that
becomes more
negative (Figure 9)]
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111
112 (0:17:40.3)

Jamie:
Daniel:

[laughs]
And then it goes, “I’m
leveling off.”

[continuing the line
with the negative
slope becoming less
negative]

Figure 9. Reproduction of Daniel’s drawing of a “normal” inflection point.
Daniel summarizes his example by circling the point of inflection (Figure 9),
describing the point as “where it just goes down and then starts to level off,” and then
describing of a point of inflection in the language of extrema as “the highest velocity that
you’ll have.”
113 (0:17:43.3)

Daniel:

114
115 (0:17:46.3)

Jamie:
Daniel:

116 (0:17:50.8)

Daniel:

So it’d be like that. Like, that [drawing a circle
would be the inflection point. (Figure 9) where the
slope stops
decreasing and
begins increasing]
Kay.
[drawing another line
Like the point where it just
goes down and then starts to and circling the
inflection point]
level off.
This is the highest velocity
that you’ll have.

It is not until Jamie attempts to identify the same inflection point on the rate
graph that Daniel admits that an inflection point can also be where the velocity is the
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lowest, demonstrating a more complete view of inflection points of a function as extrema
of the derivative of the function.
124 (0:18:17.8)

125 (0:18:20.0)

Jamie:

Daniel:

So is this inflection point

[F on the original
graph]

[inaudible]?

[pointing to the
corresponding
portion of Daniel’s
volume graph]
[drawing a
minimum at
October on the rate
graph]

Oh yeah. so I guess that it
should be the most negative
here, be like that, and then it
starts, like that’s the lowest
velocity it ever gets.

The Slide Example (Segment 5)
Julie, who generally works patiently on her own, but often asks important
clarifying questions about the group’s approach to the task, asks Daniel to clarify what he
means by point of inflection. Daniel hesitates at first as to how he should structure his
explanation, but then refers to the common human experience of riding on a playground
slide to help Julie see what he means by an inflection point being “where the velocity is
the highest.”
141 (0:19:13.7)

Julie:

142 (0:19:19.1)

Daniel:

143 (0:19:32.9)

Daniel:

144 (0:19:37.3)

Daniel:

I don’t think I understand the
inflection idea.
Okay, so if you’re, like,
here’s kind of an, idea, okay.
So if you’re drawing, a
curve. Um, like, you just.
Ah.
Okay, so the inflection point
is where the velocity is the
highest,
so, like, if it, if you were like [Drawing a curve
similar to Figure 9,
going on a slide and if
shown in Figure 10]
you’re falling down on it,
your speed would be
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145
146 (0:19:48.3)

Julie:
Daniel:

147 (0:19:53.4)

Julie:

148 (0:19:55.7)

Daniel:

149 (0:19:59.2)

Daniel:

150

Julie:

increasing, you’d be going
like down really really
quickUm hm.
Then at some point you’d
start to level off. And where
would your velocity be
highest?
Right there. Before you
[inaudible]
Yeah, like, before you start
to slope off.
Yeah, that’s just the
inflection point. Like where
the velocity is highest.
Okay.

[pointing with pencil]
[pointing with his
pencil, Figure 10]

Figure 10. Identifying “the point where you start to level off.”
In a process of linguistic invention (Walter & Johnson, 2007), Daniel skillfully
combines his meaning for the mathematical concept of a point of inflection as extrema of
the derivative or “velocity” graph with a common human experience in which “highest
velocity” can be pinpointed in the form of a kinesthetic sensation. There is an element of
iconic interpretation (Leinhardt, Zaslavsky & Stein, 1990), as the shape of the inflection
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point that Daniel draws also looks like the shape of a playground slide. I do not consider
this a negative form of iconic interpretation, as it is not so much the shape of the curve,
but Daniel’s definition of an inflection point as where “the velocity is the highest” that
justifies the location of the inflection point.
Daniel’s use of the second person pronoun “you” (144-146) may be interpreted as
a general form of “you” that is replaceable with the general “one” as in “if one were
going on a slide.” However, the sense of the pronoun is not entirely general, because
Daniel also holds Julie as the responsible referent of “you” when he asks her, “where
would your velocity be the highest?” Because of the personal nature of the embodied
sensation of maximum, I view this use of “you” as a more personal use, intended to invite
Julie to participate in recalling her own personal experience. In doing so, Daniel
demonstrates his awareness of Julie as a participant in such an experience.
Drawing a Curve (Segment 5)
Daniel offers another example to help Julie recognize how the point of inflection
as an extreme value of rate or slope (velocity) is reflected in the shape of a function. He
invites her to draw a curve and “feel the point where you start to curve off,” offering Julie
an additional opportunity to “feel” a point of inflection within the convenience of the
mathematics classroom. Again, Daniel’s use of “you” may be in a general sense, as if
anyone can draw the curve and feel the inflection point, but in the context of an invitation
to act, his use of “you” takes on a slightly more personal sense. Once again, Daniel
animates his action, speaking in the first person as if he were the curve, or riding down
the curve as a slide.
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151 (0:20:05.0)

Daniel:

152
153 (0:20:13.0)

Julie:
Daniel:

154
155 (0:20:14.4)

Julie:
Daniel:

Like if you were to draw, like
a line, like you can kind of feel
the point where you start to
curve off.
Right.
Cause you’re like drawing and
AHHH!
[laughs]
Like “I’m falling” and then
“whew!”

[drawing more
decreasing curves
similar to Figures 9
and 10.]

Connecting Inflection to Concavity (Segment 5)
Julie uses Daniel’s description of inflection point to attempt to connect it to
“concave,” another term that has emerged in conjunction with the term “point of
inflection” in a recent whole-class discussion. Julie asks, “And so, when you were talking
before, the inflection point did, did the concave, right? Did it start the concave or was that
the point of . . .” Julie’s speech fades off, and Daniel admits that he does not remember
“the concave thing.” Jamie chimes in with a rhyme about concavity, “concave down like
a frown, concave up like a cup.” Laughing at Jamie’s rhyme, possibly because he may
have learned a similar pneumonic device in his own previous calculus class, Justin helps
Daniel to understand the idea of concavity in terms of points of inflection.
165 (0:20:41.0)

166
167 (0:20:44.3)

168

Justin:

[laughing at Jamie’s rhyme]
So concave down, like that,

Daniel:
Justin:

that’s concave down.
Um hm.
-and this is concave up,

Daniel:

and so they [concave down
and concave up]Ohh!

[drawing a parabolic
curve opening down
on the curve Daniel
has drawn (Figure
11)]

[drawing a parabolic
curve opening up on
the curve that Daniel
has drawn]
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169 (0:20:46.3)

Justin:

170
171 (0:20:48.6)

Daniel:
Justin:

172
173 (0:20:58.0)

Daniel:
Julie:

-change at that point of
inflection.
Ohhh! That’s smart.
So that’s what you’re try-,
that’s what you’re saying, the
point, that’s, the veloc-, the
velocity’s the highest at that
point of inflection on a
displacement graph.
Oh, okay.
So it’s where they change.

Figure 11. Justin’s addition of concave up and concave down “parabolas”
to Daniel’s point of inflection.
The most remarkable portion of this section of transcript is the way that Justin
builds on Daniel’s previously stated ideas on inflection. Rather than create a new diagram
to demonstrate concavity, Justin highlights the concave down and concave up portions
that already exist in the representation created by Daniel (Figure 11). Furthermore,
although Justin adds the idea that concave down and concave up “change at that point of
inflection,” he also returns Daniel’s words to him in his explanation, saying “that’s what
you’re saying . . . the velocity’s the highest at that point of inflection on a displacement
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graph.” Justin’s use of “you” is literal, because Daniel literally has been saying that a
point of inflection is where “the velocity’s the highest.” Although Justin does not always
identify whose language he is repeating in further discussion as he does here, he does
continue to echo his peer’s language in the negotiation of meaning many times in this
study as evidence of his awareness of, and meaning for, his peers.
Justin’s Question: Concave Right? (Segment 5)
Justin provides additional insight into his understanding of concavity when he
turns to his instructor and asks about the correct way to characterize the concavity of a
parabola opening to the right.
182 (0:21:22.6)

Justin:

Just out of curiosity Dr.
Walter, if they had a, if you
have a curve like this, would
it be concave right?
Or is it still concave down
and concave up?

[shows Dr. Walter a
curve he has drawn
that looks like a
parabola opening to
the right]
[the top half of the
curve]
[the bottom half of
the curve]

The instructor explains that, although the curve that Justin has drawn does not
represent a function, the concavity of the curve would most likely be described as
concave down and concave up. Justin thanks the instructor and says no more on the
subject. His question, however, is interesting in that the idea of “concave right” portrays
concavity as a physical characteristic of a curve, with no explicit connection to slope or
rate of change. Had the participants attempted to interpret concavity in terms of velocity
or rate of change, the notion of “concave right” for a parabola opening to the right may
have led to an interesting discussion. As this discussion did not happen, I can only say
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that Justin’s meaning for concavity was related to the visual shape of a parabolic curve
opening in a certain direction.
Clip 182 demonstrates another unique use of pronouns in Justin’s language. He
speaks of “they” when he says, if “they had a curve,” but corrects his language, replacing
“they” with “you.” Analysis of others instances of Justin’s use of “they” and “you”
reveals that Justin generally uses the animate “they” to refer to the creators of the
Quabbin Reservoir Task, as in “they’ve given us this graph.” Justin most often uses
“you” in the general sense in explaining mathematical activity as in “you subtract this
distance.” This instance of “you” may be an exception to his general use, as Justin
specifically replaces “they” with “you.” A possible interpretation may be that Justin
identifies Dr. Walter with the creators of the task and so the referent of “they” becomes
“you” as Justin realizes that the person to whom he was addressing his question may be
the literal referent of “they.” Another possible interpretation is that Justin uses “they” to
refer to the community of mathematicians, and recognizes Dr. Walter as a member of that
community. Although there is not sufficient data to draw a firm conclusion as to why
Justin substitutes “you” for “they,” this may be an example of an instructor playing the
role of the more experienced participant in mathematical discourse who is better able to
inform Justin as to how conventional language of mathematics is used (Lampert, 1990).
Inflection and Concavity in “the Gospel” (Segment 9)
Later, as Justin is using the net rate graph to explain the shape of the volume
graph to Julie in Segment 9, he interweaves the two definitions for points of inflection,
referring to Daniel’s idea of extrema in rate of change (velocity) when looking at the rate
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graph, and building on his own idea of switching back and forth between concave up and
concave down intervals on the volume graph (displacement graph) (Figure 12).
399 (0:36:39.4)

Justin:

So it’s [the volume graph]
going concave up right here

because it [the rate graph]
keeps on getting higher and
higher and higher
and so it [the volume graph]
keeps on raising faster and
faster and faster
until it [the volume graph]
gets to that inflection point,
this point right here.
400 (0:36:49.6)
401 (0:36:50.6)

Julie:
Justin:

402 (0:36:58.6)

Julie:

Okay.
And then all of the sudden,
it’s [the volume graph] still
rising,
but it’s going, it’s rising
gradually slower and so it
[the volume graph] starts
concaving down, right?
Okay.

[after the first
minimum on the
volume graph
(Figure 12)]
[after first x-intercept
on net rate graph]
[approaching the first
point of inflection on
the volume graph]
[first inflection point
on volume graph,
first maximum on
rate graph]
[right after the first
maximum on the rate
graph]
[right after the first
inflection point on
the volume graph]

Just as Daniel used the repetition of “down, down, down” to emphasize the idea
of increasing speed in his earlier description of an inflection point in the context of a
playground slide, Justin repeats, “higher and higher and higher” to portray increasing
values on the rate graph, and correspondingly, “faster and faster and faster” to convey the
idea of increasing rate of change, or slope, on the volume graph. Justin describes this
interval of “concaving up” on the volume graph as leading up to the inflection point,
which he identifies as extrema on the rate graph. Following the inflection point,
decreasing rate, observed as a decreasing interval on the rate graph, is described as
“concaving down” on the volume graph. More examples of Justin’s descriptions of the

99
shape of the volume graph 1 can be observed in the full transcript of Segment 9, found in
Appendix F.

Figure 12. Justin’s “velocity” (rate) graph (left) and “displacement” (volume) graph
(right).
Zero Points: Shifting Frames of Reference to Reflect Experience
In Chapter 5, I described how my initial investigation of Segment 9 drew my
attention to Justin’s use of airquotes in the phrase “the amount of water that’s either
‘coming in’ or ‘leaving’” (339). I followed my vocabulary codes, tracing Justin’s use of
“coming in” to Daniel’s use of similar vocabulary in the negotiation of meaning for the

1

Justin’s explanation of the second inflection point is not as smoothly navigated, and at the end of his
explanation, Justin comments that his language “is a really bad way to say it.” This final portion of the
graph may be one of the more difficult portions to describe because the volume is decreasing while the rate
is increasing. If the volume were increasing and the rate increasing, one could say that the volume is
increasing at an increasing rate. Here, however, it is difficult to determine whether one should say that the
volume is decreasing at an increasing rate or decreasing at a decreasing rate. In the sense of becoming more
positive, the rate is increasing. In the sense of directionless rate, or speed, one might say that the rate is
decreasing because it is getting closer and closer to a rate of zero. (For example, one may be driving their
car in reverse slower and slower and slower). Similar student reactions to the concept of signed velocity are
reported in Johnson (2005) and Nemirovsky (1994).
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term “zero points” (Segment 6). This comparison of vocabulary and concept codes
revealed that the frames of reference of separate rates of change, rate of change in
volume, and volume played a role in how this vocabulary was interpreted by the
participants. Here, I tell the story of negotiation of meaning in chronological order,
beginning with Daniel’s initial recognition of the importance of “zero” (Segments 3 and
4) and offering the sequence of data that led me to an eventual interpretation of Justin’s
use of airquotes in “the gospel.”
Daniel Identifies a Zero (Segments 3 and 4)
Returning again to Segment 3, we first see Daniel speak of zero in his statement
that the volume graph “levels off at zero.”
58a (0:13:50.1)

Daniel:

So, it has a negative slope.
And then it starts going
positive up to that point.
And so it levels off at zero.
Cause the v-, the v- [1 sec]
I don’t know what you call
that. The velocity of the flow
of the water or something?
The velocity of this is zero.
[2 sec]
Which is correct on our
velocity chart.

[point E, July, on the
rate graph]
[point E, July, on the
volume graph]
[point E on the
volume graph]

[point E on the rate
graph]

Although he has difficulty explaining exactly what is zero, Daniel recognizes that
the zeros of the rate graph play an important role in the shape of the volume graph. The
idea of leveling off at zero reoccurs often in Daniel’s language, accompanied by various
conventional terms that might be associated with the idea of rate of change (Zandieh,
2000), such as “tangent” and “slope,” and some less conventional language such as “rate
of positivity.”
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Original Graph

Volume Graph

Rate Graph

Figure 13. Daniel’s graphs.
91 (0:16:09.4)

Daniel:

97 (0:16:37.7)

Daniel:

98
99 (0:16:43.0)

Jamie:
Daniel:

And then it hits zero, so like
your tangent there would be
zero.
And then it starts going to
positive to this point.
Like it stops going positive
here.
Like this is the rate of
positivity . . .

[volume graph at B]

-then it starts to go to a zero in
positivity in its growth.
Okay.
So it, it slopes out.

[rate graph from D
to E]

[volume graph from
B to E]
[rate graph at E,
July]
[rate graph from B
to E]

[volume graph at E]

Coining and Clarifying “Zero Points” (Segment 6)
Daniel coins the term “zero points,” as he helps Julie identify the intercepts of her
rate graph. Daniel is much more detailed, focusing the negotiation of meaning, as he
helps Julie to recognize what a zero point looks like. Using the original graph as a guide
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in creating the volume graph, Daniel identifies the points where the inflow and outflow
meet as zero points. The equality of inflow and outflow results in the water level
remaining constant. “So,” reasons Daniel, “where the inflow and the outflow meet are . . .
zero points.”
201 (0:22:49.3)

Daniel:

202
203 (0:23:00.0)

Julie:
Daniel:

204 (0:23:15.6)
205 (0:23:15.7)

Julie:
Daniel:

206 (0:23:20.5)
207 (0:23:25.0)

Julie:
Daniel:

. . . Okay, this [point E on the original graph] is
where the inflow equals the outflow, right?
Um hm.
And so the velocity there equals zero, right?
Cause like, there’s neither inflow, there’s not
water coming in, nor is there water coming out.
Right.
I mean, like there is, but they’re equal, so the
water level isn’t actually changing.
Okay. So how’s this gonna look?
So like where the, where the outflow and the
inflow meet, are gonna be our zero points.

Although Daniel is being much more explicit about the correlation of the original
graph and the volume graph, he still has not explicitly identified what the zero points
have to do with “zero.” At one point (203) he states that the “velocity” is zero, but then
corrects himself, saying that zero velocity does not necessarily imply zero outflow and
zero inflow (203, 205). Dr. Walter, who, with the exception of answering Justin’s
question about concavity (182), has been a silent observer of the conversation, enters the
conversation by revoicing Daniel’s statement and asking Daniel to clarify what is zero at
a “zero point.”
208 (0:23:34.3)

Dr. Walter:

I don’t understand what you mean, where the
inflow and the outflow meet you’re gonna
have zero points. Zero points of what?

In overlapping speech, Daniel and Justin offer different language for describing
zero points. Daniel appears to offer “velocity” as a synonym for “the level of water
overall,” but then stops to think (209). Justin (210) revoices Daniel’s previous language
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(203, 205) of “where the inflow and outflow meet” to say “where the inflow and outflow
are the same,” and draws the same conclusion as Daniel, that such a relationship in
separate rates of change will be reflected in the frame of change in volume over time as
“no change in water level.” Justin and Daniel verbally co-construct the idea (215-216)
that the “velocity,” or net rate graph, demonstrates “zero” because the graph crosses the
horizontal “x-axis.” This co-constructed idea is justified in two different ways. Justin
takes a local approach, saying that “the water level won’t change at that point” (217).
Daniel makes a more holistic statement about the sign of the velocity (rate) graph and the
resultant increasing and decreasing shapes of the water level (volume) graph (216-220).
Using a form of case elimination, Daniel explains that if positive rate means that the
water level is increasing, and negative rate means that the water level is decreasing, then
no change in water level must fall in between negative and positive rate, giving a zero
rate.
209 (0:23:42.7)

Daniel:

210 (0:23:52.1)

Justin:

211
212 (0:23:57.2)
213 (0:23:59.0)

Daniel:
Justin:
Daniel:

214

Justin:

215 (0:24:00.3)

Justin:

The level of water overall.
So the velocity. I think, let’s
see.
Well it’d [a zero point] be
where the inflow and the
outflow are the same, so
there is no change in water
level.
Yeah.
So,
Like where they meet,
though.
you don’t change your
veloc-yeah where they [inflow
and outflow] meet, yeah,
cause they’d be the same. So
in a velocity graph it’d be
where they would, it would
cross the x-axis.
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216

Daniel:

217 (0:24:07.3)

Justin:

218 (0:24:11.9)

Daniel:

219 (0:24:18.5)

220 (0:24:22.5)

Daniel:

Daniel:

x-axis, yeah, cause like the,
uh
Cause the water level won’t
change at that point.
-velocity of the water, if the
velocity is positive,
it will be increasing in water
level.
And if the velocity is
negative,
it will be decreasing in
water level.
And so, when the, when
there is no change in the
water level for a certain
time,
the velocity will be zero of
water coming in or water
coming out.

[sweeping hand to the
right and upward]

[sweeping hand
downward and to the
right]
[holding both hands
at the same level]

[moving right hand
away and then toward
himself]

To describe what is zero about a zero point (220), Daniel uses the language of
water “coming in” and water “coming out.” This language is problematic for Jamie
because it seems to imply that both inflow and outflow, or separate rates of change, are
also zero at a zero point. Jamie tells Daniel that she doesn’t agree that the separate rates
of change have to be zero at a zero point.
221 (0:24:36.0)

Jamie:

222 (0:24:42.9)
223 (0:24:46.2)

Daniel:
Jamie:

224

Daniel:

[3 sec] I don’t agree with
that. The velocity could be
equal.
Kay, like how so?
The velocity of the water
coming in equals the
velocity of the water going
out.
So your [3 sec] your, your
water level in your reservoir
is going to stay the same.
Yeah.

[moving right hand
toward herself]
[moving left hand
away from herself]
[raising and lowering
hands with palms
down]
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225 (0:25:01.0)

Jamie:

226 (0:25:12.7)

Daniel:

227 (0:25:18.8)
228 (0:25:20.8)

Jamie:
Daniel:

229 (0:25:30.5)
230 (0:25:32.7)
231 (0:25:33.9)

Jamie:
Daniel:
Daniel:

Whereas, if you had a
higher velocity coming in
than going out, your water
level is going to rise.
If you have a lower velocity
going in than going out,
your water level is going to
drop.
So if the velocity of coming
in and going out were the
same, what would the total
velocity equal?
They would be equal.
Wouldn’t it be zero? Like if
you have a negative
velocity, of like, five, that’s
coming out
and a positive velocity of
five that’s coming in -

[raising hand with
palm down]

[lowering hand with
palm down]

[sweeping right hand
away from self and to
the right]
[bringing left hand
toward right hand in
front of self]

Going in. That’s true.
-wouldn’t that be zero?
But we could also like draw
these two different
functions as separate, like
we’ve been drawing
velocity together-

Daniel and Jamie seem to agree that a zero point (a net rate of zero) does not
necessarily imply that no water is entering or exiting the reservoir. (In fact, in clips 203
and 205, Daniel recognized the same fact that Jamie is working to help him understand
here.) The negotiation of meaning taking place stems from a difference in frames of
reference revealed by language. Daniel’s statement in line 220 that “the velocity will be
zero of water coming in or water coming out,” immediately follows his reference to zero
on the velocity (or net rate graph) which would be in the frame of a net rate of change in
volume, later referred to as “total velocity” (226). Jamie, however, interpreted Daniel’s
statement as a claim about the separate rates of change, and found the claim of zero
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velocity to be false. This difference in frames of reference is further evidence by Jamie’s
use of the plural pronoun “they” for separate rates of change (227) and Daniel’s use of
the singular pronoun “it” for a net rate of change in volume (228). At the end of this
exchange, Daniel suggests that their difference in opinion might be resolved by drawing
the two functions separately, in accordance with Jamie’s idea of separate rates of change
rather than “drawing velocity together” as a net rate of change.
Language for Separate Rates of Change (Segment 7)
The negotiation between Jamie and Daniel resulted from Daniel’s description of
net rate of change with the words “water coming in” and “water coming out.” Before
creating an explanation for Justin’s later use of airquotes with the words “coming in” and
“leaving” in Segment 9, I first examine Justin’s use of similar vocabulary. As Justin
reiterates the goals of the task in Segment 7, he uses the term “how much water is coming
in” to describe the inflow graph. He and Jamie then construct a direct interpretation
between the frames of separate rates of change and change in volume over time, stating
that “if the inflow is smaller than the outflow . . . the reservoir is going down.”

264 (0:26:52.5)

Justin:

265 (0:26:58.1)
266 (0:26:58.3)

Jamie:
Justin:

267 (0:26:59.9)
268

Justin:
Jamie:

Yeah, well this is, this is,
yeah,
this

[inflow on the original
graph]

is the inflow right here. This
is inflow, so this is how
much water is coming inUh-huh.
-right here.
[tracing the inflow
line on the original
graph]
So
So-
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269

Justin:

270 (0:27:04.5)
271 (0:27:05.4)

Jamie:
Justin:

-if the inflow is greater
than, is smaller than the
outflow, that means that the
reservoir isgoing down.
-going down.

[bringing right hand
down to meet left
hand]

Explaining the Airquotes (Segment 9)
In the previous transcript, (264-271), Justin shifted from the separate rates of
change language (“how much water is coming in,” 264) to language from the frame of
change in volume over time (“the reservoir is going down,” 269, 271), in order to explain
the combined effects of inflow and outflow. Later, in the opening lines of “the gospel,”
we see Justin’s first recorded attempt (339) at describing the combined effects of inflow
and outflow in terms of rate of change language. He uses airquotes to qualify his
language choice.
339 (0:32:03.3)

Justin:

So like, so you take the, you
start, start with the income, uh,
inflow I’m sorry, the inflow and
you subtract the outflow from
that part right, that’s gonna give
you the amount of water that’s
either “coming in” or “leaving,”
if it’s negative it’s leaving if it’s
positive it’s, it’s coming in.

[tracing the
vertical axis on the
original graph
between the
inflow and the
horizontal axis]
[airquotes]

Based on the discussion between Jamie and Daniel in Segment 6, a possible
reason for qualifying the use of “amount of water coming in” for a positive net rate may
be the fact that such language does not tell the entire story. A positive net rate may be,
and in the case of the Quabbin Reservoir, is, a way of summarizing that there is more
inflow than outflow. However, speaking of a positive net rate as merely “how much
water’s coming in” may imply that there is only inflow, or that outflow is zero. Speaking
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of negative net rate as “how much water is leaving” also only tells half the story, and
would be more appropriately interpreted as “how much more water is leaving than is
coming in.” The mathematical practice of taking the difference in inflow and outflow and
interpreting that difference as a net rate results in the loss of information about outflow
and inflow.
Furthermore, Justin’s failure to find ordinary language that would express a net
rate of change more appropriately in terms of the reservoir suggests that “net rate of
change” is not something that is often encountered in his experiential history with bodies
of water. This is an example of Justin’s language reflecting a choice between correctly
communicating his understanding of the mathematics and correctly representing his
personal experience. The mathematical reality of combining two functions (inflow and
outflow with respect to time) and interpreting the result as a net rate of change is at odds
with experience, because the inflow and outflow of a reservoir happen at two different
locations in the reservoir. Inflow is a measure of the rate of water entering the reservoir,
which may be observed where the water source for the reservoir meets the reservoir. At
another location on the reservoir, a mechanism of sorts is constructed to moderate the
amount of water that is permitted to leave the reservoir, either for a designated use or to
avoid an overflow. It would be impractical, however, to build a reservoir so that water
enters and exits the reservoir at the same location. Therefore, while one can observe the
amount of water “coming in” to a reservoir (inflow) and the amount of water “leaving” a
reservoir (outflow), one does not observe the combined effects of these two rates as a net
rate in any physical location.
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However, one can observe the combined effects of inflow and outflow in terms of
the change in volume over time as the level of water rises and falls. Justin’s language
reflects this phenomenon as he moves to the frame of change in volume over time in his
next attempt to interpret the combined effects of inflow and outflow.
342 (0:32:25.4)

Justin:

So, if you did that
[subtraction of outflow from
inflow] just over, you know,
just did that for every single
part, this would be that part
that’s leaving,
this is the, uh, water coming
in, this is the, when the, um,
water,
“volume” level is rising.
This is when it’s [the volume
level] going down again.

[shading the area
between inflow and
outflow from A to B
(Figure 14)]

[the area between
inflow and outflow
from B to E]
[airquotes]
[the area between
inflow and outflow
from E to G]

Figure 14. Justin shades the area between the inflow and outflow graphs.
In clip 342, Justin appears to have found a compromise between his experience of
viewing inflow and outflow in separate locations and the mathematically accepted
practice of combining inflow and outflow to find a net rate of flow by shifting his frame
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of reference to one where a net rate, interpreted as net change over time, can be more
easily and accurately mapped to human experience. 2
In summary, Justin’s choice to refer to a positive net rate of change as “the
amount of water that’s either ‘coming in’ or ‘leaving,’” is his response to a situation
where the ordinary language that has been used to describe the mathematical idea of a net
rate of change does not fit well with common human experience. 3 He uses airquotes to
qualify his choice of language, and eventually, through a shift in frames of reference
(from rate of change in volume to change in volume over time), is able to find language
that fits both his experience and the mathematics. In clip 349, we see Justin again
interpret a signed net rate in terms of change in volume over time, demonstrating that he
has not abandoned the frame of net rate of change, but has merely abandoned the practice
of interpreting a net rate in terms of water “coming in” or “leaving.”
349 (0:33:09.9)

2

Justin:

And so it’s [the result of the
subtraction] gonna give you
a negative flow rate.
Or in other words, the water,
the, the “volume” of the
water is lowering, right?

[airquotes]

While Justin appears more comfortable with his new interpretation, it should be noted that he has not lost
his practice of using airquotes. He now qualifies his use of the word “volume” as a substitute for “water
[level].” I address Justin’s continued use of airquotes with “volume” in the third narrative, “Velocity vs.
Volume,” which begins on page 112.
3
In a related note, the participants demonstrated a tendency to speak of zero points as points of “no change
in water level” for a given period of time even though the term “zero point” implies that no time is passing.
I view this as yet another example of the explanatory factor of experience clashing with the explanatory
factor of mathematical understanding. Experientially, very few entities undergo instantaneous change. It is
even difficult to think of something “staying the same” for one point in time, as the word “stay” implies the
passage of time. However, the mathematical limiting process allows the creation of abstract constructs such
as “instantaneous rates of change” which imply that something can “be changing” (or in this case, not
changing) at a point. Rather than interpret zero points as “points of no change,” which experientially may
be a viable description of every point in time, the participants often referred to zero points as “periods of no
change” as in lines 220 and 223. The limiting process of a derivative involves exchanging a series of
periods for a point. While the linguistic exchange of a point for a period may be counter-productive from
this limiting perspective, it seems quite acceptable in the present discourse for its loyalty to human
experience.
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In a final example, we see Justin coordinate the three frames of reference as he
describes a zero point. Rather than immediately connecting the frame of separate rates of
change to rate of change in volume, in a way that would represent his original solution
process (Figure 15), Justin’s language again follows the course of separate rates of
change interpretation (“the same amount of water is coming in as it is leaving”), which
leads into a change in volume over time interpretation (“the volume of the water is gonna
stay the same”). Finally, Justin uses his change in volume over time interpretation to
make a claim about net rate of change (“the rate of change will be zero”).

Solution Process
Original graph of
inflow and outflow

Frames of
Reference

Interpretive Language
Process (353-355)

Separate
rates of
change

“the same amount of water is
coming in as is leaving”

“the rate of
change will
be zero”

Rate of
change in
volume

Net rate of
change graph

“and so”

“and so”
Volume

Volume graph

“volume of the water is
gonna stay the same”

Figure 15. Comparing Justin’s language with his solution process.

353 (0:33:37.7)

Justin:

So at that point,
this point right here, and at
this point right here,

[first x-intercept on
rate graph]
[the two points
where the inflow
and outflow
intersect on the
original graph]
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354 (0:33:45.9)
355 (0:33:46.5)

Julie:
Justin:

the same amount of water is
coming in as it is leaving,
right?
Right.
And so the water, volume of
the water is gonna stay the
same.

[moving both hands
across the table at
the same rate]
[holding arms out
wide with palms in
as if running them
along the surface of
a giant sphere]

And so, it’s um, the rate of
change will be zero, does that
make sense?
Justin appears to have found a reasoning sequence that not only fits his
understanding of the mathematical relationships between separate rates of change, net
rate of change, and change in volume over time at the zero points, but also one that fits
into his experiential frame, allowing him to offer a semantic warrant (Walter & Johnson,
2007) of a physical interpretation for his claims about the mathematical relationships.
Velocity vs. Volume: Analogical Reasoning Revealed
I have previously noted how Daniel, Jamie, and Justin speak of rate of change as
“velocity,” and Justin uses airquotes with the term “volume.” My analysis suggests that
these two phenomena are related in that they are evidence of the participants’ analogical
reasoning about the Quabbin Reservoir Task. In the terminology of analogical problem
solving, the participants applied the ideas of their previous work in which they have used
velocity graphs to create displacement graphs (base problem) in order to complete the
Quabbin Reservoir Task (target problem). Having solved the problem of relating the
graph of a function to the graph of the function’s derivative in the velocity-displacement
context, a next step would be mapping the velocity-displacement context to the Quabbin
Reservoir Context. This would include mapping a velocity function to a net rate (or “rate
of flow”) function and a displacement function to a quantity function. If the two problems
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are isomorphic, the next step in analogical problem solving could be to apply the solution
of using slope to relate a function to its derivative in the new context, thereby completing
the problem.
However, the Quabbin Reservoir Task was not completely isomorphic to previous
velocity-displacement tasks, and two modifications were required in order to apply the
solution of the base problem to the target problem. First, the direction of the solution is
reversed as the Quabbin Reservoir provides information about the derivative function and
requires students to reconstruct the anti-derivative. Second, the information about the
derivative, or rate of change, is not given directly. Rather than supply a net rate of change
graph, the designers of the task supplied graphs of inflow and outflow, requiring the
participants to produce a graph of net rate before isomorphic mapping, and an eventual
solution, could be reached. A possible analogical solution process for the participants’
work on the Quabbin Reservoir Task is shown in Figure 16. Vertical lines represent
mathematical relationships that were used in the solution process. Horizontal lines
represent the mapping of one context to another. For the participants in this study, this
mapping was never entirely explicit, but was revealed in the participants’ ongoing search
for labels for their various graphs.
A large portion of the participant’s negotiation of meaning and language can be
explained in terms of this model of analogical problem solving. Near the beginning of
the transcript (Segment 2), Justin quickly summarizes the solution process for the
Quabbin Reservoir Task.
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Displacement

Function

Solution: Velocity
as instantaneous rate
of change of
displacement.

Solution: Derivative as
instantaneous rate of
change of the function.

Velocity

Derivative

Quantity
Modification 1:
The direction of
the solution is
reversed.

Rate of Flow
Modification 2:
Net rate of change
is not directly
given.

Inflow / Outflow

Figure 16. An analogical solution mapping for the Quabbin Reservoir Task

42 (0:12:48.0)

Justin:

43
44 (0:12:55.5)

Daniel:
Justin:

45
46 (0:13:02.0)

Daniel:
Justin:

47
48
49 (0:13:11.0)

Daniel:
Justin:
Daniel:

50

Julie:

Okay.
Kay so cause I, I was
thinking about what you did
is that you took, you worked
backwards.
Yeah.
Cause this
is the rate of flow.
So this is what the derivative
will look like when you add
those [inflow and outflow]
together. Kind of like what I
did.
Yeah, that’s whatBut then you guys worked
backwards and decided what
the, what the flow, what the
water level would look like,
the distance.
Yeah.
So.
Does everyone understand
that? Because I didn’t
explain very well.
You just added, er-

[turns to Daniel]

[the original graph]
[the original graph]

[raising and lowering
pencil held
horizontally in the
air]
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Justin combines the conventional term “derivative” with the ordinary language
“work backwards” to describe the first modification required to complete the Quabbin
Reservoir Task. Justin also refers to the second modification, saying that they can see
what the derivative looks like by combining the inflow and outflow graphs. Although
Daniel seems to understand Justin’s abstraction of the analogical solution process, there
still remains much to be negotiated. In fact, the bulk of the content of Segment 9: The
Gospel According to Justin, is an explanation of the two modifications shown in Figure
16. Having already described in detail how he combined the inflow and outflow graphs to
create a net rate graph, Justin explains his idea of “working backwards.”
389 (0:35:45.4)

Justin:

There’s gonna be some
point, ‘cause, we’re working
backwards.
Instead of finding the
derivative,

we’re going from the
derivative
backwards.
Trying to, trying to figure
out how to go backwards,
right?

390 (0:35:54.9)

391 (0:36:07.3)

Justin:

Julie:

[pointing to volume
graph and sliding
pencil up to the net
rate graph]
[net rate graph]
[sliding pencil to
volume graph]
[pointing first at the
net rate graph and
then sliding the point
of the pencil to point
at the volume graph
again]

And so if we have that point, [first x-intercept on
zero on the derivative,
the net rate graph]
that means that on the
original graph, that point is
level, the tangent line is
zero. There is no slope.
Make sense?
Yeah.

[first minimum on the
volume graph]
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What is interesting about this portion of transcript is that it is the only time that
Justin uses the term “derivative” in Segment 9: The Gospel According to Justin. This
introduction of the conventional term “derivative,” juxtaposed with the ordinary language
of “working backwards,” may function to allow Justin to introduce a new procedure as
mathematically appropriate. The participants have worked on numerous tasks and
exercises in which they “found the derivative,” and, in that sense, have negotiated
procedural and conceptual meaning for the term derivative. Here, Justin refers to the
familiar process of “finding the derivative” to create meaning for the new process of
“going from the derivative backwards.”
The details of relating a function to its derivative have been partially explained in
terms of critical points (zero points) and hypercritical points (inflection). While inflection
points were described primarily in the language of “highest velocity,” from the base
context of velocity and displacement, reasoning about zero points mixed the language of
“velocity” and “inflow and outflow.” In this section, I trace the progression of language
from “velocity” to “volume” as the participants negotiate the mapping of language in the
analogical solution process.
“The Velocity of the Flow of the Water or Something” (Segment 3)
Once again, I return to the clip from Segment 3 in which Daniel expresses doubt
about his use of the term velocity. He not only hesitates, but explicitly acknowledges that
he is not sure what to call the analog of velocity in the Quabbin Reservoir context.
58a (0:13:50.1)

Daniel:

So, it has a negative slope.
And then it starts going
positive up to that point.
And so it levels off at zero.
Cause the v-, the v- [1 sec]

[point E, July, on the
rate graph]
[point E, July, on the
volume graph]
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I don’t know what you call
that. The velocity of the
flow of the water or
something? The velocity of
this is zero. [2 sec]
Which is correct on our
velocity chart.

[point E, July, on the
volume graph]

[point E, July, on the
rate graph]

Volume Graph

Rate Graph

Figure 17. Daniel’s graphs.
It is apparent from Daniel’s gestures that when he says, “velocity chart,” Daniel is
referring to his net rate graph. Although Daniel qualifies his use of “velocity” here, he,
Jamie, and Justin soon begin speaking metaphorically, using “velocity” to refer to net rate
of flow and “displacement” to refer to quantity or volume.
Why Velocity? (Segment 7)
As Justin, Jamie, and Daniel offer interpretations for zero points (Segment 6),
they continue to speak of their rate graph as their “velocity” graph. During a brief pause,
Julie, who has not spoken the word “velocity” in respect to the Quabbin Reservoir Task
thus far, remarks, “I think I’m still confused with the idea that it’s velocity.” Jamie admits
that she is also confused about the velocity idea. Justin and Daniel suggest that they
should call what they have been calling velocity “rate of flow.” Julie’s response reveals
that her confusion about velocity will not be cleared up by a simple change in language,
“But we’re not trying to find the rate of flow, aren’t we trying to find quantity?”
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234 (0:25:44.9)

Julie:

235 (0:25:50.8)
236 (0:25:51.9)

Jamie:
Justin:

237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248

(0:25:53.3)
(0:25:54.0)
(0:25:55.1)
(0:25:55.3)
(0:25:56.1)
(0:25:56.2)
(0:25:56.9)
(0:25:58.2)
(0:25:58.9)
(0:25:59.1)
(0:26:00.1)
(0:26:02.2)

Daniel:
Justin:
Julie:
Daniel:
Julie:
Justin:
Julie:
Jamie:
Daniel:
Justin:
Daniel:
Justin:

249
250
251
252

(0:26:04.4)
(0:26:05.4)
(0:26:07.7)
(0:26:09.6)

Jamie:
Julie:
Daniel:
Jamie:

[3 sec] I think I’m still confused with the idea that
it’s velocity.
Yeah, me too.
Kay just call it [what they have been calling
velocity] rate of flow then.
Yeah. Rate of flow.
We should call it [velocity] rate of flow.
But we’re not trying toRate of flow’s easier.
-find the rate of flowI know we’re tryin-aren’t we just, trying to find quantity?
Yeah.
Yeah.
Umhm.
But like hereBut this graph right here gives us the rate of flow,
and so we[to Julie, laughing] That was a good face!
[sighs]
Like [pause]
Hmm. I think we should find what we’re trying
to, trying to get at here.

Justin’s response to Jamie’s suggestion (252) is to re-read the instructions as
stated in the task. He then offers his interpretation of the given instructions, referring to
the quantity of water as being “like a displacement graph.” He makes his analogical
language more explicit, correcting his metaphorical statement that a graph of quantity
would be displacement by adding the word “like,” thus converting his metaphor to a
simile (254).
253 (0:26:18.4)

Justin:

254 (0:26:24.7)

Justin:

Alright, well, (a) says “sketch a
possible graph of the quantity
of water in the reservoir as a
function of time.”
So that [the graph asked for in
part a] would be the dis-, that
would be like a displacement
graph, right?
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Quantity of water, whether it’s
going up and down.

255
256 (0:26:31.1)

Jamie:
Justin:

Um huh.
Displacement.

[raising and
lowering hand with
the palm facing
downward]
[raises and lowers
hand again]

It is uncertain whether Julie’s concerns stem from a lack of recognition of the
language mapping of “velocity” to refer to a rate of flow graph (the horizontal lines in
Figure 16) or a deeper question concerning the rationale of the group’s solution process
thus far (the vertical lines in Figure 16). 4 Having expressed themselves that velocity is
not exactly the most appropriate term for the Quabbin Reservoir Task, Justin and Daniel
initially treat Julie’s confusion as a language issue, and are more careful to show their
consciousness of the possible confusion caused by the use of “velocity” and
“displacement.” Justin begins to use airquotes with the term “velocity,” implying his
recognition of the fact that the graph does not literally show “velocity” (the rate of
change of displacement) and also that the use of the term is not necessarily accepted by
all of the participants in discourse.
277 (0:27:11.1)

Justin:

So the, this
would be our rate of flow or
“velocity” if you will, right?

[the original graph]
[airquotes]

Even though Justin has addressed the fact that “velocity” is not the most
appropriate language Julie continues to press the issue that velocity, or rate of change, is
“not what [they’re] trying to find.” Again, Justin rephrases the point of the task, which is
to take the given information about the rate of change and describe the resultant changes
in quantity, or water level, by creating a graph of quantity with respect to time.

4

My follow up interview with Julie suggested that her confusion may have involved a combination of both
vertical and horizontal factors.
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280 (0:27:19.8)

Julie:

281 (0:27:20.7)

Justin:

That’s not what we’re trying
to find.
No, we’re trying to find,
we’re trying to take this
graph,
they’re telling us how much
the water level is changing

and make uh, our “best
guess”
at what the water level looks
like,
a graph of how, the water
level change over time. Does
that make sense?

[points to the
original graph]
[moving hands
together and apart
vertically with palms
facing]
[airquotes]
[holding two hands
with palms facing as
before]
[drops the left hand
and just moves the
right hand slowly up
and down with palm
facing downward]

Units of Measure for Quantity (Segment 8)
Julie and Jamie appear to be more comfortable with the restated goals of the task.
However, the normally silent observer Dr. Walter asks Justin to clarify the hand motions
that he uses to accompany his statements about the change in water level over time (284).
284 (0:27:36.4)

Dr.
Walter:

So you’re thinking of
measuring the quantity of
water in the reservoir by the
height [1 sec] of water in the
reservoir?
When you’re doing this I’m
imagining you’re talking
about the height?

[raising and
lowering flat hand]

Justin justifies his use of height as a matter of preference: height has fewer
dimensions than volume to worry about (286).
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286 (0:27:48.2)

Justin:

That’s [measuring volume by
height] how I, that’s how I
think about it, cause I don’t
know how else, I guess you
could measure it [quantity of
water] in, like volume, but,
I don’t know, height, just, to
me, seems more, one, two
dimensional.

[raising and lowering
hand with palm
down]

Although height may be more natural to work with, and a better fit for the
graphical method of representing quantity, Daniel suggests that “volume” may be
“better,” or more appropriate for the situation. Dr. Walter suggests that the participants
look at the units of measure associated with the original graph given with the task. Upon
reading “millions of gallons per day,” Justin concludes that volume is more appropriate
than height for measuring the quantity of water in the reservoir.
292
293
294
295

(0:28:36.3)
(0:28:38.0)
(0:28:39.1)
(0:28:39.8)

Dr. Walter:
Justin:
Jamie:
Justin:

What’s your, what’s your rate measured in?
Rate is measured inMillions of gallons per day.
Millions of gallons per day, so it would be
volume.

“What Would the Derivative of Volume Be?” (Segment 8)
Having been reminded that “velocity” may not be the most appropriate term for
the present discussion, Daniel poses a question about the correct language for referring to
the derivative of volume. He uses analogy to reason about language, noting that there is a
special name for the derivative of displacement (velocity) and a special name for the
derivative of velocity (acceleration). Daniel asks if there is a special name for the
derivative of volume. Justin reasons that velocity is really just “how fast you’re changing
your displacement,” and so “how fast you’re changing your volume,” should be “rate of
flow.”
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318 (0:30:31.5)

Daniel:

319
320
321
322

Justin:
Daniel:
Justin:
Daniel:

(0:30:43.6)
(0:30:46.4)
(0:30:47.8)
(0:30:48.2)

323 (0:30:51.2)

Justin:

324 (0:30:54.6)

Daniel:

325 (0:31:03.3)

Justin:

326 (0:31:05.1)
327 (0:31:06.1)

Daniel:
Justin:

[4 sec] So, cause like when you take the
derivative of displacement, it’s velocity.
Velocity.
When you take that derivative it’s umAcceleration.
-acceleration, but what would the derivative of
volume be?
I would imagine it [the derivative of volume]
would be rate of change, rate of flow, change.
Rate of change, yeah. [4 sec] Rate of flow
change.
Cause your velocity is just your rate of change
of your displacementYeah.
-like how fast you’re changing your
displacement, so how fast you’re changing
your volume would be the rate of flow, right?

Although Daniel does not disagree with Justin’s label for the derivative of
volume, he also does not seem satisfied. For a major portion of Segment 9, Daniel
searches the textbook, and eventually presents the idea that perhaps the derivative of
volume can be represented as “surface area.” This idea does not seem particularly
applicable, and, concluding that his idea “doesn’t really make much sense,” Daniel says
that perhaps the current language of “inflow” and “outflow” will suffice.
Shifting Gestures for Volume (Segment 9)
Despite Justin’s statements that volume is a more appropriate term for describing
the quantity of water in the reservoir, he nevertheless continues to use airquotes and other
gestures with the term “volume” throughout “the gospel.” This can be observed by
revisiting clips from the previous discussion of zero points.
342 (0:32:25.4)

Justin:

So, if you did that
[subtraction of outflow from
inflow] just over, you know,
just did that for every single
part, this would be that part
that’s leaving,

[shading the area
between inflow and
outflow from A to B]
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this is the, uh, water coming
in, this is the, when the, um,
water,
“volume” level is rising.
This is when it’s [the
volume level] going down
again.

349 (0:33:09.9)

Justin:

And so it’s [the result of the
subtraction] gonna give you
a negative flow rate.
Or in other words, the water,
the, the “volume” of the
water is lowering, right?

[the area between
inflow and outflow
from B to E]
[airquotes]
[the area between
inflow and outflow
from E to G]

[airquotes]

A second look at these clips suggests that Justin uses “volume” as a replacement
for “water.” Subsequent uses suggest that “water” may be a cut-off version of “water
level,” as Justin leaves his airquotes to incorporate a palm down gesture similar to the one
that he previously used to accompany the term “water level.”
352 (0:33:20.9)

Justin:

they’re [inflow and outflow]
gradually becoming equal,
so it’s the water level, the
volume level is staying the
same. Right?

[holding hand flat
with palm down at
eye level]

The last time that Justin used this palm down “water level” gesture, Dr. Walter
questioned the gesture as demonstrating Justin’s measuring of the amount of water in the
reservoir by height (284), which led to Justin’s eventual conclusion that “volume” would
be a more appropriate means for measuring the amount of water (295). Justin’s next use
of volume (355) is accompanied by a gesture that is much more three-dimensional,
possibly reflecting Justin’s statement that height has fewer dimensions than volume, and
his emerging recognition that the multi-dimensional “volume” may be more appropriate
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than height for measuring the quantity of water in the reservoir. Once again, he offers
“volume” as a replacement for “water,” which may or may not be a truncated version of
“water level.”
353 (0:33:37.7)

354 (0:33:45.9)
355 (0:33:46.5)

Justin:

Julie:
Justin:

. . . the same amount of water
is coming in as it is leaving,
right?
Right.
And so the water, volume of
the water is gonna stay the
same.

[moving both hands
across the table at
the same rate]
[holding arms out
wide with palms in
as if running them
along the surface of
a giant sphere]

Justin summarizes how he combined the inflow and outflow graphs, and his
purpose in doing so, in clip 366, stating that a graph of net rate will help one to
understand the shape of the “displacement graph.” However, he quickly inserts the
substitute term, “volume graph,” as though guilty of misspeaking, yet qualifies the term
“volume” with airquotes, reflecting his consciousness, and possible qualification, of this
alternative choice in language.
366 (0:34:22.7)

Justin:

. . . and so that kind of helps
to combine the two graphs,
like that, cause now you can
see what the rate of flow,
what the change of, in the
flow rate, is, over time, and
that kind of helps ya
understand what’s going on
with the displacement graph.
“Volume” graph

[Justin traces his
rate graph from
right to left and then
left to right three
times as he speaks,
finishing on the
word “understand”]

[airquotes]

Labeling the Volume Graph (Segment 9)
The Gospel According to Justin ends with a short discussion of units of measure
for volume and a final identification of the important points that help to correlate the
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three graphs. Justin and Daniel have previously commented that the initial value of the
volume graph is arbitrary. Although the rate graph gives enough information to sketch the
correct shape of the volume graph, the actual values of the rate graph will differ by a
constant from the true values for volume. Justin resurrects this previous conversation
with Daniel as he explains this idea to Julie as “the thing you don’t know.”
429 (0:38:25.2)

Justin:

Now the thing you don’t
know, which is like kind of
what Daniel said,
‘cause I had that line right
here.

You don’t know where to
start this graph at.
430 (0:38:31.8)

Justin:

431 (0:38:38.2)

Justin:

I mean, this graph, you
know, this could be one
thousand, um, cubic gallons,
or whatever I don’t know
you say that.
Or it [the initial value of the
volume graph] could be, you
know, you don’t know how,
where to start this graph at.

[pointing toward
Daniel with his
pencil]
[a horizontal line that
Justin previously
erased from his
volume graph]
[touching points on
the vertical axis of
the volume graph]
[the y-intercept of the
volume graph]

[holding pencil
parallel to the
horizontal axis of the
volume graph and
sliding it back and
forth in the “vertical”
direction]

This transcript raises a question about Justin’s meaning for the word “gallons.”
Here, and later, he modifies the term “gallons” to say “cubic gallons.” The term “cubic
gallons” may seem redundant to the listener, and Justin admits his doubts about his term
by saying that he doesn’t “know how to say that.”
Although the other participants do not question the term “cubic gallons,” Justin’s
hesitation associated with “cubic gallons” may imply an underlying process of Justin’s
negotiation of meaning with himself. Justin has modified his former one-dimensional
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gestures for volume as “water level” to three-dimensional gestures to accompany the term
“volume level.” It may be that Justin’s use of “cubic gallons” is his way of verbally
modifying a given unit of measure to create a unit of measure for volume. Just as “feet”
become “cubic feet” and “meters” become “cubic meters” when speaking of volume,
Justin applies this pattern to gallons to say “cubic gallons” for his volume graph,
neglecting the fact that gallons by nature are a unit of volume. Justin continues to work to
negotiate a relationship between the terms “volume” and “gallons.” In the next transcript
(437-443), Justin re-labels his volume graph, which was formerly labeled “water level,”
as “volume.” When Julie asks if volume really is the correct term for the graph of
quantity, Justin refers to the fact that the given graph measures rate in gallons per day,
and so keeping “the same kind of units,” the quantity graph would have to be a volume
graph.
437 (0:38:52.9)

Justin:

438 (0:39:08.1)
439 (0:39:13.4)

Julie:
Justin:

440 (0:39:16.8)

Justin:

. . . does that make sense?
how I went from, how I
combined the two graphs
and then how I went, how I
looked at this graph
and then tried to make a, um
volume.
Take away my “water level,”
that’s right this [the label on
the vertical axis of the
volume graph] should be
“volume.”
[5 sec] Is it volume?
Yeah, ‘cause we’re working,
it’ll [the volume graph] be
the volume of the water.
‘Cause this, the rate is in
gallons, gallons per day.

[pointing to the rate
graph]
[rate graph]
[volume graph]
[erasing a mark on
the volume graph]

[pointing to the
volume graph]
[the rate graph]
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441 (0:39:21.1)

Justin:

442 (0:39:28.9)
443 (0:39:31.5)

Julie:
Justin:

[3 sec] And so you just want
to keep the same kind of
units so it’d [the units of the
vertical axis of the volume
graph] be gallons, cubic
gallons, I guess is what it
would be.
Oh. Oh, okay, yeah.
So volume.

[pointing to the
volume graph]

Julie makes one last summary of the critical points on the graph with Justin’s
help. Together, Justin and Julie demonstrate the dialogic phenomenon of exchanging
discourse habits that at one time may have seemed unnatural to them (Lewis & Ketter,
2004). While Julie initially had doubts about the term “velocity,” in clip 449 she uses it
comfortably to communicate with Justin.
447 (0:39:38.4)

Julie:

448 (0:39:45.7)

Justin:

449 (0:39:49.6)

Julie:

450 (0:39:56.2)

Justin:

No, I think that’s, just like,
the top and the bottom
points are your zero points?
On, top and your bottom
points for what graph?
Like these points on your
volume graph

[pointing to points on
her page]

[minimum and
maximum on her
volume graph]
are your zero points on your [touching her rate
velocity?
graph]
Yes.
[nodding]

Justin then points out the inflection points on both graphs. Like an instructor
revoicing (Forman & Ansell, 2001) the words of his students, Justin replaces Julie’s
ambiguous ordinary language of “the top and the bottom points” with the more
conventional terms “maximums” and “minimums.” Although he applies his airquotes
now to the term “velocity,” he continues to use the equally questionable term
“displacement” to talk about a volume graph.
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452 (0:40:01.2)

Justin:

And then your maximums
and your minimums on your
veloc-,
your, we’ll call “velocity”
graph are going to be your
points of inflection on your
displacement graph.

[Julie’s rate graph]

[airquotes]
[pointing to Julie’s
volume graph]

Re-Labeling (Segment 12)
Thus far, Justin has used gestures to place airquotes around “velocity” and
“volume,” has repeatedly replaced the terms “water” and “displacement” with “volume,”
and hesitated to speak of “cubic gallons.” This hesitation and shifting language in for the
concept of volume began when Dr. Walter asked Justin if he was thinking of measuring
the volume of the water in the reservoir by the height (284). The process of verbal relabeling has also been reflected in Justin’s inscriptions, as Justin has replaced the original
label of the vertical axis of his quantity graph, which read “water level,” with the word
“volume.” Figure 18 shows Justin’s attempts thus far to map “displacement” to an
appropriate term in the Quabbin Reservoir Context. The dotted arrows in the figure
indicate language that Justin has spoken but either abandoned or recognized as not
completely appropriate. The solid arrows indicate language that Justin continues to use.
Justin’s process of re-labeling continues as he again reads the instructions for part
(a) of the Quabbin Reservoir Task.
622 (0:48:04.1)

Justin:

Kay, so, um, [part] (a) was,
sketch our little graph, of
the quantity of water in the
reservoir as a function of
time.
So it’d be volume,

[begins to erase the
label on the vertical
axis of his volume
graph]
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623

Daniel:

624 (0:48:23.6)

Justin:

625 (0:48:28.2)
626 (0:48:28.8)

Daniel:
Justin:

so it’d [the label of the
vertical axis of the volume
graph] be gallons, cubic
gallons, what is it, what is
it, millions of gallons yeah,
millions of gallons.
It’d be millions of gallons,
per day.
millions, well it’d [the label
of the vertical axis of the
volume graph] just be
millions of gallons, yeah
perPer day.
-per, per day or time.

[writing “millions of
gallons” on the
vertical axis of his
volume graph]

“Water Level Height”

“Displacement”

“Cubic Gallons?”

Function

“Millions of Gallons”
“Volume”

“Velocity”

Derivative

“Rate of Flow”

Figure 18. Justin’s attempts to map “velocity” and “displacement” to
vocabulary in the Quabbin Reservoir context.
At this point (clip 622) Justin erases his second written label for the volume
graph, “volume,” and writes “millions of gallons.” He does this with hesitation, verbally
inserting the term “cubic gallons” as he searches for the correct label. Both Daniel and
Justin verbally add the term “per day,” although Justin does not write the incorrect “per
day” on his volume graph. Daniel, on the other hand, may have correctly added the “per
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day” term, because his next statement seems to indicate that he is actually looking at the
rate graph.
627 (0:48:29.9)

Daniel:

628 (0:48:40.5)

Daniel:

629 (0:48:46.8)

Justin:

630
631

Daniel:
Justin:

633 (0:48:58.0)
634 (0:48:58.5)

Daniel:
Justin:

Then our, or that’s the uh derivative, that’s the
volume, yeah, that’s the, what’d we call that?
What do we call the rate of change of the
volume? Is that what we’re calling our
derivative?
No it’d [the derivative] just be the rate of
change of, it wouldn’t be rate of change of the
volume, um, it would just beRate of, of flow?
-it [the derivative] would be rate of, it would
be rate of change of theOf water?
Yeah of the millions of gallons.

Surprisingly, Justin says that the derivative wouldn’t be the rate of change of
volume, but that the derivative would be the rate of change of the millions of gallons.
Justin has previously recognized that “millions of gallons” implies a volume
measurement, and so it is not immediately apparent why he feels that one term would be
more appropriate than the other. Figure 19 shows Justin’s process of determining a name
for the derivative of volume. Where he has accepted the terms “volume” and “millions of
gallons” as analogs for “displacement,” Justin has also just stated that the derivative
would not represent “change in volume,” but “change in millions of gallons” instead.
Upon hearing Justin’s comment, Jamie contradicts Justin’s statement that it
“wouldn’t be the rate of change of volume,” by stating that the rate of change of volume
is the same thing as the rate of change of the millions of gallons. Daniel (after some
hesitation) and Justin agree. Justin goes on to justify Jamie’s statement by referring to a
familiar context for studying derivatives, the context of motion.
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“Water Level Height”

“Displacement”

“Cubic Gallons?”

Function

“Millions of Gallons”
“Volume”

“Velocity”
Derivative

“Change in millions of
gallons”
“Change in volume”

Figure 19. Determining a name for the derivative of volume.
635 (0:49:00.4)

Jamie:

636
637 (0:49:03.6)

Justin:
Jamie:

638 (0:49:05.7)
639 (0:49:09.1)

Justin:
Daniel:

640 (0:49:12.2)
641
642 (0:49:12.5)

Jamie:
Justin:
Daniel:

643 (0:49:14.4)

Justin:

644 (0:49:19.4)

Daniel:

645

Justin:

646

Jamie:

The same thing as rate of
change of, our volume.
Huh?
That’s [the rate of change of
the millions of gallons] the
same thing as the rate of
change of our volume.
Yeah.
Would it? [short pause] Yeah it
should beYeah.
Yeah.
-because if you’re taking dy dx [writing on his
it’s the rate ofpaper]
‘Cause it’d be like using
meters and saying your rate,
your change in distance. So
it’d be change in volume.
[sighs]
[writing on his
paper]
We’re working gallons and so
it’d [our derivative] be change
in volume.
Yeah.
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647 (0:49:22.6)

Justin:

648 (0:49:24.6)

Jamie:

649 (0:49:24.9)

Justin:

650 (0:49:28.1)
651 (0:49:28.4)

Jamie:
Daniel:

If you were working in meters
it’d [the derivative] be your
change in distance.
Uh huh.
And so it’d be your distance
graph.
So this would be considered
our volume graph.
Yeah.
Yeah. I like that. The change
of [3 sec] the change of [1 sec]
VOLUME with respect to
time.

[writing on her
paper]
[touching his
volume graph]
[Justin’s volume
graph]

In this final portion of transcript, Justin lays out an additional element of his
analogical language framework: the units that are used to label a function and its
derivative in the velocity and volume contexts (Figure 20).

“Distance Graph”

“Working in
Meters”

“Change in
Distance”

Function

Units of
Measure

Derivative

“Volume Graph”

“Working in
Gallons”

“Change in
Volume”

Figure 20. Justin’s fitting of units of measure into the analogical language structure.
Justin speaks of “using” and “working in” specific units of measure. In the
velocity and displacement context, he speaks of “using” meters as a unit to measure
distance. In such a case, the derivative would be more naturally described as
representative of “change in distance” rather than “change in meters.” For volume, he
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speaks of “using” gallons to measure volume. Reasoning analogically, Justin concludes
that the derivative would be said to show “change in volume” rather than “change in
millions of gallons.” This further settles Justin’s hesitation as to what to actually write as
a label for his graph of quantity. He reasons that in a situation where “you were working
in meters . . . it’d be your distance graph,” and therefore, in their situation of “working in
gallons” they would name their graph a “volume graph.”
Having sorted out subtle differences in the meaning of “volume” and “gallons,”
Justin finally labels his graph with both terms. He places “volume” as a general title for
the graph, and “millions of gallons” next to the vertical axis, indicating the units in which
values on the vertical axis are measured (Figure 21). Daniel also seems content with the
title they have found for the “derivative of volume,” which is “the change of volume with
respect to time” (651). With a resounding “Woohoo” from Daniel, the group moves on to
tackle part (b) of the Quabbin Reservoir Task.

Figure 21. Justin’s volume graph with “volume” as a title and “millions of gallons” as
units for the vertical axis.
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This last except of transcript may help to illustrate a possible weakness of viewing
the learning of mathematics strictly from the perspective of becoming a participant in
discourse. This weakness has to do with how discourse as a social practice may serve to
mask the contributions, or even existence, of individual cognition. As Justin has played a
definite role in his group as one who listens, explains, organizes, and justifies, the result
has been that I, as an observer, can say very little about how he has come to believe that
what he is saying is true. For the most part, the analysis here may suggest that vocal
egocentric speech does not exist in the language of university students. However, this
final portion of transcript (643-651) appears to be an exception that suggests that
egocentric speech does exist and may, in fact, be viewed as a means for evaluating
individual cognition.
Although his analogical argument (643-651) may serve as a response to the
questions of his peers, Justin’s language also suggests that the primary question that he is
answering may be his own. With considerably less hesitation than in previous portions of
transcript, Justin now speaks as though resolute. While his earlier explanations,
specifically in Segment 9: The Gospel According to Justin, were constantly interrupted
by his characteristic, “Does that make sense?” Justin does not stop to check for
understanding or agreement. This may be because Justin, in clips 643-651, is either
negotiating language with himself, or using language to express relationships that he has
recently come to know. He is answering his own questions about the analogical
relationships and language that are central to his mathematical understanding. Because
Justin’s language does not include the cues that generally reflect his efforts to place
himself at the point of view of the hearers of his speech, I view this portion of transcript
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as an example of more egocentric speech that allows me as an observer, to make
conjectures about the structure of Justin’s individual thoughts. As has been explained
earlier, due to the concern that the participants often expressed for one another’s
mathematical understandings, egocentric speech as evidence to support such conjectures
is relatively rare to this data. Therefore, while I have said much about the social
negotiation of mathematical meaning and language, it is quite possible that the role of
individual cognition may have taken a secondary role in this analysis. The resulting
implications are discussed in the next chapter.
In this chapter, I have presented three narrative strands of the negotiation of
meaning and language in mathematical discourse. To negotiate meaning for the
conventional terms “point of inflection” and “concavity,” Daniel used personal pronouns
and personal experience to convey his meaning for “point of inflection,” which was later
connected to Justin’s meaning for “concavity,” resulting in a view of inflection points
that functioned to help Justin to relate the graphs of a function and its derivative. In the
negotiation of language for Daniel’s construct of “zero points,” Jamie, Daniel, and Justin
purposefully chose language that consistently reflected their personal experience to assist
their interpretation of mathematical concepts. Finally, Justin’s analogical reasoning
process was revealed as the participants pursued answers to each others’ questions and
comments about “velocity,” “volume,” and “the derivative of volume.”
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION
In defining human agency, Inden (1990) stated that when making a choice, human
agents “may consider different courses of action possible and desirable, though not
necessarily from the same point of view” (p. 23). The analysis of three processes of
negotiation of meaning presented here highlights how different points of view, or
different explanatory factors, may be reflected in the participants’ choice of language. In
this chapter, I discuss situations in which the explanatory factors of one’s experience and
one’s understanding of the mathematics can lead to improvisation or compromise in
mathematical discourse. Looking at conventional mathematical language as an
abstraction of the analogous features of various contexts and personal experiences, I
suggest a Mathematical Language Matrix as a way to characterize mathematical
language. I also suggest implications for the teaching of mathematics “in context.”
The participants in this study have displayed more than just a variety of
mathematical language. Their choices have also demonstrated how mathematical
discourse truly is a social practice. Each participant had different experiences and
expectations to contribute to mathematical discourse, and each exhibited a “mindful
awareness of the impact one’s actions and choices may have on others” (Walter &
Gerson, 2007, p. 209). The third explanatory variable for choices made in mathematical
discourse, that of the social situation in which the discourse occurs, was reflected in
Justin’s and Daniel’s use of social speech that may be said to epitomize Piaget’s
description of “attempting to place himself at the point of view of his hearer” (1997/1896,
p. 9). As this type of speech may be used to increase students’ access to mathematical
discourse, instructors would be wise to, after Lampert (1990), model, describe, and
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negotiate (Cobb, Wood & Yackel, 1993) similar types of speech in their mathematics
classroom.
Finally, it should also be noted that the mathematical discourse described here
emerged as a result of the participants’ choices as they developed their own solution to
the Quabbin Reservoir Task. Their participation in mathematical discourse wasn’t just a
process of taking on roles in some pre-existing conversation, and stands in drastic
contrast to notions of scripted mathematical discourse. In a sense, the term
“participation,” may not completely capture the contributions that Daniel, Jamie, Justin,
and Julie made. Through the exercise of personal agency, they were the creators,
moderators, and evaluators of personally and socially meaningful mathematical
discourse. Indeed, the viewpoint of “becoming a participant in mathematical discourse”
may be limited not only by traditional views of mathematical discourse, but also
traditional views of participation. In the sections that follow, I synthesize my
observations and analyses of the mathematical discourse of these participants to define
mathematical discourse from the perspective of personal agency. This definition may
help researchers to broaden and refine their notions of mathematical discourse, and help
teachers to appreciate the value of student language and thought.
Mathematics and Experience
In choosing his mathematical language, we have seen how Justin was careful to
not only be mathematically correct, but also experientially correct. That is, Justin avoided
making interpretations of the mathematics that couldn’t be mapped to personal
experience. His avoidance of a net rate interpretation of a zero point in terms of physical
phenomena reminds me of the choice of a practicing elementary school teacher named
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Matt when he was completing a similar task about water in a reservoir (Johnson, 2005;
Walter & Johnson, 2007). This teacher relocated the context of the task to a bathtub,
where the bather specifically controlled inflow and outflow, either by turning on the
faucet, turning off the faucet, opening the drain, or closing the drain. Simplifying the task
by not allowing water to be entering and exiting the bathtub simultaneously, Matt’s
consequential interpretation of a point where the net rate graph crossed from the upper
half plane to the lower half plane was as follows:
Then we think, ‘you know what, I’ve got enough water,’ so we start turning the
knob off at this point . . . as we’re turning we’re decreasing the gallons a minute
from one and half gallons per minute to one gallon per minute to zero gallons per
minute right here. Then we notice we’ve got too much, so immediately, no time
between when we turn it off and when we start turning the other knob to let
the water out, we notice we have too much, so we start to turn the knob at this
point to let the water out, and we’re slowly turning that knob, or slowly opening
the drain . . . (Johnson, 2005, p. 56, emphasis added)
This elementary school teacher, in inventing a situation that may be explained by the
given graph of rate, presented a situation that may be slightly unrealistic. With absolutely
no time passing, the bather turns off the inflow at the very moment that he turns on the
outflow, resulting in a virtual “point” at which the net rate of change is zero. This may be
considered a case where personal experience is momentarily improvised in order to
correctly reflect the mathematics of the situation.
In the current data, the opposite phenomenon might be observed, in which the
mathematics is momentarily compromised in order to allow for language that fits
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personal experience. When the participants spoke of a zero point as a “period of no
change,” and found alternatives to describing net rates of change as physical
combinations of inflow and outflow, they may have danced around some of the more
technical details of the mathematics in favor of preserving the semantic nature of their
argument. In both cases, however, the momentary compromises were acceptable to the
listeners. This suggests that there may be an underlying unspoken assumption that
relationships between mathematical events and personal experience are not to be
interpreted in a strictly literal sense. Rather, the participants play “the believing game”
(Elbow, 1973) in order to extract the more general sense of the comparison rather than
get caught up in little details.
Organizing Conventional and Ordinary Language
At the beginning of this study, I described a continuum of conventional and
mathematical vocabulary, characterizing conventional mathematics language as language
having precise and abstract meanings in mathematical discourse, such as “derivative.” I
hypothesized that every conventional mathematics term could also be described in
ordinary language, such as Justin’s description of velocity as the derivative of
displacement as “how fast you’re changing your distance.” Figure 22 represents my
initial ideas about the placement of the term “derivative” and the phrase “how fast you’re
changing your distance” on this continuum of mathematical language.
Conventional
derivative

Ordinary
“how fast you’re
changing your distance”

Figure 22. A continuum for mathematical language.
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The data were also rich with mathematical language that I could not characterize
as completely conventional mathematical language, nor completely ordinary. Some
examples would be “instantaneous rate of change,” and “velocity.” I imagined these two
terms as located at some point along the mathematical language continuum between the
extremes of conventional and ordinary (Figure 23). The curved arrows cycling between
“instantaneous rate of change” and “velocity” in Figure 23 represent my confusion about
which I considered to be “more” conventional. I considered “velocity” a precise
conventional term, but not a strictly mathematical term because of its importance in
physics. “Instantaneous rate of change” didn’t seem to belong to any specific application
of mathematics, and was therefore very abstract, yet not exactly as precise as “derivative”
or even “velocity.” In fact, “instantaneous rate of change was more of a description or
interpretation of a derivative.

Conventional
derivative

Abstract
Precision

Ordinary
instantaneous
rate of change

velocity

Abstract
Descriptive

Contextualized
Precision

“how fast you’re
changing your
distance”
Contextualized
Descriptive

Figure 23. Completing the continuum for mathematical language.
As I attempted to place various types of language along my continuum, I
continued to encounter the same phenomena. Some language was very conventional in
that it was abstract and precise; other language was abstract, but more descriptive than
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precise; and other language was precise, but less abstract because it was strongly
associated with a particular science or context other than mathematics. I concluded that I
would either have to make a choice between abstraction and precision as the more salient
feature of conventional mathematics vocabulary, or change the structure of my
continuum. I decided to change the structure of my continuum, creating a two
dimensional array for characterizing mathematical language. This array, which I named a
Matrix for Mathematical Language, essentially combined two continua, one represented
by the extremes of precision and description, and the other by the extremes of abstraction
and contextualization (Figure 24). Precise and abstract mathematical language could now
be found in the upper left hand corner of the matrix. Descriptive but abstract terminology,
such as mathematical definitions, descriptions and abstract interpretations, was located in
the upper right hand corner. Contextualized analogs or examples of precise mathematical
terms found a place in the lower left hand corner of matrix, and contextualized
descriptions found place in the lower right hand corner.
Precise

Abstracted

Contextualized

Descriptive

Derivative

Instantaneous rate of change

Velocity

“how fast you’re changing your
displacement”

Figure 24. Matrix for mathematical language
I realized that this matrix could be extended indefinitely, as new contexts, such as
the Quabbin Reservoir context, could be added. I didn’t know if I could claim that one
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context was more “contextualized” than another. Furthermore, I reasoned that
mathematics itself was a context, the context of abstraction. I changed my representation
once again, replacing the continuum of more or less contextualized language, with a list
of different contexts. I then added the Quabbin Reservoir Context to this list (Figure 25).
Precise

Context

Descriptive

Mathematics

Derivative

Instantaneous rate of change

Kinematics

Velocity

“how fast you’re changing
your displacement”

Quabbin Reservoir

Rate of flow

“how fast you’re changing
your volume”

Figure 25. Extended matrix for mathematical language.
Learning to Think Mathematically
Although the participants may not have literally organized the language of their
mathematical discourse in a matrix as I have, the data suggest that they did demonstrate
an inclination to organize language by identifying analogs for mathematical concepts in
different contexts and interchanging precise and descriptive language for the purposes of
explanation and justification. These organizational habits may be reflective of an ongoing
process of learning to think mathematically that takes place as students engage in
discourse with the goals of solving mathematical problems and advancing their own
mathematical understanding. Not only did the participants find and agree upon a solution
to the given task, but they engaged in the mathematical processes of property noticing,
interpretation, conceptualization, abstraction, and generalization.
Like Daniel, I was not entirely satisfied with the analog of derivative in the
Quabbin Reservoir Context as “rate of flow.” As mentioned by Zandieh (2002), the
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language of derivatives in the field of kinematics is highly developed, as “velocity,”
“acceleration,” and even “jerk” (the time derivative of acceleration) are quantities that are
measured and studied independently. Zandieh suggested that the precise language
structure is a motivation for studying derivatives in kinematic contexts. Attempting to fill
in the matrix for derivative in the context of the Quabbin Reservoir reveals that there is
no commonly known “special name” for “the derivative of volume.” As mentioned in
Chapter 6, the net rate of change of volume, or derivative of volume, is not generally
measured in a reservoir. Inflow and outflow, on the other hand, not only exist in the
world of mathematics, but are also observed and measured as quantities in fields such as
engineering, agriculture, and, as reported by Walter and Johnson (2007), the more
common human experience of filling up a bathtub. The design of the Quabbin Reservoir
Task (Hughes-Hallett et al., 1994) accurately reflects this fact by providing information
about inflow and outflow, rather than combining the data as a net flow.
Sfard (1997) suggested that metaphors are used for conceptualizing, while,
analogies are used for reasoning. The matrix of mathematical language may provide an
example of Sfard’s notion of metaphor. When Daniel asks, “What would the derivative of
volume be?” his demonstrated meaning for mathematical language may be represented
by Figure 26. Reasoning that the derivative of displacement, velocity, is a quantity that
can also be measured, Daniel conceptualizes the idea of a derivative of volume. Although
he has not been told that a derivative of volume exists, and does not know what such a
derivative would be named, he reasons a derivative of volume into existence. This
derivative of volume, which did not previously exist in Daniel’s language matrix, comes
into existence through the vehicle of metaphor.

144
Context

Precise

Descriptive

Mathematics

Derivative

Instantaneous rate of change

Kinematics

Velocity

“how fast you’re changing your
displacement”

Quabbin Reservoir

“What would the
derivative of volume be?”

“how fast you’re changing your
volume”

Figure 26. Daniel’s matrix for mathematical language for the concept of derivative.
One possible argument for contextualized mathematics instruction can be formed
by considering the impact of adding additional contexts to the language matrix in Figure
25. Each time a new context is added, more language becomes relevant to the study of
mathematics, giving students opportunity to build upon and refine their meaning for new
types of language as they learn to engage in the mathematical activity of identifying and
abstracting patterns from a variety of contexts. A completely abstract approach to
mathematics limits students’ opportunities to build meaning and language, especially
when the abstract language of mathematics does not intersect often or well with students’
ordinary language. The addition of contexts to mathematics instruction implies an
addition of language, and if the language of these contexts intersects appropriately with
students’ experience, this language offers additional pathways for students to access
mathematical discourse. Furthermore, students are then given rich opportunities to
participate in the process of abstraction as well as operate on the results this process. If,
however, additional contexts are not reflective of, or closely related to, student
experience, the addition of these inappropriate contexts may further impede students’
access to both the discourse and the mathematics (Zevenbergen, 2000).
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Another possible danger in contextualizing mathematics activity is that teachers
may take the extreme stance of completely eliminating the abstract language of the
mathematical context because it may seem irrelevant or impractical. However, Brown
(2001) recognized the teaching and modeling of conventional terminology as a necessary
role of the mathematics teacher, along with providing students opportunities to use
language that symbolizes their own experience. Sfard (2000) also suggests that what
some may call the premature introduction of language may in fact be a necessary step in
the process of learning about mathematical concepts. When Daniel introduced the term
“inflection point” to discourse, Julie and Jamie’s questions revealed that they had not
previously engaged in extensive negotiation of meaning for the term. Although Jamie
could recognize an inflection point as a maximum or minimum on a derivative graph, she
had not yet noticed how points of inflection were also represented in the shape of the
original function. Daniel’s introduction of the conventional language of inflection point
motivated the development of descriptive language from a variety of contexts to create
and negotiate meaning for a mathematical idea that may not have been naturally
encountered in the contextualized realm (Figure 27). As a result, the participants learned
to notice new mathematical properties of mathematical objects.
Figure 28 represents a possible mathematical language matrix for the concept of
”zero points.” The term, “zero points” is not a conventional mathematics term, nor does it
suggest the context of velocity or water in a reservoir. To represent the nature of Daniel’s
coined term “zero points,” I introduce a new context for language that is descriptive of
the shape of a graph, with “zero points” being a more precise description of “where the
graph crosses the horizontal axis.” As in Figure 27, the matrix for inflection points, it is
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useful to identify individual frames of reference that may be represented by different
graphs within the various contexts. In this matrix, I have also included the name of the
participant who introduced the various descriptive terms to discourse. Each of the
participants offered different ways of describing zero points, thus creating a richer
definition and interpretation for Daniel’s coined term. In doing so, they developed ways
to apply the shape of an abstract graph towards the purpose of interpretation of physical
phenomena in the rich context of water in a reservoir.
Context
(Frame of Reference
within a context)

Precise

Descriptive

Mathematics
(Function)

“Inflection Point”

“Where concave down changes to
concave up”

Mathematics
(Derivative)

Extrema

“Where the slope is the highest”

Kinematics

“Where the velocity is the highest on a
displacement graph”

“A Slide”

“The point where you start to level off”

Figure 27. A co-constructed mathematical language matrix for “inflection point.”
The findings of this study suggest that, to assist students in learning to think
mathematically, the purpose of studying mathematics in context should be made explicit.
Situated cognition views of learning (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989) suggest that
students may compartmentalize their activity according to context. For example, a
student in a contextualized calculus course may report that they learned about velocity
one week and rate of flow the next week, but never make the abstract connection between
the two contexts which a mathematician might refer to as “derivative.” Students may
need to be explicitly taught that mathematical concepts are intended to be abstract
concepts that can be applied to and observed in various other contexts. Therefore, the
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primary purpose of studying mathematics in context is not necessarily to give
mathematics a more familiar appearance, but to provide opportunities for students to
learn to identify, compare, and abstract mathematical concepts from these contexts.
Analogical problem solving may help students to participate in these activities, but if
mappings and solution processes are not made explicit, students may find themselves
overwhelmed by a large amount of language with few connections in meaning for that
language.
Context
(Frame of Reference
within a context)

Precise

Descriptive

Mathematics
(Function)

Extrema

“Maximums and minimums”
(Justin)

Mathematics
(Derivative)

Critical Points 5

Zeros of the derivative

Shape of a Graph
(Rate)

“Zero Points”
(Daniel)

“Where [the graph] crosses the xaxis” (Justin and Daniel)

Shape of a Graph
(Original)

“Where they meet” (Daniel)

Shape of a Graph
(Quantity)

“Your top and bottom points”
(Julie)

Kinematics

“Where the velocity (of the
water) is zero” (Daniel)

Quabbin Reservoir
(Separate Rates of change)

“When the inflow equals the
outflow” (Jamie)

Quabbin Reservoir
(Volume)

“When the volume of the water
isn’t changing” (Justin)

Quabbin Reservoir
(Net Rate)

“When the net flow is zero”
(Justin)

Figure 28. Mathematical language matrix for “zero points.”

5

In a strict mathematical sense, critical points and extrema do not refer to the same concept. However, for
the purposes of our participants in completing and explaining the Quabbin Reservoir Task, these concepts
coincided well.
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Instructors and students might be encouraged to make their analogical language
explicit by identifying their analogical language use. To further capitalize on the
abundance of mathematical language, students and instructors might even create their
own matrices of mathematical language as they participate in contextualized
mathematical activity. As demonstrated by the choices of the participants in this study,
both instructors and students have the potential to ask questions and make comments that
encourage the negotiation of meaning and language toward making relationships between
different types of language more explicit.
The Values of Mathematical Discourse
If defining types of discourse is to go beyond word choice and content to include
Gee’s (1996) idea of “ways of behaving, interacting, [and] valuing” (p. viii), the choices
of the participants in this study may provide a basis on which we may begin to define
mathematical discourse. Julie leads the way, pressing her peers to make their analogical
reasoning, solution processes, and language explicit with summarizing statements and
clarifying questions. These questions encouraged the other group members to share and
revise their thinking and language through engagement in the negotiation of meaning.
Jamie exemplified the mathematical value of precision. In originally coding the
data for pronoun use, I noticed that statements by Daniel, Julie, or Justin, were replete
with the pronouns such as “this” and “that” and “it.” Jamie’s language was exceptional
in this respect. I noticed that I didn’t need to hypothesize about possible referents for her
pronouns because she rarely used these pronouns at all, and made the referents of the
pronouns she did use explicit through gestures and pointing. Jamie sought precision in
her language, and was conscious of the different labels that were being used for different
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graphs. The transcript below demonstrates Jamie’s refusal to accept Daniel’s misuse of
the term “midpoint,” which encouraged Daniel to add even more labels to the horizontal
axis of his graph so that he could be more precise as he referred to different portions of
the graph. The value of the labels was made apparent to me as I used them to refer to
different portions of the graphs in my process of analysis.
825 (0:56:41.9)

Daniel:

826 (0:56:45.3)

Jamie:

827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834

(0:56:54.1)

Daniel:
Jamie:
Daniel:
Jamie:
Daniel:
Jamie:
Daniel:
Daniel:

835
836 (0:56:57.3)
837 (0:56:59.4)
838 (0:57:00.2)

Jamie:
Daniel:
Jamie:
Daniel:

(0:56:49.9)
(0:56:50.4)
(0:56:51.8)
(0:56:52.5)

And after February, or after the midpoint, of
between January and AprilWhat is the midpoint? I don’t think it’s, like
the middle of February?
it’s not February, butOkay.
I’m just saying likeThe midpoint.
-the midpoint.
Okay, I understand.
I don’t know [inaudible]
Ooh. We could put like “A” and “B,” and “C”
[labeling the horizontal axis with the letters A
through G].
Yeah.
Wooh! I ‘m so excited!
[laughs]
Yes! I got all the way up to “G”!

Daniel’s tendency to search out and even create labels for important mathematical
objects suggests a view of the role of personal agency in the hermeneutic cycle of
mathematical language. Daniel was not afraid to act creatively on language as he coined
phrases and created examples, but at the same time he exhibited awareness of a larger
system of conventional language and ideas. Daniel also exemplified the value of sense
making. Viewing mathematical language and concepts as part of a structured system, he
built on his knowledge of the relationship between displacement and velocity to
conceptualize and reason about the relationship between rate of flow and volume. Daniel
even searched for language to complete his mapping of the two problem solving contexts.
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Combining creativity with sense making, Daniel melded the idea of maximum velocity
with his personal experience to develop a kinesthetic description of a point of inflection.
Daniel also recognized mathematics as a social practice as well as a personal practice,
and was always the first to check whether his peers felt comfortable with his point of
view with questions such as, “Is everyone good with that?”
Justin also developed a habit of checking with his peers, repeatedly asking, “Does
that make sense?” and waiting for a response before moving on. Justin demonstrated an
acute awareness of what his peers were, and had been, saying. He based his decisions for
language not only on his personal experience and understanding of the mathematics, but
also his best approximation of his peers’ understanding of the mathematics. One of the
ironies of Segment 9: The Gospel According to Justin is the fact that it cannot be
classified as strictly “according to Justin.” Analysis has shown how many of Justin’s
decisions about language reflected the language of his peers in previous discourse. From
his use of “negativity” after Daniel, to his care to say that the rates are “becoming equal”
rather than “coming to zero” as suggested by Jamie, to his qualification of the
metaphorical term “velocity” to show his respect for Julie’s preferences, to his final
triumph in organizing two different terms for quantity of water as prompted by his
instructor, Justin’s words provide evidence of one of the most important processes in the
negotiation of meaning: listening. Although Justin may have been able to correctly
explain his solution using his own preferred language, his language awareness
demonstrates an acute awareness of his peers and a level of social speech that goes
beyond simply acknowledging the presence of his listeners to actually speaking the words
that they have spoken.
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New Forms and Functions for Social Speech
My application of Piaget’s (1997/1896) notion of social and egocentric speech
suggests possible characterizations of the roles of social and egocentric speech in
mathematical discourse. To characterize social speech, I searched for evidence of the
speaker attempting to place him or herself at the point of view of the hearer, which
resulted in the identification of some specific uses of pronouns and the dialogic nature of
my participants’ speech. For example, in the “inflection” narrative, Daniel used the
second person pronoun “you,” not to accuse or command, but to invite Julie to reflect
upon her own personal experience. Daniel’s language reflects his purposeful choice based
on his meaning for point of inflection and his meaning for Julie as one who may relate to
the experience of riding down a slide.
142 (0:19:19.1)

Daniel:

143 (0:19:32.9)

Daniel:

144 (0:19:37.3)

Daniel:

Okay, so if you’re, like, here’s kind of an, idea,
okay. So if you’re drawing, a curve. Um, like, you
just. Ah.
Okay, so the inflection point is where the velocity
is the highest,
so, like, if it, if you were like going on a slide and if
you’re falling down on it . . .

I found that language not only may reveal the choices that the participants make,
but also the choices that they do not make. For example, Daniel’s hesitation (142)
demonstrates that, although he considered approaching his explanation from the
perspective of drawing a curve (an explanation that he does later offer), he opted for an
experiential example in which his own understanding of inflection as point of “highest
velocity” can be interpreted quite literally. The three explanatory factors for language in
mathematical discourse are reflected in Daniel’s choice. Daniel’s language reflects his
own mathematical understanding of points of inflection as points of highest velocity. The
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notion of riding down a slide draws on Daniel’s personal experience. The social
implications of Daniel’s concern and respect for Julie as a member of their collaborative
group may have encouraged Daniel to bring in the factor of personal experience as a
frame for his explanation.
Another example of social speech as “placing [oneself] at the point of view of the
hearer” was demonstrated in Justin’s habit of revoicing, which may be viewed as the
practice of adopting and adapting the language of the hearer. Although he demonstrated
the capacity to explain the mathematics of the Quabbin Reservoir Task using various
types of language, Justin chose to demonstrate appropriate use of the language of his
fellow participants. For example, in Segment 9, we see Justin echo a previous
conversation of Jamie and Daniel, stating that, instead of talking about net rate “coming
to zero,” he chooses to say “they’re gradually becoming equal” as was suggested by
Jamie. We also see that Justin is not merely parroting Jamie’s language, but that he
appropriately indicates on the original graph the point where the inflow and outflow
curves intersect.
352 (0:33:20.9)

Justin:

So it’s lower right here.
Now it’s [the rate graph]
gradually coming to zero,

it’s gradually, um, coming to,
it’s gradually, I don’t want to
say coming to zero, I wanna
say, [2 sec]
yeah they’re [inflow and
outflow] gradually becoming
equal, so it’s the water level,
the volume level is staying the
same. Right?

[the rate graph at A]
[the first intersection
of the inflow and
outflow on the original
graph]
[the first x-intercept on
Justin’s net rate graph]

[the first intersection
of the inflow and
outflow on the original
graph]
[holding hand flat with
palm down at eye
level]
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Figure 29. The original graph (left) and Justin’s rate graph (right).
Speiser (2002) demonstrated how even young students are capable of “trying on”
the thinking of others, and inviting others to do the same. These invitations to participate
in discourse are structured in the present data by Daniel’s use of examples and pronouns
and Justin’s revoicings. The result is a type of social speech that goes beyond Piaget’s
categories for young children. Like O’Connor and Michael’s (1996) characterization of
revoicing, this social speech functioned to invite and allow all participants access to
mathematical discourse. A fellow researcher pointed out that, without this form of social
speech as a norm in mathematical discourse, Julie’s important contributions to the
negotiation of meaning may never have entered the social discursive stage.
Egocentric Speech and Implications
As mentioned earlier, a possible weakness in the methodology and analysis of this
study may be the way in which individual cognition may be obscured or ignored when
mathematical activity is viewed through the lens of the social practice of mathematical
discourse. If social speech, as discussed earlier, may be viewed as the participants’ efforts
to adopt and understand one another’s language and points of view for the purpose of
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negotiating mathematical language and meaning, egocentric speech may continue to
represent the other end of the continuum. That is, egocentric speech would be speech in
which the participants do not make an effort to adopt one another’s language or point of
view, and therefore, the participants use their own language for their own purposes. They
vocalize their inner thoughts, not for the purpose of explaining or even communicating
with others, but towards the ends of developing, clarifying, or solidifying their own
mathematical understandings.
Piaget (1997/1896) noted that egocentric speech is not intended to serve social
functions, and as a result is often not observed in the language of adults in social
situations. Therefore, a researcher or mathematics teacher who is interested in accessing
the individual cognition dimension of mathematics learning with as little interference as
possible may choose to ask learners of mathematics to directly explain their mathematical
understandings, or perhaps less directly, to explain why they made the decisions that they
did when solving mathematical problems. If such questions are interpreted by learners as
invitations to participate in egocentric speech, it may be possible to achieve a better
approximation of how those individuals’ mathematical understandings are developing.
After listening carefully to egocentric explanations, the researcher or teacher may
participate more genuinely in social speech for the negotiation of meaning.
As an example, the instructor-participant in this study exhibited sincere questions
as she asked the participants to explain the intended meanings for their language
(Daniel’s “zero points”) and gestures (Justin’s rising and falling palm for “water level”),
as shown in the transcripts below. In response to the instructor’s questions, the
participants reflected on and eventually expressed their reasons for their choice in
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language and gestures, providing further evidence that allowed me as a researcher to
provide more convincing interpretations of the participants’ individual thoughts.
208 (0:23:34.3)

Dr. Walter:

209 (0:23:42.7)

Daniel:

220 (0:24:22.5)

Daniel:

And so, when the, when there is
no change in the water level for a
certain time, the velocity will be
zero . . .

284 (0:27:36.4)

Dr. Walter:

So you’re thinking of measuring
the quantity of water in the
reservoir by the height [1 sec] of
water in the reservoir?
When you’re doing this I’m
imagining you’re talking about
the height?

[raising and
lowering flat
hand]

That’s how I, that’s how I think
about it, cause I don’t know how
else, I guess you could measure it
in, like volume, but,
I don’t know, height, just, to me,
seems more, one, two
dimensional.

[raising and
lowering hand
with palm down]

286 (0:27:48.2)

Justin:

I don’t understand what you
mean, where the inflow and the
outflow meet you’re gonna have
zero points. Zero points of what?
The level of water overall. So the
velocity. I think, let’s see.
[holding both
hands at the
same level]

The egocentric reflection and speech that resulted from such questions not only
helped Daniel and Justin to clarify and better their own mathematical understandings, but
these questions were also seen as initiatory to extended processes of social negotiations
of meaning. As has been demonstrated by the findings of this study, an in-depth analysis
of the negotiation of meaning and language in mathematical discourse can suggest new
and complex ways of viewing the process of learning mathematics. However, as
recognized by Sfard (2001), such findings are to be viewed as interpretations of the
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participants’ intentions, and are not to be viewed as absolute truth or facts. Here I suggest
an additional limitation to such studies, being that, without specific invitations for the
participants to participate in egocentric speech, the continuous influence of the
participants’ concern for how their choices may affect one another, may obscure and
possibly even eliminate the importance of individual mathematical thought. However,
just as students and teachers can use revoicing and other forms of social speech to
emphasize the role of collective understanding mathematical discourse, I would suggest
the participants in discourse also have the capacity to ask questions and make other
decisions that shape discourse in a way that also emphasizes the existence and
importance of individual thought in social practices.
Defining Mathematical Discourse via Agency
Finally, it should be noted that the perspective of learning mathematics as
becoming a participant in discourse also has the potential of obscuring the characteristics
that make mathematical discourse mathematical. In this study, I have demonstrated how
three factors might be viewed as explanatory for choices made in mathematical discourse.
Applying Walter and Gerson’s (2007) definition of personal agency as the “requirement,
responsibility and freedom to choose based on prior experiences and imagination, with
concern not only for one’s own understandings of mathematics, but with mindful
awareness of the impact one’s actions and choices may have on others” (p. 209), I have
discussed how “prior experiences and imagination” are reflected in students’ decisions to
use analogy and analogical language as vehicles for mathematical conceptualization and
reasoning. While relating mathematics to personal experience, the students have carefully
negotiated meaning that not only matches previous experience, but also reflects their own
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efforts to communicate and improve their own mathematical understandings. The
participants in this study have also exhibited “mindful awareness of the impact one’s
actions and choices may have on others,” by developing forms of social speech that may
increase participants’ access to discourse.
At the beginning of Chapter 2, I cited Goodwin’s (2000) suggestion that the ideal
context for the study of human cognition, language, and action is a situation where
participants carry out action through talk. Goodwin stated that these participants should
not, however, be placed in sterile clinical environments for such studies, but be
simultaneously attending to “larger activities that their current actions are embedded
within,” and “relevant phenomena in their surround.” I now suggest an analogical
language mapping of my own. I view “larger activities that their current actions
embedded within,” as analogous to the social sphere in which mathematical discourse
takes place. I also view “relevant phenomena” as analogous to the experiences, linguistic
and otherwise, which the participants bring to mathematical discourse.
The third explanatory factor for human choice in mathematical discourse,
“concern for one’s own understanding of the mathematics,” does not have an analog in
Goodwin’s description. This is not entirely surprising, as Goodwin was not specifying his
work to mathematics education. My resulting suggestion, then, is that the third
explanatory factor may be what makes mathematical discourse mathematical. While the
exercise of personal agency in all forms of discourse may reflect the social and
experiential explanatory factors, not all discourse reflects the participants’ concern for
their understanding of the relevant mathematics. At the moment that the participants’
concern for their understanding of the mathematical concepts involved begins to play a
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role in explaining choices made in discourse, then, I suggest, mathematical discourse may
be said to exist. If we look at the various examples of discourse that may have originally
been characterized as mathematical simply because they occurred in a mathematics
classroom, included the use of mathematical vocabulary, or included mathematical
content, we may find that the participants’ concern for their own understanding of the
mathematics is not always reflected in participants’ discursive choices. In such a case, I
would suggest that these types of discourse should not be considered mathematical.
Richards’ (1991) four types of mathematical discourse may also be united by the
factor of concern for one’s own mathematical understanding, in terms of how the
participants take care to either advance or correctly represent such understandings. In the
discourse of research mathematicians, the advancement of mathematical understanding
may be said to be the unifying goal of mathematical discourse. In the discourse of
mathematical journals, it is not so much the development of understanding, but the
communication of understanding in a clear and concise manner that determines
organization, word choice, and other relevant decisions for discourse. While advancing
mathematical understanding may not be a goal of the inquiry discourse of adults, efforts
are made to correctly represent and apply mathematical understandings in ways that will
solve problems. Ideally, the discourse of the mathematics classroom would be centered
on the goal of advancing learners’ mathematical understandings through instruction, and
correctly representing that mathematical understanding for the purposes of assessment.
I suggest that mathematics educators define and study mathematical discourse as
discourse in which the three explanatory factors of (1) experience and imagination, (2)
social roles and responsibilities, and (3) concern for one’s own understanding of the
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mathematics are reflected in participant choices. I believe that such a definition may
assist both teachers and researchers in identifying why simply “having students talk to
one another” while doing mathematics may not be a sufficient characterization of
mathematics learning. For example, one may observe a mathematics classroom where the
participants may (1) draw upon their experiences and imaginations, and (2) attend to their
social roles and responsibilities as co-operative participants in discourse, but (3) lack in
their efforts to either advance or express their own mathematical understandings.
Classroom mathematical discourse must, by definition, be guided by the learners’
concern for their own mathematical understanding. On the other hand, mathematical
discourse may fall short for the purposes of learning mathematics if the participants (1)
fail to connect their mathematical understanding to the relevant areas of personal
experience or (2) fail to co-operatively attend to their social roles and responsibilities.
This suggested definition of mathematical discourse sets high standards for those
who view mathematical discourse as central to mathematics learning. It implies that
instructors should not only encourage students to draw upon their own experiences and
engage in the social practices of questioning, explaining, and justifying, but should also
seek to encourage these students to act based upon a concern for their own mathematical
understanding. Determining how students may reach this point was not the focus of this
study, although I believe that reviewing the data suggests that particular classroom norms
enacted in the classroom in this study (for example, extended time to allow the
negotiation of meaning to occur and the instructors’ modeling of sincere questions about
the intended meaning of the learners’ language and gestures) and approaches to learning
mathematics (such as the inclusion of contexts that allow participants multiple avenues to
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access discourse) certainly do not inhibit, and may be said to encourage, the exercise of
personal agency in this way. Defining mathematical discourse has already entered a
hermeneutic cycle of defining, applying, and redefining, and will likely continue in such
a cycle as long as researchers are concerned with discourse in mathematics education. At
present, though, I choose to define mathematical discourse as discourse in which the
factors of personal experience, social awareness, and each individual’s concern for their
own understanding of the mathematics can be viewed as explanatory of human choice.
This view of mathematical discourse invites researchers and practitioners to make
choices that may increase the productive exercise of personal agency by learners of
mathematics.
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APPENDIX A: THE QUABBIN RESERVOIR TASK
Quabbin Reservoir Task*

Name____________________________________________
Please use additional paper as needed to provide complete answers.

(b) Explain the changes in the quantity of water in the reservoir in terms of the
relationships between outflow and inflow during each quarter of the year. How are these
changes evident in your graph in part (a)?

(c) How does the quantity of water in the reservoir in Jan 1993 compare with the quantity
of water in the reservoir in Jan 1994? How do you know?

*Adapted from Hughes-Hallett, et al. (1994). Calculus. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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APPENDIX B: PARTICIPATION IN DISCOURSE

Participant

Number of clips for which the participant was the speaker

Daniel
Dr. Walter
Jamie
Julie
Justin

284
33
173
82
276
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APPENDIX C: PRONOUN CODES

Pronouns

Number of Clips

Impersonal
It
That
This
Those
These
Them-inanimate
They-inanimate

183
120
63
3
4
5
12

Personal
He
I-personal
I-personifying
If you
She
They
We/us
You-one
You-plural
You-the hearer
You-personified
Possessive

2
148
3
22
2
7
110
87
17
70
2
80
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APPENDIX D: VOCABULARY CODES

Code
April
February
January
July
acceleration
add
after
again
all
amount
anti-derivative
apex
area
around
backwards
be
become
below
between
both
bottom
certain
change
chart
combine
come
concave
cone
consolidate
correspond
cross
cubic
cup
curve
cylinder
d-graph
dam
day
decrease
derivative
derive

Number of Clips
12
5
9
1
2
7
5
5
3
4
13
4
1
1
6
84
2
1
11
4
2
2
28
2
4
21
13
3
1
1
1
3
1
5
7
13
2
3
12
29
1

Code
difference
different
dimensional
direction
displacement
distance
down
drop
dy
end
enter
equal
equation
f of x
f prime of x
fall
fast
fill
first
five 5
flow
formula
fourth 4
frown
full
function
gallons
gallons per day
go
gradually
graph
great
gross
growth
half
height
high
hit
how much
idea
important

Number of Clips
3
6
2
1
10
6
22
2
1
1
1
13
1
1
1
2
5
1
18
1
8
1
3
1
1
11
13
6
68
3
48
10
2
1
1
5
11
3
5
1
1
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inflow
integral
irrelevant
keep
language
lateral
leave
left
less
level
line
little
low
magic
mark
maximum
measurement
meet
meter
middle
midpoint
minimum
minus
monkey wrench
more
most
negative
negativity
net
no
no change
normal
off
original
out
outflow
over time
overall
part
past
peak
period
pertinent
point
position
positive

28
3
1
5
4
1
6
1
7
15
7
5
5
1
1
5
6
4
2
2
6
1
1
2
7
3
26
3
2
24
3
1
8
1
14
25
4
1
11
1
1
2
1
50
1
16

positivity
problem
process
quantity
quarter
quick
rate
rate of change
rate of flow
reflect
relationship
remain
reservoir
result
right
rise
same
second 2
separate
shape
side
slide
slope
slow
small
speed
sphere
start
stay
still
stop
subtract
surface area
table
tangent
thickness
third 3
time
together
top
total
unit
up
velocity
volume
water

2
3
1
16
14
1
14
22
15
1
1
1
10
1
61
6
21
23
6
3
3
1
9
3
2
1
5
35
3
11
4
5
14
1
4
1
1
11
8
5
7
4
18
37
57
45
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water level
weird
wording
x-axis
year
zero

19
3
1
1
3
29
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APPENDIX E: CONCEPT CODES

Code

Description

Examples

Change in rate
of change over
time

Describes a change in
the rate of change but
does not quantify a
rate.

“the negative slope starts going positive”
“the slope starts becoming negative” “your
speed would be increasing” “it [the water
level] keeps rising faster and faster and
faster” “increasing and increasing even less”

Change in
volume over
time

Describes a change in
volume over a period
of time, but does not
attempt to quantify a
rate.

“volume graph,” “changes in quantity of
water,” “the quantity of water is increasing,”

Extrema

Extrema in either
volume, rate of change,
separate rates of
change, or rate of rate
of change

“highest velocity that you’ll have,” “lowest,”
“most outflow,” “greatest slope is right
here,” “highest point of flow rate,”
“inflection point,” “top and bottom points,”
“maximums and minimums,” “apex,” “peak”

Inflow =
Outflow

Where the inflow is
equal to the outflow

“where the outflow and the inflow meet,”

Net rate of
change = 0

When the rate of
change is zero/slope of
the tangent line is zero

“the velocity hits zero,” “zero point,” “in a
velocity graph it would be where it would
cross the x-axis,” “the rate of change would
be zero,” “where the tangent is zero”

no change in
volume

When the volume is
staying the same

“Leveling off” “no change in the water level
for a certain time,” “the velocity of the water
coming in equals the velocity of the water
going out,”

Original graph

Verbal references or
gestures that indicate
all or parts of the given
graph

“the inflow,” “Hector,” “these two functions
as separate,” “we’re given this graph
[pointing to the original graph] right here,”
“those two graphs, adding them together,”
“where they [inflow and outflow] meet,”
“this [graph] is separate change”

Points and
parts

References to specific
points or periods, the
horizontal axis or the
vertical axis of a graph

Horizontal Axis: “time” “between,”
“quarter,” “from here to here,” “April,”
“parts,” “per day”
Vertical Axis: “gallons,” “that point up
there” and all references to extrema
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Rate of change
graph

Verbal references or
gestures that indicate
all or parts of the rate
of change graph

“our velocity [graph],” “d-graph,” “our rate
graph,” “what the derivative will look like”
“the happy flow chart of our velocity”

Rate of change
in volume

An instantaneous rate
of change.

“how much the water level is changing,” “the
velocity of the flow of the water,” “rate of
flow”

Rate of change
of rate of
change

An attempt to quantify
(as positive or
negative) or label the
rate of change of the
rate of change.

“increasing much much faster positively”
“the derivative of velocity is acceleration,”
“your rate of change of your rate of change”
“concavity,” “concave down,” “concave up”

Rate of rate of
change = 0

Points at which the
concavity changes
(down to up or vice
versa) or extrema of
the rate of change

“inflection point,” “it starts concaving
down,” “the velocity is the highest”

Separate rates
of change

Speaking of rate of
change in terms of
inflow or outflow

“velocity coming in,” “velocity going out,”
“inflow,” “outflow,” “they’re gradually
becoming equal” “the same amount of water
is coming in as it is leaving” “amount of
water that is coming in”

Signs

Quantitative adjectives
that come in opposite
pairs that signify
contrast within the task

“positive,” “negative,” “up,” “down,”
“coming,” “going”

Volume

The amount of volume
in the reservoir, often
at a specified point in
time.

“the amount of water in the reservoir,” “the
quantity of water,” “millions of gallons,”
“volume level,” “the volume of the water,”
“displacement”

Volume graph

References to parts or
all of the volume graph

“a displacement graph,” “quantity of water
going up or down,” “volume graph,” “this
[graph] is kind of like our total inflow or
outflow”
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APPENDIX F: FULL TRANSCRIPT OF “THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO JUSTIN”
330 (0:31:22.4)
331 (0:31:23.5)
332 (0:31:25.5)

Daniel:
Justin:
Julie:

333 (0:31:32.9)

Justin:

334 (0:31:40.7)
335 (0:31:41.4)

Jamie:
Justin:

Julie where you at?
How you doing Julie?
Um, I don’t I don’t know. I, I
still don’t understand where
we’re going.
What we’re gonna do, let’s
see, is, this is the way I see it,
alright? This is the gospel
according to Justin.
[laughs]
Kay, so we’re given this, this
graph right here right?

It gives us an outflow graph

and an inflow graph.

336 (0:31:48.0)
337 (0:31:48.5)

Julie:
Justin:

338 (0:31:54.2)

Justin:

339 (0:32:03.3)

Justin:

Right.
Now, to me, you can’t really
do much when you want to
know how, what the volume
of the water is, with those two
graphs separate.
So, what I’m thinking to do is
to add them [inflow and
outflow] together, so you take
the difference between the
two points, right?
So like, so you take the, you
start, start with the income,
uh, inflow I’m sorry, the
inflow and you subtract the
outflow from that part right,
That’s gonna give you the
amount of water that’s either
“coming in” or “leaving,”
if it’s negative it’s leaving if
it’s positive it’s, it’s coming
in.

[Justin indicates the
original graph on
Julie’s page. It is right
side up for Julie, but
upside down from his
point of view]
[tracing outflow graph
roughly from left to
right with pencil tip]
[tracing inflow graph
from right to left with
pencil tip]

[tracing the vertical
axis on the original
graph between the
inflow and the
horizontal axis]

[airquotes]
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340 (0:32:23.7)
341 (0:32:24.3)
342 (0:32:25.4)

343 (0:32:41.6)

Justin:
Julie:
Justin:

Justin:

344 (0:32:49.8)

Julie:

345 (0:32:54.7)

Justin:

346 (0:33:05.7)
347 (0:33:06.4)

Julie:
Justin:

348 (0:33:08.8)

Julie:

Does that make sense?
Okay, yeah.
So, if you did that
[subtraction of outflow from
inflow] just over, you know,
just did that for every single
part, this would be that part
that’s leaving,
this is the, uh, water coming
in, this is the, when the, um,
water,
“volume” level is rising.
This is when it’s [the volume
level] going down again.
So basically, this
is kind of what I did last time
in class, it is, I kind of tried to
sketch those two graphs
adding them [inflow and
outflow] together, so, go
ahead.
So, like this minus this
[inflow minus outflow value
between A and B], wouldn’t
that make it [the result of the
subtraction, the value of the
rate graph] zero?
It [the subtraction of inflow
and outflow values indicated
by Julie in 344] would make
it, well, it would make it
negative, it would go below
here, right? Cause if you take
this distance right here, and
you subtract this distance
from that.
Oh, kay.
It’s gonna put it [the result of
the subtraction in 344 as a
value on the rate graph].
down here someplace. Does
that make sense?
Yeah.

[shading the area
between inflow and
outflow from A to B]

[the area between
inflow and outflow
from B to E]
[airquotes]
[the area between
inflow and outflow
from E to G]
[Justin’s rate graph in
his notebook]
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349 (0:33:09.9)

Justin:

350 (0:33:17.3)
351 (0:33:18.3)

Julie:
Justin:

352 (0:33:20.9)

Justin:

353 (0:33:37.7)

Justin:

And so it’s [the result of the
subtraction in 344] gonna
give you a negative flow rate.
Or in other words, the water,
the, the “volume” of the water
is lowering, right?
Okay.
So, this is, this is what I came
up with.
So it’s
lower right here. Now it’s [the
rate graph] gradually coming
to zero,
it’s gradually, um, coming to,
it’s gradually, I don’t want to
say coming to zero, I wanna
say, [2 sec]
yeah they’re [inflow and
outflow] gradually becoming
equal, so it’s the water level,
the volume level is staying the
same. Right?
So at that point,
this point right here, and at
this point right here,

the same amount of water is
coming in as it is leaving,
right?
is leaving, right?

354 (0:33:45.9)
355 (0:33:46.5)

Julie:
Justin:

356 (0:33:55.8)

Julie:

357 (0:33:57.9)

Justin:

Right.
And so the water, volume of
the water is gonna stay the
same.

And so, it’s um, the rate of
change will be zero, does that
make sense?
Cause if you subtracted this
from thisfrom this-

[airquotes]

[Justin’s net rate graph
in his notebook]
[the rate graph at A]
[the first intersection of
the inflow and outflow
on the original graph]
[the first x-intercept on
Justin’s net rate graph]

[the first intersection of
the inflow and outflow
on the original graph]
[holding hand flat with
palm down at eye level]
[first x-intercept on rate
graph]
[the two points where
the inflow and outflow
intersect on the original
graph]
[moving both hands
across the table at the
same rate]
[moving both hands
across the table at the
same rate]
[holding arms out wide
with palms in as if
running them along the
surface of a giant
sphere]

[pointing to the original
graph at B]
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358 (0:33:58.1)

Julie:

-it would be zero.

359 (0:33:58.3)

Justin:

360 (0:33:59.8)

Justin:

361 (0:34:07.8)

Julie:

-it [the result of the
subtraction, the value of the
rate graph] would be zero,
yeah.
And so, and then I just, I just
kind of guess-timated the
same thing. What’s the
distance between these, these
two lines right here, like that.
Uh-huh. So you’re just taking
this
and subtracting this one,

which would put it like thereish.

362 (0:34:12.2)
363 (0:34:13.8)
364 (0:34:14.4)

365 (0:34:21.7)
366 (0:34:22.7)

Justin:
Julie:
Justin:

Julie:
Justin:

Yeah, uh-huh.
Okay.
And then, um, doing the same
thing from here,
but, sticking with the same
one, taking the inflow
and subtracting the outflow,
even though the outflow is
higher.
Okay.
And so, that's kind of, how
I'm looking at it, and so that
kind of helps to combine the
two graphs, like that, cause
now you can see what the rate
of flow, what the change of,
in the flow rate, is, over time,
and that kind of helps ya
understand what's going on
with the displacement graph.

[touching horizontal
axis of original graph at
B]
[touching horizontal
axis of original graph at
B]
[pointing to
corresponding points on
the inflow and outflow
graphs between April
and July]
[a point on the inflow
graph between April
and July]
[corresponding point on
the outflow graph
between April and July]
[a point in space on the
original graph that is
about the same distance
above the x-axis as the
difference between
inflow and outflow for
that same x value]

[after the second
intersection of inflow
and outflow]
[inflow curve]
[outflow curve]

[Justin traces his rate
graph from right to left
and then left to right
three times as he
speaks, finishing on the
word “understand”]
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367 (0:34:40.1)
368 (0:34:40.8)

Julie:
Justin:

369 (0:34:42.7)

Jamie:

370 (0:34:44.8)

Justin:

371 (0:34:46.7)

Jamie:

372 (0:34:47.4)
373 (0:34:49.0)
374 (0:34:50.3)

Justin:
Jamie:
Justin:

375 (0:34:58.2)
376 (0:35:01.1)
377 (0:35:01.4)

Daniel:
Justin:
Daniel:

378 (0:35:02.8)

Justin:

379 (0:35:05.6)

Daniel:

380 (0:35:09.8)

Justin:

381
382
383
384

Daniel:
Justin:
Daniel:
Justin:

(0:35:12.5)
(0:35:13.6)
(0:35:15.4)
(0:35:17.7)

385 (0:35:21.3)

Daniel:

386 (0:35:23.6)

Justin:

387 (0:35:30.2)

Justin:

“Volume” graph.
Does that make sense?
Yeah.
Does that all make sense to
you guys? Am I lying?
So that’s, that’s your rate
graph.
That’s that’s what I,
“imagine- “
Okay.
-picture it as.
Yeah, it makes sense now.
And so, with this, is this kind
of what your, your volume
graph looks like?
Kind of, something kind of
like that?
Um, yeah.
Okay.
You mean like this is the top
of the dam?
I don’t, that’s just uh,
arbitrary [inaudible].
Oh. Okay. Like it’s like thatish.
It just all depends on where
you start your water level at,
yeah.
Start at some m.
Yeah. So the same thing.
Which stands for water level.
And so here

you know that your rate of
change is negative, right?
Yeah, so you’re going “doop,
doop, doop, doop”
And so you know your slope
of your “volume graph,”
the slope is going to be
negative, right? Cause this
part is negative.
And then you’re going to get

[airquotes]

[airquotes]
[mimicking Justin’s
airquotes]

[showing Daniel]

[Justin‘s volume graph]

[the horizontal axis on
Justin’s volume graph]
[traces the horizontal
axis but then erases it]
[Daniel shows Justin
his volume graph]

[Justin’s net rate graph
before the first xintercept]

[falling intonation]
[airquotes] [Justin’s
volume graph before
the first minimum]
[Justin’s net rate graph
before the first xintercept]
[first x-intercept on
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to this point of your, that it’s
[the rate graph] zero,
and so it’s [the volume graph]
going to level off right there,
right?

388 (0:35:42.6)

Julie:

389 (0:35:45.4)

Justin:

390 (0:35:54.9)

Justin:

391 (0:36:07.3)
392 (0:36:08.3)

Julie:
Justin:

393 (0:36:13.2)

Justin:

394 (0:36:21.9)

Justin:

There’s going to be some
point there where the tangent
is zero.
Right? Does that make sense?
Yeah.
There’s gonna be some point,
‘cause, we’re working
backwards. Instead of finding
the derivative,
we’re going from the
derivative
backwards.

Justin’s net rate graph]
[drawing a horizontal
line at the first
minimum on Justin’s
volume graph]
[retracing the short
horizontal line]

[really quiet, even for
Julie]
[pointing to volume
graph and sliding pencil
up to the net rate graph]
[net rate graph]

[sliding pencil to
volume graph]
Trying to, trying to figure out [pointing first at the net
how to go backwards, right?
rate graph and then
sliding the point of the
pencil to point at the
volume graph again]
And so if we have that point,
[first x-intercept on the
zero on the derivative,
net rate graph]
that means that on the original [first minimum on the
graph,
volume graph]
that point is level, the tangent
line is zero. There is no slope.
Make sense?
Yeah.
So now, what’s going to
[volume graph after the
happen is the slope of this line first minimum]
is gonna start being positive.
Alright so it’s [the volume
[tracing the shape of the
graph] going to be concave
volume graph directly
up, like that,
after the first minimum]
until it [the rate graph] gets to [first maximum on the
its highest point of,
net rate graph]
um, flow rate.
And then it’s [the rate] gonna [net rate graph as it
gradually still go, it’s gonna
decreases back to zero
gradually get, less positive.
after the first
maximum]
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It’s [the rate] still positive
see?

The water level is still rising,

395 (0:36:31.5)
396 (0:36:32.5)
397 (0:36:34.1)

Jamie:
Daniel:
Justin:

398 (0:36:39.0)
399 (0:36:39.4)

Daniel:
Justin:

400 (0:36:49.6)
401 (0:36:50.6)

Julie:
Justin:

402 (0:36:58.6)
403 (0:36:59.0)

Julie:
Justin:

but it’s [the water level] rising
at a smaller rate. Does make
sense?
Yes.
It’s like our inflection point?
So. [1 sec] Let me finish
explaining and then we’ll go
back.
Kay.
So it’s [the volume graph]
going concave up right here
because it [the rate graph]
keeps on getting higher and
higher and higher
and so it [the volume graph]
keeps on raising faster and
faster and faster
until it [the volume graph]
gets to that inflection point,
this point right here.
Okay.
And then all of the sudden,
it’s [the volume graph] still
rising,
but it’s going, its rising
gradually slower and so it [the
volume graph] starts
concaving down, right?
Okay.
And so, the water level is still
rising,
it’s just rising slower until it

[lining up the length of
the pencil with the
horizontal axis and
sliding it away from the
axis in the positive
vertical direction]
[pointing quickly to the
volume graph after the
first point of inflection
and then quickly to the
net rate graph after the
first maximum]

[Julie looks at Daniel
but then away]

[after the first minimum
on the volume graph]
[after first x-intercept
on net rate graph]
[approaching the first
point of inflection on
the volume graph]
[first inflection point on
volume graph, first
maximum on rate
graph]
[right after the first
maximum on the rate
graph]
[right after the first
inflection point on the
volume graph]

[pointing pencil
“upward” and pulling it
quickly “upward”]
[tracing concave down
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gets to that point right here,
right here

404 (0:37:06.9)

Julie:

where it’s [the rate] zero.
Kay so here
and here

405 (0:37:10.6)

Justin:

correspond withWith this point
and that point

406

Julie:

-here

and here.

407 (0:37:12.2)

Justin:

408 (0:37:20.0)
409 (0:37:22.9)

Julie:
Justin:

410 (0:37:32.6)

Justin:

411 (0:37:38.2)

Justin:

And this, um, point of
inflection,
what we’re calling the point
of inflection is this point right
here.
Does that make sense?
[2 sec] Yes.
Okay. So, then what happens?
We come, start coming, we’re
going negative,
right? Increasing the
negativity of that.
So it [water level/the volume
graph] keeps going down,
faster and faster
and faster because the
velocity is getting lower and
lower and lower right?
So it keeps going down

until it gets to some point
right here

area before maximum
on volume graph]
[second x-intercept on
rate graph]
[first minimum on
volume graph]
[first maximum on
volume graph]
[first x-intercept on rate
graph]
[second x-intercept on
rate graph].
[pointing with Justin to
the first x-intercept on
rate graph]
[pointing with Justin to
the second x-intercept
on rate graph]
[first inflection point on
the volume graph]
[first maximum on rate
graph]

[tracing pencil point
along rate curve after
the second x-intercept]
[Justin’s rate graph
from second intercept
to the minimum, E-F]
[tracing volume graph
after the first maximum
towards second
minimum]
[tracing rate graph from
second x-intercept to
the minimum]
[tracing volume graph
from first maximum
toward second
minimum]
[minimum on rate
graph]
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where it’s still gonna be
negative,

412 (0:37:47.7)
413 (0:37:48.0)

Julie:
Justin:

414 (0:37:50.4)
415 (0:37:50.4)

Julie:
Justin:

416 (0:37:52.3)
417 (0:37:53.7)

Julie:
Justin:

418 (0:38:01.7)
419 (0:38:02.3)

Julie:
Justin:

420 (0:38:04.5)

Julie:

421 (0:38:05.4)

Justin:

422 (0:38:12.5)

Justin:

423 (0:38:17.0)
424 (0:38:17.4)

Julie:
Justin:

[tracing back and forth
on rate graph after the
minimum]
but it’s gonna start coming, be [lowering hand in the
less negative,
air]
if that makes sense.
Yeah.
It’s kind, it’s [411] a really
bad way to say it [the negative
rate is increasing on F to G],
but that’s the only thing I can
think of.
Okay.
And that’s [point F on the
[pointing to the volume
graph, although the
volume graph] where your
exact point is not clear]
point of inflection is.
Okay.
Right? Because it’s still, it’s
[rate graph and volume
graph approaching the
going negative really fast,
inflection point]
really fast, really fast, really
fast
until gets to this point where
it [the rate] starts, where it
stops
[inaudible, “Increasing?”]
increasing, um[moving hand toward
Julie]
[inaudible, “negative, so it’s
decreasing?”]
-it stops decreasing
[pointing to the rate
graph]
and it starts, the velocity starts [pulling hand toward
being,
self along the table top]
yeah, and so it [volume graph] [volume graph after the
kind of starts leveling out.
inflection point]
Does that make sense?
So if this line were to keep
[rate graph after the
going up here to zero,
minimum]
it’d [volume graph] keep
[continuing the concave
going around like this untilup curve on the volume
graph after the
inflection point]
Oh, okay.
-you get that point.
[pointing the minimum
that he has just drawn
on the volume graph]

183
425 (0:38:18.5)

Justin:

Does that make sense?

426 (0:38:19.6)
427 (0:38:20.3)

Julie:
Justin:

428 (0:38:22.2)
429 (0:38:25.2)

Julie:
Justin:

Yeah.
So that’s kind of how I’ve
been looking at it [the
Quabbin Reservoir Task].
Kay.
Now the thing you don’t
know, which is like kind of
what Daniel said,
cause I had that line right
here.
You don’t know where to
start this graph at.

430 (0:38:31.8)

Justin:

431 (0:38:38.2)

Justin:

432
433 (0:38:42.3)
434 (0:38:43.5)
435 (0:38:46.1)

Jamie:
Justin:
Julie:
Justin:

436 (0:38:51.3)
437 (0:38:52.9)

Julie:
Justin:

I mean, this graph, you know,
this could be one thousand,
um, cubic gallons, or
whatever I don’t know you
say that.
Or it [the initial value of the
volume graph] could be, you
know, you don’t know how,
where to start this graph at.

Okay.
Does that make sense?
Mmhmm.
But you can kind of get the
general idea, that, from
working backwards.

Of what it’s [the volume
graph] gonna look like.
Okay.
But does that actually, before
we get to that, does that make
sense?
how I went from, how I
combined the two graphs
and then how I went, how I
looked at this graph
and then tried to make a,

[erasing the curve that
he just extended]

[pointing toward Daniel
with his pencil]
[the horizontal line that
Justin previously erased
from his volume graph]
[touching points on the
vertical axis of the
volume graph]
[the y-intercept of the
volume graph]

[holding pencil parallel
to the horizontal axis of
the volume graph and
sliding it back and forth
in the “vertical”
direction]

[pointing to the rate
graph and sliding the
point of the pencil
down the page to point
at the volume graph]

[pointing to the rate
graph]
[rate graph]
[volume graph]
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438 (0:39:08.1)
439 (0:39:13.4)

Julie:
Justin:

440 (0:39:16.8)

Justin:

441 (0:39:21.1)

Justin:

442 (0:39:28.9)
443 (0:39:31.5)
444 (0:39:32.7)

Julie:
Justin:
Justin:

445 (0:39:36.3)
446 (0:39:37.4)
447 (0:39:38.4)

Julie:
Justin:
Julie:

448 (0:39:45.7)

Justin:

449 (0:39:49.6)

Julie:

450 (0:39:56.2)
451 (0:39:56.9)

Justin:
Daniel:

452 (0:40:01.2)

Justin:

um volume. Take away my
“water level,”
that’s right this [the label on
the vertical axis of the volume
graph] should be “volume.”
[5 sec] Is it volume?
Yeah, ‘cause we’re working,
it’ll [the volume graph] be the
volume of the water.
‘Cause this, the rate
is in gallons, gallons per day.
[3 sec] And so you just want
to keep the same kind of units
so it’d be gallons, cubic
gallons, I guess is what it
would be.
Oh. Oh, okay, yeah.
So volume.
So does that make sense?

Yeah.
Do you have any questions?
No, I think that’s, just like,
the top and the bottom points
are your zero points?
On, top and your bottom
points for what graph?
Like these points on your
volume graph
are your zero points on your
velocity?
Yes.
volume of a sphere
[inaudible]
And then your maximums and
your minimums on your
veloc-, your, we’ll call
“velocity”
graph are going to be your
points of inflection on your
displacement graph.

[erasing a mark on the
volume graph]

[pointing to the volume
graph]
[the rate graph]
[pointing to the volume
graph]

[circling the page with
the rate and volume
graphs with the pencil
tip]

[pointing to points on
her page]

[minimum and
maximum on her
volume graph]
[touching her rate
graph]
[nodding]

[Julie’s rate graph]

[airquotes]
[pointing to Julie’s
volume graph]

